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Abstract 
The important role that research-based spin-offs (RBSOs) plays in promoting economic growth and 
pushing technological development has been widely acknowledged. The main constraint this type of new 
venture faces is the difficulty to raise capital in the early stages of development. This thesis seeks to 
further investigate this challenge, and aims at exploring the impact of funding sources on the subsequent 
performance of RBSOs. Further, the paper examines how the entrepreneurs’ perceptions and 
preferences influence the choice of funding sources. Moreover, the paper intends to map how the value-
adding activities of each funding source can compensate for deficiencies in the entrepreneur’s initial 
capabilities, and consequently investigate how this can impact the subsequent performance of RBSOs. 
To achieve these objectives, an extensive literature study was performed, and further development of 
existing theory to suit the needs of the paper was accomplished. This resulted in the development of a 
typology of RBSOs, the specification of a comprehensible stage-model for RBSOs and a meticulous 
theoretical analysis of each funding sources. Together, these provided the necessary framework to 
compensate for the complexity surrounding RBSOs. Further, a secondary data collection was performed 
from a sample of FORNY-supported firms that were situated in the prominent Norwegian energy sector 
and started within the time frame 1995-2005. A representative selection of 15 firms was subsequently 
investigated through in-depth case interviews, granting the authors an extensive and comprehensive 
data foundation. Most importantly, this sample included both successful and unsuccessful firms, existing 
and discontinued firms, hence giving consistent output on subsequent performance of the case firms. 
In light of the theoretical framework, an analysis of the empirical results was performed through the 
formulation of a conceptual scenario model of “best practice” for each type of RBSO. The analytical 
model indicated several more or less distinct patterns relating use of funding source at different stages 
to subsequent performance. Notably, some critical social resources needed to overcome critical 
junctures were identified for the different types of RBSOs. One important finding was that among the 
RBSOs that struggled to surpass the entrepreneurial commitment juncture, those that acquired external 
competence were shown to perform substantially better. Further, the previous experience and acquired 
competence of the entrepreneurial team was shown to greatly influence the choice of funding sources, 
and more experience led to higher acceptance towards private equity investors. Moreover, empirical 
evidence revealed a surprisingly high number of RBSOs that had an exquisite desire for independence 
and correspondingly low growth ambitions, a finding that led to an interesting debate around willingness 
to grow vis-à-vis actual performance of the RBSOs. 
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Sammendrag 
Forskningsbaserte oppstartsbedrifter (RBSO) spiller en stor rolle i arbeidet med å skape økonomisk vekst 
og promotere teknologisk utvikling. Som en liten bedrift i en dynamisk kontekst er utfordringene mange 
og store. For mange er den største å skaffe tilgang til finansielle midler, spesielt i de tidligste 
utviklingsfasene. Denne masteroppgaven ønsker å drøfte nettopp denne utfordringen og vil utforske 
sammenhengen mellom bruk av ulike finansielle kilder og påfølgende ytelse til RBSOene. Samtidig vil 
forfatterne gjennom oppgaven se nærmere på holdninger gründere har og hvordan disse påvirker selve 
valget av finansieringsform. Videre forsøker oppgaven å finne sammenhenger mellom de ressursene som 
finnes i selskapet på oppstartstidspunktet og de som blir gjort tilgjengelige av finansielle tilbydere 
gjennom såkalte «verdiskapende aktiviteter», og se dette i sammenheng med den påfølgende ytelsen.  
For å nå målene satt for oppgaven ble relevant litteratur nøye studert. Basert på dette ble det utviklet 
flere modeller tilpasset oppgavens målsetninger. Dette inkluderte både en typologi av RBSOer, en 
fasemodell over bedriftsutviklingen og en grundig analyse av tilgjengelige finansielle kilder. Til sammen 
utgjorde modellene et rammeverk tilpasset de dynamiske omgivelsene til RBSOer. Videre ble en empirisk 
case studie gjennomført basert på et utvalg av bedrifter som hadde fått støtte gjennom FORNY-
programmet og som jobbet mot energibransjen. Et representativt utvalg på 15 bedrifter ble deretter 
analysert gjennom intervjuer og sekundærdata, hvilket ga forfatterne et bredt datagrunnlag. Dette 
utvalget inkluderte selskaper med ulik grad av suksess, og selskaper som både eksisterte eller som var 
oppløst. 
Den empiriske analysen ble gjennomført med grunnlag i det teoretiske rammeverket og konseptuelle 
scenarier ble formulert for å finne en mulig «beste-praksis» for hver type RBSO. Denne analytiske 
modellen antydet flere mer eller mindre tydelige mønstre som relaterte valg av finansieringskilde i de 
ulike utviklingsfasene med bedriftens resultat. Spesielt tydelig viste det seg at enkelte ressurser var 
sentrale for å overkomme de kritiske holdepunktene og disse ble identifisert for hver type RBSO. Et viktig 
resultat var blant annet at de selskapene som kom seg forbi «gründer engasjement» holdepunktet ved å 
ansette ekstern kompetanse ble vist til å yte bedre. Videre viste det seg at gründerens erfaring påvirket 
valget av finansieringskilde i stor grad, der de med høyere erfaring valgte en bredere blanding av 
finansieringskilder og var generelt mer aksepterende til eksterne finansieringskilder. De empiriske 
resultatene viste også at en overraskende stor andel av selskapene hadde et bestemt ønske om å være 
uavhengige, noe som førte til en interessant debatt rundt vekstambisjon i forhold til påfølgende ytelse av 
disse RBSOene. 
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 Introduction 1
The creation of new firms to commercialize academic research has been acknowledged among scholars 
as an important mechanism to foster economic growth and answer future global challenges (Wright et 
al., 2007). However, in order to achieve this, a Research-Based Spin-Off (RBSO) has to overcome many 
obstacles. One of the main constraints this type of new venture faces is the difficulty to raise capital in 
the early stages of development (Knockaert et al., 2009). The demanding process of transforming 
research into commercial products and services does indeed require a significant amount of initial 
funding, thus often resulting in negative cash flows over several years. Moreover, this constraint is 
largely related to the information asymmetry and high uncertainty that surround RBSOs in particular, 
originating both in technological and organizational aspects (Wright et al., 2007). 
The majority of studies focusing on financing of new technology-based ventures have a supply-side 
focus, thus taking the investor’s perspective (Rasmussen and Sørheim, 2012b). However, the choices 
made concerning funding of RBSOs are primarily done by the entrepreneurs, and highly influenced by 
their perceptions and preferences (Riding et al., 2012). Hence, adopting a demand-side perspective when 
assessing financial sources is often more purposeful, as financing preferences vary according to for 
example the entrepreneurs’ growth goals and desired ownership. Further, RBSOs are not a 
homogeneous group, and largely differ both in the nature of the products and services developed as well 
as the entrepreneurs’ initial social capital and network (Mustar et al., 2008). 
To answer the “ financing gap” and stimulate commercialization of research, Norwegian policy makers 
have spent considerable funds through different initiatives and support infrastructures (Rasmussen and 
Rice, 2012). Notably, the FORNY program was specifically set in place to fund the establishment of 
support infrastructure and fuel the creation of RBSOs. However, there is limited empirical evidence 
examining the subsequent performance of FORNY-supported firms (Rasmussen et al., 2012). A recent 
evaluation performed by Borlaug et al. (2009) documented disappointing growth rates for Norwegian 
RBSOs, but did not account for the different faiths of discontinued firms nor related performance to the 
actual time of development of each firm. Rasmussen et al. (2012) declared that researchers are 
requesting more systematic and consistent empirical work in the field. In fact, most of the existing 
literature on RBSOs is based on studies of a small number of prestigious and successful research 
institutes (Rasmussen et al., 2012).  
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This thesis aims at contributing with precise and in-depth knowledge of RBSOs in Norway. In particular, 
the authors wish to address the financial constraints that are especially hard to overcome for this type of 
firm. The thesis seeks to explore the impacts of funding sources on the subsequent performance of 
RBSOs in Norway. To achieve this, an in-depth case study was performed on a relatively large sample of 
firms, including discontinued firms with similar long periods of time spent on development. The sample 
of case firms was narrowed down to the most prominent industry in Norway, namely the energy sector, 
due to the scope of the thesis and to achieve the desired meticulousness. The authors found it 
purposeful to adopt a demand-side perspective, and as such especially intend to examine how the 
entrepreneurs’ perceptions and preferences influence choices made concerning financing. Further, the 
thesis aims at exploring the link between the entrepreneurs’ initial social capital and network, and the 
value-adding resources of the each source of funding. Above all, the authors wish to incorporate 
throughout the thesis the particularly dynamic and complex aspects of the development of RBSOs, in 
order to investigate how initial conditions and the acquiring of a mix of funding sources over time 
ultimately affect the performance of the venture. To achieve this, the authors formulated a set of 
research questions. 
Q1:  How does choice of funding sources impact the subsequent performance of RBSOs? 
Q2:  How do the entrepreneurs’ perceptions and preferences influence the choice of funding sources? 
Q3:  How does the link between the entrepreneurs’ initial capabilities and the value-adding resources 
of each funding source impact the subsequent performance of RBSOs? 
The thesis unfolds along the following lines. First, a brief overview of the context surrounding Norwegian 
energy-related RBSOs will be given. Second, the research methodology used will be presented, and 
limitations to keep in mind for the rest of the thesis will be recognized. Thirdly, a theoretical framework 
will be developed through an extensive literature study and further development of existing theory to 
compensate for the rather fragmented literature. Further, empirical findings will be presented in a 
narrative way. The previous parts will then form the basis for an analysis of the empirical results in light 
of the theoretical framework that will attempt to answer the research questions through the 
development of a conceptual model of “best practice” for RBSOs. Finally, conclusions are drawn, 
implications for both RBSOs and policymakers are emphasized, and areas for further research are 
discussed.  
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 Context 2
The purpose of this thesis is to thoroughly examine the situation for energy-related RBSOs in Norway in 
particular. It is therefore highly relevant to define what characterizes Norway as a context. In order to do 
so, the authors wish to describe the Norwegian context departing from a holistic perspective and moving 
down to particularities specific to the Norwegian RBSO environment. Hopefully, this brief review will 
help the reader better understand the analysis of the empirical evidence that will be performed later on. 
Hence, firstly an overview of the main characteristics of the Norwegian business and industry context will 
be given. Further, the efforts around innovation and more specifically the funding environment for new 
ventures will be examined. Thereafter, a short review of the different actors involved in the 
commercialization of publicly supported research in Norway will be given, followed by a brief overview 
of the research environment. 
 Business and industry context 2.1
Norway escaped relatively unscathed from the recession induced by the 2008-2009 financial crises, and 
the economy currently continues to grow despite the current economic turbulence in the euro area 
(OECD, 2012). The wealth created by the energy sector through the development of Norway’s abundant 
natural resources has led to sustained growth for the Norwegian economy (Finansdepartmement, 2013). 
As such, the Norwegian context stands out in the global setting. The following part will attempt to map 
the main characteristics that distinguish the Norwegian economy.  
The discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea led to substantial changes in the Norwegian economy, 
which went from being almost exclusively built on agriculture, fishing and industry in 1970 to nearly a 
third being built on offshore industrial activity in 2006. The petroleum sector stands out as very capital 
intensive, employing a relatively low share of the labor force but generating around 30% of total value 
added in 2006. Oil and gas exports accounted for more than 50% of the export value from Norway in 
2005 (OECD, 2008). The dominant position of the petroleum sector is not unique, but the high level of 
technology and large supplier industry together with a high level of interdependence with other sectors 
is distinctive. Moreover, Norway is a significant producer of renewable energy, with over 99 % of the 
electricity production covered by hydropower. In addition, wind power, wave power and bio-energy 
from wood constitute abundant resources. Despite the limited solar energy resources, the Norwegian 
solar industry is also globally present, as it is for example one of the largest manufacturers of solar grade 
silicon and solar cells (OECD, 2012). An important feature for Norway is the many initiatives set in place 
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by the government to promote the development of renewable energy, notably incentives for oil and gas 
industry to invest in renewable R&D projects (Energidepartementet, 2012). 
As the domestic market is fairly limited, Norwegian Industries is characterized by a high degree of 
international focus (OECD, 2012). This leads to large parts of the Norwegian business being based on 
export. Unfortunately, the Norwegian industry faces major challenges in the upcoming years. High labor 
cost levels and strong “real exchange rate” characterizes the Norwegian business context, this despite 
the creation of the Government Pension Fund in 1990 with the implicit goal of investing oil and gas 
revenues abroad to prevent this. 
Lastly, Norwegian business comprises mostly small companies (less than 100 employees), with 99.5% of 
firms counting for approximately 50% of the overall value creation and counting for 60% of private sector 
employment (Handelsdepartement, 2012). Beside these, there are only a few large companies of 
international size, mostly linked to the energy and offshore supply industries, aquaculture, 
telecommunications, shipping and financial sectors, with high share of state ownership.  
To summarize, the general Norwegian economic context is favorable and the prospects for the future are 
good. Nevertheless, to sustain long-term growth and prepare itself for the already started decline in oil 
reserves (“life after oil”), Norway depends on continued innovation both in existing and towards new 
industry sectors, an area where Norway’s performance is mixed compared to other OECD countries 
(OECD, 2010). 
 Innovation policy and funding of new ventures in Norway 2.2
The innovation inputs in Norway have been considered weak when benchmarking several standard 
innovation indicators with other OECD countries, and the outputs have been considered even weaker, 
especially when compared to other Nordic countries. For instance, the R&D spending as a percentage of 
GDP is markedly lower than the other Nordic countries and below the OECD average (OECD, 2008). The 
somewhat broader European Innovation Scoreboard also showed that Norway performed rather poorly. 
However, some argue that much of the R&D in Norway is performed through knowledge-intensive 
offshore-related engineering activities that are not accounted for in the innovation indicators (OECD, 
2008). 
The Norwegian equity market is considered relatively underdeveloped, only equivalent to about 15 % of 
the GDP compared to the European average of around 25 %. A very high proportion of this equity is held 
by the corporate sector, while private equity investors only account for 5 % (OECD, 2008). The low level 
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of private equity is partly due to the high level of state ownership in the Norwegian industry and is to 
some extent compensated by the various government policies initiated. However, some argue that the 
Norwegian government undertakes insufficient initiatives to provide sufficient capital for new ventures 
in the early stages. Claims have been made that the lack of available soft capital to gear and help relief 
some of the risk for private equity investors is the main reason for the low level of private equity 
investments (NVCA, 2010). Some further claim that the clue to overcoming the weak innovation inputs in 
Norway lies in strengthening the private equity market by increasing the competent capital base 
available to Norwegian entrepreneurs (NVCA, 2010). 
Due to a low level of industry R&D expenditure and a low share of high technology firms, the Norwegian 
government considers fostering academic entrepreneurship to be particularly important (Rasmussen and 
Gulbrandsen, 2012). This has resulted in a large number of governmental schemes aimed at 
accomplishing this goal, administered by the RCN, Innovation Norway (IN) and SIVA. Similarly to private 
equity investors, these entities evaluate start-ups and help finance those they judge have a chance to 
succeed. However, the policy instruments set in place have been criticized for being dysfunctional, with 
insufficient coupling with industry, and too much complexity and bureaucracy. (Rasmussen et al., 2007) 
The FORNY program (administered by the RCN) is considered the main support mechanism for the 
commercialization of publicly funded research in Norway, and aims at both establishing an efficient 
infrastructure to promote it, and directly fund the creation of RBSOs to increase both the number and 
the quality. For further reading about the theoretical rationale, the declared objectives, the different 
schemes and a brief evaluation of the performance of the FORNY program, see Appendix 1. 
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 Commercialization actors and research environment 2.3
There have been significant reforms in the research environment in Norway in the past 10 years, with 
new legislation bringing intellectual property into line with international practice and considerable 
efforts made to strengthen the public research institutions’ (PRIs) commercialization capabilities (OECD, 
2008). In fact, having limited R&D spending in the Norwegian business in general has resulted in 
relatively many RBSOs. Other countries such as Finland and Sweden for instance, that have higher R&D 
spending, have directed their focus more towards collaboration between university and industry in order 
to commercialize research. To support the commercialization of research, three Norwegian government 
agencies have the following key roles: 
• Research Council of Norway combines the role of traditional research council with that of an 
innovation agency, providing funds to all from basic research at PRIs to R&D in more established 
companies. 
• Innovation Norway handles the role of business and regional development on behalf of several 
ministries, providing funds through a large specter of loan, grant and advice initiatives. 
• SIVA controls much of the innovation infrastructure, operating science parks and providing 
incubation to new ventures. 
Moreover, these agencies use intermediary organizations such as technology transfer organizations 
(TTOs) that focus specifically on creating spin-off ventures and licensing from research. In Norway, these 
organizations are often shared infrastructure between universities, colleges and research institutes 
(Rasmussen and Rice, 2012). Rasmussen et al. (2007) found that TTOs operate rather differently in the 
various regions in Norway, and criticize the unclear role distribution between the government agencies, 
TTOs and science parks, referring to often parallel activities between the different stakeholders. 
The majority of the R&D done in Norwegian universities is done in the four largest universities: UiO 
(Oslo), NTNU (Trondheim), UiB (Bergen) and UiT (Tromsø) (Rasmussen and Rice, 2012). A relatively 
limited part of the R&D is performed by colleges, somewhat illustrated by the fact that only around 10 % 
of patents originate from these PRIs (Rasmussen et al., 2007). Together, the universities and colleges 
stand for approximately a quarter of all R&D in Norway (OECD, 2008). Further, Norway is a country with 
a relatively large research institute sector, comprising 61 PRIs in 2005. The most important research 
institutes are the geographically spread SINTEF institutes (accounting for 60 % of patents in Norway), IRIS 
(Stavanger), NGI (Oslo) and CMR (Bergen) (Rasmussen et al., 2007).Especially technical research institute 
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perform a significant amount of R&D, as these have long had the mission to support the industry with 
R&D development and innovation, particularly through applied research. About a quarter of the R&D 
activity in Norway is done by the research institutes (OECD, 2008).  
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 Method 3
This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the research on RBSOs by formulating implications for RBSOs 
through an analysis of existing literature and funding alternatives within the field of academic 
entrepreneurship, and correlating this with findings from an empirical study. The theoretical background 
for this thesis is partly based on a literature study previously performed by the authors that examined 
the available funding sources for academic spin-offs. This master thesis will extend this work and further 
empirically investigate some of the topics that required enlightenment. The research questions for this 
study formed the starting point for the work performed throughout this thesis. For the attentive reader, 
these were introduced in chapter 1. 
For the literary review, journal articles served as the main source, but the reference database 
additionally included books, reports, undergoing research papers and online information pages. For the 
empirical case study, interviews constituted the primary source, supplemented with secondary data such 
as news releases and general available information about the firms. In the following, the methods used 
both in the theoretical and the empirical study will be reviewed. 
 The literature study 3.1
Research on RBSOs is a relatively narrow and new field. For instance, a small group of authors are highly 
influential and frequently cited. Commonly, the need for more empirical research and consistence is 
called for. For this literary review, a large number of sources were reviewed as the basis for the 
evaluation. The sources not used directly in the text have served as general inspiration. Although the 
main interest have been funding of RBSOs, it was necessary to include references on broader topics as 
well as the research field is somewhat fragmented. 
Literature search 
Several of the research papers on the field have studied the financial situation of RBSOs from the 
viewpoint of the financial source (e.g. the VC screening properties, contribution of value-adding 
activities). As previously emphasized, this master thesis intends to turn the viewpoint around and will 
examine the financial sources from the RBSO’s perspective.  To achieve this, two main streams of 
literature were scrutinized – literature on academic and technology-based ventures, and literature on 
the different financial alternatives available to these types of firms.  
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The gathering of literary sources was performed in two steps. Initial collection was done through articles 
provided by the academic supervisor and through a general online search. Search engines such as Google 
Scholar, Scopus and BIBSYS ASK (university library resource offered by NTNU) were mainly employed, 
together with online databases available through the university (ProQuest Entrepreneurship, 
SpringerLink, Wiley Online Library, ScienceDirect and Jstor). The authors initiated with general searches 
aimed at getting an overview of the literature, and followed up with a narrower search oriented towards 
the specific topics of this thesis. As will be reviewed later in the thesis, there are several terms for this 
kind of venture. The most common terms used to describe the appropriate form of new venture were 
research-based/academic/university spin-offs and NTBFs, and these were the keywords mainly employed 
in searches.  For the second stream of literature on financial sources, the commonly used search phrases 
were: (corporate) venture capital, business angel, government programs, strategic alliances and debt.  
After the initial collection of literary sources was completed, new sources were found in two ways. 
Firstly, a new set of keywords based on the reviewed literature was made and applied. Secondly, 
literature was found through a snowballing effect from reading through the literature in the first step of 
the search. New articles, books and reports were found by reviewing other works from highly cited 
authors, the most common journals and references that particularly addressed the topic for this thesis.  
Authors and journals 
Along the collection of background literature, a limited set of authors emerged as central for this thesis. 
All had a substantial set of published works and subsequent citations in other works. Within the 
entrepreneurship literature, these are all renowned names, and their research has been key 
contributions to the RBSO literature. As a result, most of the other works this thesis is based on will be to 
a large degree influenced by these few authors. 
When it comes to the national affiliation, the literature on RBSOs is mainly centered in the UK (e.g. Mike 
Wright and Andy Lockett) the US (e.g. Scott Shane and Josh Lerner) and in the UK (e.g. Mike Wright and 
Andy Lockett). The scope of the thesis was narrowed down to the Norwegian context, but contributions 
from the US and UK authors are significant to the research field and were to certain degree considered 
generalizable. The contextual constraint did however impact the thesis. For example, the Norwegian 
market is fairly small, and as a result, Norwegian companies often have to internationalize their 
operations and thereby are dependent on collaboration with international partners.  
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As a measure of the quality of the works used as references in this thesis, the authors started out 
wanting to focus on renowned journals that were highly ranked by indexes such as Thomson Reuters’s ISI 
Web of Knowledge. This however proved difficult as several of the articles found through the 
snowballing method were published in journals less known, but nevertheless had relevant findings for 
this thesis. As already emphasized, the research concerning the topic for this thesis is recent and small in 
scale, and consequently, the authors found it necessary to include literature from lesser known journals 
as well. 
 The Case study 3.2
The choice of study-type had initially to be determined. This involved chosing between a quantitative 
and a qualitative study. Firstly, the literature study pointed out that RBSOs are rather  heterogeneous 
(Mustar et al., 2006), a finding that  was accounted for when assessing study design. A quantitative study 
could have explained several aspects surrounding these differences, as well as provided a statistical 
overview of these ventures; a qualitative study on the other hand could more in depth uncover the 
differences between the individual firms. Secondly, a quantitative study depends on a certain number of 
respondents. In the beginning of the decision process around type of study, there was some uncertainty 
as to how many RBSOs would want to participate, as well as the fact that the authors did not receive 
contact information to the companies. This made it difficult to predict how large the final sample would 
be. A qualitative approach on the other hand gives room for smaller subsets. Thirdly, the scope of the 
thesis included finding the relation between funding sources and the subsequent performance of the 
RBSOs, which was assumed to be a somewhat subjective perception. As a result, a qualitative approach 
was ultimately chosen as it could provide a deeper explanation to the research questions that were 
formulated. Further, the limited time available for a master thesis conclusively favored the qualitative 
study, as the gathering of a sufficiently large quantitative database was considered too lengthy.  
The second decision was subsequently to decide what kind of qualitative study should be performed. Yin 
(2009) differentiated between five different forms of qualitative studies: Experiment, Survey, Archival 
analysis, History and Case Study. For this thesis, three “how”-research questions were formulated. 
Furthermore, in order to attempt to answer these questions, the authors considered that there was no 
need to control behavioral events. The study did however focus on contemporary events. According to 
Yin (2009),  this could be answered through Surveys, Archival analysis or Case Study. The scope of the 
thesis was however to uncover a process and reasoning behind choices taken. Archival analysis 
individually will answer this to some extent, but not enough to fully disclose the findings. The basis for 
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evaluation is highly individual and a survey will not necessarily portray the different points of view. The 
case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but in cases where relevant behaviors cannot 
be manipulated. Its unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence (Yin, 2009). This 
aspect was considered to make room for interviews which were to pinpoint the heterogeneity of RBSOs. 
As a result, case study was picked as the method of choice for this thesis.  
It is important to note that there are shortcomings when it comes to case studies as well as other study 
forms. For one, there is no rigid structure or given research design used and as a result the process of the 
investigator can be sloppy or investigator bias can influence the results. Furthermore, case studies can 
provide little bases for scientific generalization and they can be time-consuming. Lastly, in order to 
generalize the results of the case study, a rich theoretical framework must be provided, which also is 
very time-consuming (Yin, 2009). Firstly, in order to compensate for the potential lack of structure, the 
authors appointed a similar approach to be used in all the cases. Secondly, to compensate for the time-
constraint posed by the short time-frame of a master thesis, the interviews of case firms that were 
situated in other parts of the country were to some degree selected and compiled in a two-week time-
frame in order to decrease time spent on interviews.  
Further, Yin (2009) opened for combining different forms of qualitative studies as part of the research 
design, something the authors included in their considerations. Especially in the data-gathering stages of 
the study, this was treated as important as the initial list of potential cases consisted of an overwhelming 
number of 436 potential cases that needed to be reduced. The aim of screening cases is to make sure 
that the cases are properly identified prior to the data collection (Yin, 2009). It is evident that attempting 
to contact all the 436 cases would have been very time-consuming, and the qualitative study forms such 
as archival analysis of articles in newspapers, journals and online portals could give important 
information to help limiting the number of cases. Therefore, the authors chose to perform a preliminary 
qualitative archival analysis before the primary qualitative study was performed, an analysis that will be 
presented in detail in the next section. 
The next step was to determine what type of case study design was to be used. According to (Yin, 2009)  
there are four types of case-study design. Firstly, case studies can have both single- and multiple-case 
designs. When having the choice and resources, multiple-case designs may be preferred over single-case 
designs, and the analytical benefits from having two or more cases may be substantial (Yin, 2009). For 
one, by having several sources of evidence, the study results could be considered as more robust. In this 
study, it is clear that the heterogeneity of the case firms leads to impacting differences in the sample 
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characteristics. A single-case study would have given a thorough analysis of one company, but would not 
necessarily contribute to an overall understanding of RBSOs.  Another important benefit reach through 
multiple-case studies is the possibility of direct replication. Conclusions derived from the evidence can be 
considered more powerful than those coming from a single case (Yin, 2009) and therefore, a multiple-
case study was evidently chosen.  
The second decision to be made when designing a case study concerns the units of analysis – between 
holistic and embedded case studies. Holistic case design are used when there is only one unit of analysis, 
while embedded case design are used when there are several units of analysis (Yin, 2009). The aim of 
this thesis is to relate many aspects surrounding RBSOs to several variables. Hence, the choice of 
embedded case design was rather given. 
Ultimately, interviews served as the primary basis for performing the empirical study. A major purpose of 
this kind of case study might simply be to corroborate certain facts that you already believe are 
established. Usually, interviews will follow a certain set of questions (Yin, 2009). However, as 
established, a qualitative and embedded case design was chosen, and a perfect replication is often not 
the best approach to performing this type of study. Central to the cases in the selection was that they 
were largely heterogeneous, and questions posed to one case would not necessarily apply to another 
case. In addition, the roles the interviewees were often different as will be explained in the next section, 
and therefore the interviewees would commonly have different knowledge of the process. It was 
considered important to have a common evaluation basis for all cases (Yin, 2009). Consequently, the 
interview design itself became an important source of debate, where the focus was on how to replicate 
the case interviews while still account for the large differences among the cases. The discussion ended 
up in the incorporation of semi-structured interviews. Firstly, by allowing the conversation to flow, the 
interviewee would have the freedom to argue for their experiences on his or her own terms. Secondly, 
by having a preliminary overview of the topics to discuss during the interview, all aspects would be 
accounted for (Bryman, 2008).  
  
13 
 
The screening process 
After correspondence with RCN, the authors received data from all 436 start-ups that had received start-
up funding through the FORNY-program in the time-frame 1995 to 2011. Variables that were given 
through the data sheet were year of establishment, key figures for 2011 for those still in existence and 
the incubator from which they emerged from. As this list was considered too extensive for a thorough 
inspection of each unit, the authors made the decision to narrow down the number of cases through 
several steps.  
While the list received from the RCN formed a valid starting point, the data sheet was somewhat 
fragmented and several misstatements were found. The authors therefore decided to validate the 
accuracy of the variables. Through the online database Brønnøysundregisteret, all units were 
consequently looked up. Variables such as start-up year, year the business was shut down and current 
address were checked. In addition, the field of business was reviewed with available information either 
through the online database, financial databases or through the company home page in those cases 
where those existed. Particularly when evaluating the companies that had been out of commission for a 
few years, this was rather challenging. In some cases, the field of business assigned from the RCN did not 
match the information available online, and as a result, some data were reassigned by the authors. The 
first step in narrowing down the list was based on this general evaluation of all companies, in particular 
based on the area of business. The decision on which business area to continue to focus on was 
thoroughly discussed.. The decision landed on the prominent energy sector in Norway, as it can be 
considered the currently most important and value-creating sector. Furthermore, this decision was 
sound as both authors have a solid technological background from the energy and environment field.  
Moreover, most of the firms are based on high-tech research, and as a result, there are various degrees 
of technology readiness across the different business areas. High-tech ventures evidently have a much 
longer time-to-market than other start-ups. Based on the previous work in gathering secondary data, the 
authors validated all the start-up years. The second step was therefore to exclude the youngest 
companies, as the older companies would have had time to develop their technology closer to 
something commercial or in some cases already reached the market with their products or services. 
Companies founded from 2006 and later were subsequently excluded. The business field restriction 
together with the start-up year constraint resulted in a list of 54 companies that were given further 
inspection.  
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After the selection, the authors where coupled with a researcher and a scholar that had written papers 
based on a similar data source. Through a meeting, the authors were supplemented with a list of FORNY 
firms that received funding earlier than 2006. Compared to the initial data sheet, this list included 
several new variables that were later integrated. For one, the incubator from which the RBSOs emerged 
from was verified through this new list. Additionally, in the cases where the outcome of some of the 
companies was blurry, this new list provided some new clues as to what had occurred with them. After 
the data was optimized, the authors also added information available through a renowned financial 
database, Profforvalt.no (license provided by NTNU), and further cross-checked the data through a public 
financial database, Purehelp.no. 
Moreover, a thorough secondary data collection was performed for all the 54 companies through a 
general internet search and a database-search of historical articles in newspapers. Particularly for the 
companies in the sample that were discontinued, this archival analysis gave important data. At this point 
of time, the information gathered was quite large, and in addition to the extensive data sheet of 
benchmarking variables, a profile of each of the 54 companies was written in order to unite all 
information gathered. Moreover, the business area of each venture within the energy sector was split 
into three industrial sectors: Oil and Gas, Renewable Energy and Energy (as some firms had operations in 
both industrial fields).  The extensive data search additionally resulted in some specification of the initial 
sample of firms, and the sample was reduced to 38 cases, mostly due to wrongful match with desired 
business area. For instance, some of the initial companies purely targeted environmental technologies, 
thus not specifically addressing the energy sector. 
A case study of 38 units was however still considered too extensive by the authors. Through the previous 
stages of narrowing down the selection of case firms, it became clear that the information that was 
available online or through databases was insufficient for many of the firms, especially the firms that 
discontinued early., The thorough secondary data collection gave some indications to what had 
happened to most of the companies, but the information as a total was still quite fragmented. In order 
to perform an ultimate selection of case firms, it was therefore decided to develop a short set of 
questions to acquire consistent information about essential elements. These elements mainly 
investigated the companies’ origin and their development processes, along with the use of financial 
sources. There were three companies whom the authors were unable to gather contact information on, 
as they had been dissolved before the Norwegian online company register Brønnøysundregisteret was 
established, and no information beyond the company name was found. Mainly, founders or current CEO 
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were the targets for this enquiry. In some cases however, the only available person was another member 
of the management. While a large share of the firms was willing to participate, there were also 
companies the authors were not able to reach through phone calls. The authors received answers from 
27 companies. Contact through email was attempted with the remaining eight, but with unfruitful 
results. 
During the previous phone conversations, some indicated that they would not like to participate further 
in the study, and as a result, an additional eight was excluded from the list. A meeting was set in place 
for the remaining 18 companies. Mainly, founders still affiliated with the venture were the main target 
for the final interviews, but the authors ended up interviewing a wide variety of key persons in the case 
firms. This was considered a strength rather than a weakness, as this thesis focus both on technological 
and business aspect of new ventures, and differing backgrounds provided a more diverse and broad 
perspective around the central topics discussed. In two cases, the meetings were cancelled in the last 
minute by the contact. Furthermore, case interview of four of the companies were compiled in two 
meetings. One of these meetings involved two separate business units that were presently gather in one 
operating company (for the rest of this thesis considered as company E), while the other meeting was 
discussed with the person responsible for both commercialization processes of the two units. Thereby, 
the final selection of cases consisted of 15 companies 
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 The cases 3.3
The RBSOs in the final selection were situated in the four largest cities in Norway and mostly operated in 
the petroleum industry. The renewable industry was also relatively well represented with four firms, and 
differed to a large extent both in size and type of technologies. Under the selection process, the 
geographical location was not emphasized as the authors desired a representative selection of cases. 
However, the spread among the four actual cities turned convenient, although not surprising as the 
largest research environments are situated here. The distribution between universities and research 
institutions was equally not emphasized, but turned out rather even. A highly relevant fact for this thesis 
was that four of the companies in this sample had discontinued. An overview of all the cases is given in 
Table 1. To remind the reader, company E is a distinctive case as company was established in 2011 to 
incorporate two of the units in the original selection. 
Table 1 - Summary of the cases 
Company 
A-O 
Location 
(area) 
Origin  Start-up 
year 
Status Contact 
person  
Business Area 
A Trondheim University 2004 In Existence Founder, CTO Petroleum 
B Trondheim University 2005 Discontinued Founder Petroleum 
C Trondheim Research 
Institution 
2001 In Existence CEO Petroleum 
D Trondheim University 2002 In Existence CTO Petroleum 
E Stavanger  Research 
Institution 
2004 In Existence Business 
Controller 
Petroleum 
F Stavanger  Research 
Institution 
1997 Discontinued Founder Petroleum 
G Stavanger  University 2004 In Existence Board Leader Petroleum 
H Stavanger  Research 
Institution 
2003 In Existence Board Leader Petroleum 
I Bergen  Research 
Institution 
2000 Discontinued Founder Petroleum 
J Bergen  Research 
Institution 
1997 Discontinued Founder Petroleum 
K Oslo Research 
Institution 
1998 In Existence Founder, CEO Renewable 
Energy 
L Oslo University 1996 In Existence Founder, CEO Renewable 
Energy 
M Oslo University 1999 In Existence Founder Petroleum 
N Oslo Other 2000 In Existence Founder Renewable 
Energy 
O Oslo Other 2004 In Existence Founder Renewable 
Energy 
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 Limitations to the thesis 3.4
As with all scientific studies, there are several limitations to this work that are important to emphasize. 
For instance, the validity of the gathered literature for the theoretical study was mostly evaluated by the 
authors’ subjectivity. As a result, there might be several biases to the contents. Also, since the literature 
on this field is still new and rather fragmented, a small number of authors are highly influential. In fact, 
several other studies have included the works of these authors in their works as well. Additionally, 
through the snowballing search for literature several of the articles used were published in less 
renowned journals. These were still added to the final reference database as their contents were 
considered relevant to this thesis. As a result, there might be some bias associated with the reference 
articles. 
Furthermore, the final selection of firms ended in 15 cases. This is a large number in order to replicate an 
interview design considering the limited scope of a master thesis. As previously mentioned, the authors 
chose a semi-structured interview form, as the different roles the interviewees would lead to large 
difference in knowledge about the RBSOs, and that diversity in answers was desired. However, with a 
rigid structure on the interview, it is clear that the representative for the RBSO might not mention all the 
relevant facts that the authors sought for. Further, some questions were not appropriate for all 
companies. For example, a question about present performance would not be particularly relevant for 
companies that were discontinued.. A protocol for all the topics that needed to be investigated was 
made beforehand the interviews, but the sequence was not given. Each author had individual 
responsibility for making sure that particular topics were discussed. It is also important to note that in 
order for the author to replicate the exact quotation made by the interviewee, the meetings were 
recorded. Despite the authors emphasizing on the fact that the interviews were anonymized, it is 
possible that the interviewees have held back certain opinions. 
A known shortcoming lies within the role the interviewee had in the case RBSO. Only one representative 
for each company was interviewed. This could lead to an interviewee bias as there were individual 
viewpoints that may not have been representative for the RBSO. This bias is particularly relevant when 
the personal preferences and perceptions around funding sources were investigated. Further, as the 
selection of cases was consciously made based on the start-up time of the firms there was a long time-
span from when decisions were made to today. Evidently, this is an important weakness as many 
interviewees made clear that some of the topics discussed were blurry to them. Moreover, as a last 
important note, the authors would like to emphasize the limitations given by the short time frame of a 
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master thesis. While a relevant literary study was conducted during autumn 2012, it is evident that a 
more extensive study over a longer time period would lead to much more ample and conclusive 
evidence. 
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 Literature study 4
As mentioned, research on RBSOs is a relatively new field, but has gained importance in recent years as 
policymakers increasingly emphasize the role of RBSOs to promote innovation (Rasmussen et al., 2012). 
There are several studies examining formation and development processes (Rasmussen et al., 2011, 
Clarysse et al., 2011), the social and technological capabilities of RBSOs (Heirman and Clarysse, 2007, 
Shane and Cable, 2002) and the financial obstacles for RBSOs (e.g Politis et al., 2012, Carpentier and 
Suret, 2006). Moreover, several studies have examined the performance of RBSOs in terms of impact, 
and Rasmussen et al. (2012) identified two dominant perspectives. Some studies explored the impacts in 
terms of contribution to economic development. Another set of studies examined the impacts in terms 
of dissemination of applicable research to society. Furthermore, this literature review identified a stream 
of research that attempted to link the initial context and resources of RBSOs to subsequent 
performance. These studies were shown to investigate a large number of factors, but Rasmussen et al. 
(2012a) claimed that the relations between the different factors were insufficiently studied, and that the 
contexts were often too specific. Lastly, some studies have examined the different funding sources 
available to RBSOs, notably soft funding (e.g. Rasmussen and Sørheim, 2012a), business angels (e.g. 
Sørheim and Landström, 2001, Politis, 2008) and venture capitalists (e.g. Zhang, 2007, Wright et al., 
2006).  
The following is a presentation of the relevant literature for this thesis. When considered necessary, the 
authors have developed theoretical frameworks in order to compensate for lack of consistent theory. As 
emphasized, this is to a large extent due to the rather fragmented literature surrounding RBSOs. Firstly, a 
thorough theoretical background on RBSOs will be presented. Thereafter, a meticulous presentation and 
analysis of the different funding sources available to RBSOs will be given. Ultimately, this will result in a 
solid framework that will form the basis for structuring the empirical results procured and subsequently 
analyzing these findings. 
 RBSOs 4.1
Historically, technology from research institutions has majorly been commercialized through licensing. In 
recent years, commercialization through creation of independent business entities has emerged as a 
viable solution to the same purpose. The American Bayh-Doyle act from 1980 was a pioneering 
legislation that gave the proprietary rights of technology developed in research institutions to the 
institutions themselves rather than the researcher. As a response to the many successful high-tech firms 
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that originated from research in the USA, similar legislation was later implemented in most countries as 
policy makers and institutions realized the potential value creation (Lerner, 2004). Indeed, RBSOs have 
been shown to represent an overall wealth creation as start-ups increase employment and contribute 
with significant societal gains through the introduction of revolutionary products and services. 
(Utterback et al., 1988). 
 The rationale behind formation of RBSOs 4.1.1
Established firms possess several advantages in commercializing technology; their market knowledge, 
customer relationships, distribution systems and related product portfolio. As a result, licensing of 
research-based technology to established firms has traditionally been the way of commercializing, as the 
additional expense of creating a new firm could not be justified (Shane, 2004). However, during the last 
fifteen years, the number of RBSOs has increased substantially in many European countries (Mustar et 
al., 2008). This leads us to explore the rationale behind the formation of new firms from university 
technology or ideas, despite the presented disadvantages with regards to established firms.  
Shane (2004) presented a set of reasons that leads to the formation of spin-offs instead of licensing. 
First, he claims that the radical nature of university technology or ideas is often the main basis for the 
formation of a spin-off. Radical technology or ideas challenge the existing firms’ organization and 
position in the market, often perceived as a threat. The tacit nature of the knowledge also leads to 
difficulties communicating the value of the technology or idea, often resulting in disbelief and rejection 
from the managers of established firms. Further, the technology or ideas developed at universities are 
often early stage and “unproven”. For established firms, it is often difficult to see the applicability of new 
technology, and they are often reluctant to invest resources in discovering this due to their often short 
term focus and profit-oriented goals (Shane, 2004). 
Profit prospect is moreover a reason for the formation of new firm, as it often motivates inventors to 
become entrepreneurs and benefit from the value their inventions create to a much higher degree, as 
well as providing them with the self-employment opportunity. In addition, Shane (2004) points out that 
creating RBSOs is more profitable for the PRI itself than licensing, as equity in spin-off captures more of 
the value created from an invention, rather than only the value from receiving royalties for the use of IP. 
Hence universities increasingly encourage the formation of RBSOs, as PRIs seek alternative income 
sources for the future (Shane, 2004). Lastly, as previously accentuated, governments are a major driving 
force for the formation of spin-offs. RBSOs diversify and develop the local surrounding economy, 
creating more jobs compared to licensing and stimulating to more economic growth (Shane, 2004). 
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 Characteristics 4.1.2
RBSOs are new ventures that emerges from PRIs and whose products or services are based on 
proprietary technology or skill (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). Mainly, there are four types of ventures 
emerging from a research setting that occur in literature: Academic spin-offs (ASOs) (e.g Wright et al., 
2007, Clarysse et al., 2007), University spin-offs (USOs) (e.g Clarysse et al., 2011, Baldini, 2010), new 
technology-based firms (NTBFs) (e.g Rasmussen and Sørheim, 2012b) and RBSOs (e.g Lockett et al., 
2005). All types are based on research and a general requirement is that they are all dependent on 
transfer of proprietary rights from the parent organization. However, while ASOs and USOs spring out 
from a pure academic setting, NTBFs and RBSOs extend this definition to also include other research 
organizations (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). RBSOs is a subset of NTBFs (Wright et al., 2007) and, 
according to Heirman and Clarysse (2004), RBSOs do not necessarily develop a physical technology, thus 
can include other form of ventures such as consultancy firms. Table 2 gives a systematic overview of the 
four different types. 
Table 2 - Different types of new ventures 
Factors RBSO ASO/USO NTBF 
Basis Research University or college 
research 
Research 
Founders From PRIs From academic 
institutions 
No requirement 
Product or service Technology and/or skill Technology and/or skill Technology 
 
As acknowledged, there are several types of start-ups that are based on research. The obvious enquiry 
the reader may make is the rationale for choosing precisely RBSOs as the type of firm to investigate. 
Essentially, the explanation lies in the characteristics of the Norwegian context. As was presented, much 
of the R&D in Norway is performed by PRIs, with approximately a quarter performed by universities and 
colleges (predominantly universities), and a quarter done by research institutes (Rasmussen et al., 2007). 
Further, as will be examined later, most of the governmental schemes, that form an important part of 
the funding sources for new ventures, do not distinguish between the different PRIs. Notably, the FORNY 
program, which constitutes the main support mechanism for the commercialization of research, targets 
research-based spin-offs from all PRIs, and support both the development of both technologies and 
services. Hence, the authors considered it purposeful to study the more inclusive RBSO type of firm  
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Information asymmetries and uncertainty 
There are two essential challenges for RBSOs. Firstly, as new and small business, RBSOs are subject to a 
high degree of uncertainty, and have short track records that makes it challenging to value the company 
(Shane and Stuart, 2002). In others words, it is especially challenging for investors and founders to 
confidently predict what the future prospects of the company are going to be (Gompers and Lerner, 
2000), and there is a wide number of potential outcomes for the venture. For more established firms, 
the evaluation of the company is often based on observable history, but for RBSOS, this is not possible 
until after the entrepreneur has obtained resources, established a functioning organization and started 
the development of products (Shane and Stuart, 2002). Another uncertainty aspect of young high-tech 
firms is that new technology is unpredictable and requires undefined large resource commitments in 
order to create prototypes and further develop the technologies. As a result, the revenues and profits 
often lie far in an unpredictable future (Shane and Stuart, 2002). Firms with more tangible assets find 
financing often both easier to obtain and on more favorable terms than firms with more intangible 
assets (Gompers and Lerner, 2001).  
Another prominent challenge is the differences in information possessed between entrepreneur and 
others, making it difficult for outsiders to evaluate the RBSO with the same accuracy as entrepreneurs 
(Rasmussen and Sørheim, 2012a). The entrepreneur naturally possess deeper knowledge about the 
venture’s prospects, the capabilities of the entrepreneurial team and their level of commitment to the 
venture (Shane and Stuart, 2002). The resource providers can’t supervise actions made by the venture’s 
management, which further leads to two main challenges from the investor’s perspective: Either the 
founder may take decisions that prove to be harmful to the venture and that the investors cannot 
observe, or the entrepreneurs might deliberately exploit the information asymmetry to their self-
motivated benefit (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). 
 The development process of RBSOs 4.1.3
When evaluating RBSOs as business units, it is fundamental to use a framework that accounts for the 
evolution of the venture. Generally, this type of new venture unit seems to grow in similar patterns and 
Wright et al. (2007) described the development through four phases: the Research phase, the 
Opportunity-framing phase, the pre-organization phase and the reorientation phase. Commonly, studies 
use a life-cycle approach that distinguishes between pre-seed, seed, start-up, growth and exit (Figure 1). 
The three first stages are often referred to as the early stages in literature. The four phases described by 
Wright et al. (2007) and in the life-cycle approach contains similar elements. For the purpose of this 
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thesis, a model incorporating elements from both will be presented in the following. Each phase specify 
activities to be performed as well as strategic planning the firms must perform moving forward (Vohora 
et al., 2004). Literature often places these stages through a projected revenue graph for the RBSO and 
the financial sources that are available. As the authors consider this revenue graph to vary significantly 
between the different types of RBSOs, as will be further elaborated in the next section, only the timeline 
itself will be used to describe the stage-model. Furthermore, it is important that this is a model, and the 
time-horizons for each stage considerably vary among the different types of RBSOs, The activities to be 
performed are however similar. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Evolution of RBSOs 
Pre-seed stage 
In the pre-seed stage, the purpose is to generate and assess business ideas from initial research 
developed at the PRIs (Ndonzuau et al., 2002). As a result, this stage is often referred to as the proof-of-
concept phase. It is an opportunity recognition phase where the founders alone or together with 
associated TTOs need to identify the commercial applicability of the intellectual property they have 
created (Wright et al., 2012). Through a screening process, the technology itself is evaluated, and its 
validity for further development and commercialization is assessed(Vohora et al., 2004). The overall 
costs associated with this stage are usually not high, and funding is therefore often procured from 
internal sources (Politis et al., 2012). Vohora et al. (2004) found that the ventures in this stage often 
suffered from a lack of understanding for commercial exploitation of the technology and inexperience in 
creating commercial value of research. Important challenges in this phase include imprecisely defined 
opportunities, ambiguously targets and impracticable solutions (Wright et al., 2007). The entrepreneurial 
team consequently needs to acquire additional competence in this stage, often through an associated 
TTO. 
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Seed stage 
In the seed stage, the purpose is to further develop the business ideas. The venture becomes more 
tangible and Strategic plans are implemented. The founders are confronted with several critical decisions 
such as when and where to acquire future needs for resources and knowledge. Typical activities here are 
related to the protection of the technology or idea, the development of the product or services into 
prototypes, and further development of the business plan with deeper analyzes and quantification of 
market potential (Ndonzuau et al., 2002). This stage is characterized by high intensity of R&D and as a 
result, technical competencies are usually critical for this phase (Wright et al., 2007). Moreover, critical 
decisions for the further development of the firm have to be made. As a consequence of this increasing 
strategic importance, the managerial competencies within the entrepreneurial team become 
increasingly important in this stage (Politis et al., 2012).  
Start-up stage 
In the start-up stage, the initial product or service developed is introduced to the market (Politis et al., 
2012). Entrepreneurs must continuously identify, acquire and integrate resources and re-configure them 
into the venture. This is especially important if the RBSO is founded with low start-up capital and 
inexperienced management (Vohora et al., 2004). As a result, this is the stage where a competent 
management and relevant network relations are crucial to succeed. Moreover, this is where the need for 
material and financial resources significantly increases in order to produce and introduce the product or 
service developed (Ndonzuau et al., 2002), often forcing RBSOs to seek support from private investors 
(Politis et al., 2012). This phase is characterized as a learning phase, and interaction with outside actors 
leads to acquisition of information and knowledge (Wright et al., 2007). 
Growth stage 
In the growth stage, the RBSO starts to generate economic value and sustainable returns. It is common 
to divide this stage into early growth phase and expansion phase, as RBSOs often have to adopt a two-
step growth strategy due to lack of financial resources in the start-up stage. Many RBSOs will remain 
indefinitely in the early growth stage as initial prospects prove wrong, while the most promising RBSOs 
with high growth potential and international scope will move quickly to an expansion phase (Ndonzuau 
et al., 2002). At a certain point in time, the growth rate will decline and move into the eventual “mature” 
phase of the growth stage. Along with the growth of the venture, a need to scale up the production 
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emerges. Although the RBSO starts to generate profits, several subsequent rounds of raising financial 
resources are often required (Politis et al., 2012). The fundamental objective in this phase is to access 
and reconfigure resources in order to assemble the capabilities which enables the venture to reach such 
a phase (Vohora et al., 2004). While many RBSOs up to this point have had access to facilities through 
their institution of origin, expansion lead RBSOs in this stage to professionalize their operations and 
move closer to the industry (Wright et al., 2007).  
At some point, the life-cycle of the RBSO will end. This can either occur through sale of the whole firm to 
a third party (e.g. trade-sale, typically a strategic acquirer) or through liquidation of the firm due to non-
viability (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). 
Critical Junctures 
In addition to the fixed phases, the authors found it purposeful to include transition phases in the stage-
model. Vohora et al. (2004) introduced the concept of critical junctures due to the complex challenges 
that need to be overcome in order to move from one stage to the next. They claimed that ventures often 
will stagnate in a stage unless it overcomes the juncture to move to the next stage. An improved version 
of the stage-model (Figure 1) is presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Stage-model for RBSOs 
  
 
  Pre-
seed 
  Seed   Start-
up 
  Growth 
  
  
  
 
Entrepreneurial 
commitment 
  
  
  
  
Threshold of 
credibility 
Threshold of 
sustainability 
26 
 
As can be observed, the life-cycle process presented in Figure 1 has been refined with an additional three 
transition phases. The first critical juncture is defined as the entrepreneurial commitment. Commitment 
from the entrepreneurial team is essential for the venture to be taken from an idea into forming a 
business (Vohora et al., 2004). It is important to differentiate between entrepreneurial intentions and 
commitment, where the major difference is that in the latter, the entrepreneur commit to a certain 
course of events (Wright et al., 2007). For example, some entrepreneurs must make the decision 
whether or not he should leave his initial job at the PRI in order to focus full time on the RBSO. The 
commitment made by the entrepreneur creates stability and ensures a continuous flow of innovative 
inputs in the RBSO, hence leading to steady improvements of initial products and introduction of new 
products and services (Vohora et al., 2004). 
The second juncture is the threshold of credibility, as this is a crucial challenge for all new ventures. 
Especially for RBSOs, the initial resources are intangible and compromise mainly of technical know-how  
(Vohora et al., 2004). Additionally, RBSOs seldom have long track-records, and acquiring external capital 
is particularly challenging for RBSOs that have not passed this threshold.  
The last critical juncture is the threshold of sustainability. The essential element to overcome this 
juncture is the management’s ability to continuously re-configure resources, capabilities and liabilities 
from weaknesses into strengths for the venture (Vohora et al., 2004). This threshold is highly dependent 
on the initial resources of the entrepreneurial team. By eliminating the weaknesses through the 
acquiring of new competence, the RBSOs achieve new competitive advantages that can be benefitted 
from through new markets and increased revenue generation. 
 Typology of RBSOs 4.1.4
As previously mentioned, RBSOS are a heterogeneous group of firms. It is therefore purposeful to create 
a relevant framework that can distinguish between the different types that exist. There are three 
different analytical perspectives on RBSO types that are common in the literature. These mainly 
differentiate between the determinants that define competitive advantage for the RBSOs. The first 
perspective, namely the resource-based perspective, attributes excess performance to resources and 
capabilities property of the venture, and has become increasingly influential in recent literature (Wright 
et al., 2007). The second perspective, the business-model perspective, focuses on the activities 
developed by the RBSO, the industrial sectors in which they belong to and other differentiating key 
indicators (Wright et al., 2007). Lastly, the papers that focus on the institutional link between the 
venture and the parent organization, and try to determine the context that shapes the development of 
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the RBSO, are categorized within the institutional perspective. Several studies have tried to address 
typology of RBSOs. Mustar et al. (2006) studied the different taxonomies of this type of venture, and 
found that existing studies are mostly based on only one of the analytical perspectives, focusing only on 
certain aspects and ignoring other important topics. 
As all the RBSOs in the selection of case firms are considered high-tech ventures, the authors found it 
purposeful to differentiate between the concept maturity – the radicalness of the technology, and the 
varying resource needs for the venture. A high concept maturity usually involves products that are a 
further development of, or new use of an existing technology, while low concept maturity describes 
products or services that are based on a more radical technology. Resource needs is used as a collective 
term for all technical, financial and human resources needed in order to develop the RBSO into a 
company with sustainable returns. While both dimensions are highly related to the resource-based 
perspective, the dimensions also incorporate parts of the two other presented perspectives. It is 
important to note that no previous typological studies found by the authors differentiated RBSOs along 
these exact dimensions. The result of the development of a theoretical framework to differentiate RBSOs 
led to the formulation of a new typology that the authors considered suitable to evaluate the funding 
choices of RBSOs. It is important to note that while the following classification is highly anchored in 
existing literature, many of the distinctions that are made are based on the authors own perception.  
Figure 3 portrays the categorization of the different types of RBSOs. Figure 3 portrays the typology. 
 
Figure 3 - RBSO Typology 
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Knowledge -based RBSOs 
Ventures with high concept maturity and low resource needs are often founded in order to 
commercialize the entrepreneur’s knowledge (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004) and is a way for the founder 
to employ themselves. They often take the form of technical consultancy firms and builds upon the 
central research the founders performed while at the PRI (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004). In fact, Heirman 
and Clarysse (2004) found evidence that technical consultants comprised a major part of RBSOs. With 
high concept maturity, solutions are often an incremental step from existing products with relatively 
small degree of innovativeness. The service offering is unlikely to be based on patents, or demand 
significant further R&D (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004).. As the market offering often is a service, the start-
up costs are small compared to other types of ventures, which leaves little need for external investors in 
the earliest phases (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). Additionally, this type of RBSO is close to the market at 
start up, and the service addresses clear unmet market needs (Wright et al., 2007). This gives the RBSO 
the opportunity to rely on revenues for further growth in earlier stages than other RBSOs. RBSOs in this 
category will typically have few employees (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004), and are often compared to the  
“lifestyle” firms found in the literature. (Wright et al., 2007). 
Innovative product -based RBSOs 
As the name indicates, this type of RBSO is based on innovative technology and is often the product of 
extensive research at the PRI. As a result, the technology is closer to market introduction when the firm 
is established, and resources needed for further R&D are thereby small compared to other types of 
RBSOs (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). Costs related to the market introduction itself are however similar 
to the other types of RBSO. Additionally, the closeness to product launch leads the RBSO to expect 
revenues shortly after start-up, and is less dependent on external funding sources (Wright et al., 2007).  
A low concept maturity indicates a product solution that is very innovative compared to existing market 
solutions, and this type of RBSO often target niche markets (Wright et al., 2007). Typically, these RBSOs 
will have few employees at start-up, and have higher focus on market introduction and further business 
development than other RBSOs, with for instance most growth being based on after-sale services 
(Wright et al., 2007). 
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Incremental technology -based RBSOs 
RBSOs with a high concept maturity and high resource needs will typically provide a new product based 
on an incremental step in existing technology (Wright et al., 2007), where existing technology is 
underdeveloped or can be put to new commercial use. These RBSOs are often formed with the aim to 
develop a technology for later licensing to outside firms, but frequently end up performing the 
downstream services and production themselves (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004). At the time of venture 
establishment, the technology is far from market-ready (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). Incremental 
technology -based RBSOs are therefore based on a technology that addresses a market need rather than 
adapting a technology to a market, which is rather the case for the previously presented innovative 
product -based RBSOs. The development from technology to products is both time-consuming and 
costly, but has a lower degree of uncertainty than the more disruptive technologies. As the technology 
often needs to be researched and further developed after venture start-up, the venture typically needs 
several years in order to start growing. 
Disruptive technology -based RBSOs 
RBSOs with a high need for resources to develop and grow will typically require a waste period of R&D to 
introduce a product or service to the market. A low concept maturity means that the applicability of the 
technology is unclear, and the technology is often disruptive and proprietary (Heirman and Clarysse, 
2004). In fact, this RBSO represent the most radical technology-offering among the different RBSO types. 
In addition, contrary to the innovative product-based RBSOs, the technology is in its early-stage 
development and far from market-ready  at start-up (Wright et al., 2007). The high resource needs are 
linked to the time-consuming and costly development process from uncertain technology to final, and 
this type of RBSO is highly dependent on additional funding. Secondly, this type of RBSO is also the one 
with the steepest growth curve, and typically the highest requirements of technical expertise and 
commercialization competence. Therefore,  this type of venture is commonly described in the literature 
as VC-backed ventures, defined as spin-offs that are based on radical, early-stage and general-purpose 
technology  that more easily attract external equity funding (Shane, 2004).  
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The importance of a typological framework 
The authors would like the emphasize the important impact the heterogeneity of RBSOs (Mustar et al., 
2006) have on the topics that will be treated later in the thesis. As the attentive reader may have 
noticed, the dimensions chosen to differentiate RBSOs, namely resource needs and concept maturity, 
were carefully chosen in order to give the authors a suitable framework to later analyze the different 
funding sources, and evaluate the initial and subsequently needed social and financial resources. 
Notably, the typology will be used to categorize the case firms, and later examine the empirical evidence 
using the different types of RBSOs as basis. 
 Social capital and network 4.1.5
Before examining the resource needs of RBSOs, it is essential to map what resources RBSOs initially 
possess. As the particular field of resource mapping is rather complex, it is important to note that only 
the main features will here be assessed. Furthermore, only the core entrepreneurial team and 
“privileged witnesses” will be considered, thus excluding individuals that solely have financial interests. 
The core entrepreneurial team will be defined as individuals that played an active role in the founding of 
the RBSO, have a financial interest and are involved in the strategic decision-making (Wright et al., 2007). 
“Privileged witnesses” was a term introduced by Vanaelst et al. (2006) and are defined as individuals that 
guide researchers in the pre-startup stage, often part of TTOs and incubators. Above all, the essential 
characteristic of an entrepreneurial team is that it is largely dynamic. Hence, the evolutionary aspect of 
social capital and network has to be taken into consideration (Wright et al., 2007). With this in mind, a 
generic overview of the initial social resources a RBSO typically possess will first be presented. 
Thereafter, changes in the RBSO’s social capital and network over time will be briefly examined. Lastly, 
critical success factors established in the literature will shortly be discussed. 
At the core of every RBSO lies research, thus the core entrepreneurial team will initially be comprised of 
scientists. Evidently, this implies strong technical capabilities, but also often a strong academic network 
that includes e.g. science parks, TTOs and other scientific entrepreneurs. Nosella and Grimaldi (2009) 
presented four main advantages of such a network: (1) it increases the entrepreneurs’ opportunity 
identification capabilities, (2) it facilitates access to resources, (3) it favors economies of time and (4) is a 
source of status and referrals. 
On the other hand, Wright et al. (2007) claim that researchers initially tend to be support oriented and 
innovation oriented, often lacking goal orientation and intentionally avoiding bureaucracy. Support 
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oriented implies more informal interaction and important features such as mutual trust, cooperation and 
individual growth. Innovation oriented indicates a flexible and unrestrained attitude towards 
performance indicators and accomplishment accountability. 
Putting the two previous paragraphs in perspective, one could argue that the deficiencies put forward by 
Wright et al. (2007) are precisely what a strong academic network can potentially compensate for. 
Indeed, the earlier-mentioned “privileged witnesses” are often procured through this network, giving 
strategic advice to overcome the lack of goal orientation from the researchers, while providing support 
to overcome the challenges posed by bureaucratic formalities (Vanaelst et al., 2006). Table 3 summarizes 
the main capabilities and deficiencies of a typical RBSO founding team. 
Table 3 - Overview of initial social resources 
Capabilities Deficiencies 
Technical competence  Goal orientation 
Access to academic network  Processing bureaucratic formalities 
 
When the RBSO is established as a legal entity, passing the critical juncture called the entrepreneurial 
commitment, the RBSO founding team evolves into a management team and a board of directors. This 
marks a significant change in the social resources of the RBSO. In fact, Bjoernaali and Gulbrandsen (2010) 
showed that changes in social resources are closely related to overcoming critical junctures and reaching 
the next development stage. Early social capital is generally added through social networks and largest 
stakeholders such as e.g. a university, a research institution or investors. In addition, industry 
representatives are often added to help covering the gap between RBSO and industry (Nosella and 
Grimaldi, 2009). Indeed, it is generally these gaps (e.g. absence of relevant experience, know-how and 
networks) that ultimately provoke the need for additional social resources. Social capital added in later 
stages are usually value-adding investors, professional executives and individuals with market-specific 
knowledge aiding with acquisition of other resources such as sales and marketing for example (Bjoernaali 
and Gulbrandsen, 2010). Moreover, Wright et al. (2007) found that researchers usually prefer to recruit 
those people whose way of looking at a business is very close to theirs. Social network theory similarly 
indicate that scientific-entrepreneurs are likely to recruit individuals from their existing social network 
(Bjoernaali and Gulbrandsen, 2010). 
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Ultimately, the literature generally agrees that social capital and network significantly influence the 
performance of a RBSO (Wright et al., 2007). A study by Heirman and Clarysse (2006)  determined that 
the single most important predictor of growth during the first five years after startup was the degree of 
commercial and sector-specific competence in the entrepreneurial team. The upper echelon perspective 
posits that there are two important success factors that positively affect the performance of a RBSO 
(Wright et al., 2007). 
• Cognitive diversity, the existence of different individual characteristics, educational backgrounds 
and business experiences. 
• Behavioral integration, the ability to work collectively and benefit from cognitive diversity, 
characterized by interaction, sharing and discussion that create a culture that integrates 
differences. 
Vanaelst et al. (2006) examined these two factors in depth, and found that the acquiring of team 
members with commercial background expectedly had a positive effect, but had surprisingly little 
influence on the cognitive diversity. Often, new team members in the entrepreneurial teams only 
reinforced the current cognition of how to run the venture, a finding that has been shown in the 
literature to have mixed effects on the performance of ventures (Vanaelst et al., 2006). This is a rather 
interesting finding, and will be briefly explored in the analysis of the empirical results in the thesis. 
 Performance indicators  4.1.6
To conclude the section on RBSOs, an interesting theoretical discussion can be conducted around what 
indicators can measure their performance. Finding appropriate indicators to map the performance of 
RBSOs is a particularly challenging task. Indeed, most current studies generally use only limited and 
quantitative units of analysis such as turnover, market capitalization, sales growth, sales per employee 
etc. (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006, Zhang, 2009, Walter et al., 2006). A review by Shepherd and Wiklund 
(2009) analyzed over 80 empirical studies published in leading management and entrepreneurship 
journals attempting to explain differences in growth performance of firms, and revealed that very few of 
these studies used qualitative measures in order to establish performance. Despite all these studies, 
researchers have not been able to isolate variables that have a consistent effect on growth performance, 
and individual studies have only explained a limited portion of the differences in performance 
(Macpherson and Holt, 2007). One could argue that the performance of RBSOs has to be defined through 
more long-term indicators, as the development of uncertain technology is time-consuming and often 
require long time spans before the RBSO can start to grow. In fact, several cross-country performance 
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studies have shown that economic performance alone is poor (Gulbrandsen and Rasmussen, 2012). 
Rasmussen et al. (2012) argue that the performance of RBSOs should be affiliated more to the societal 
benefits and the technology transfer itself, rather than the economic impact. 
McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) made an extensive review of the growth performance literature, and 
sorted the literature in three different streams: Growth as an Outcome, The Outcome of Growth and The 
Growth Process. The first stream examines growth as an outcome and primarily intends to explain the 
variances in growth performance. The second stream focuses on outcomes of growth, thereby taking 
growth as given and looking at the consequences on the firm. The third stream looks at growth as a 
process and examines what goes on within the firm while it is growing. All three streams form the basis 
for many interesting and important discussions around the performance of RBSOs. However, due to the 
scope of this thesis, only the first stream of growth performance literature, Growth as an Outcome, will 
here be treated. 
Performance is a multidimensional element, as it can be both objective and subjective, financial and non-
financial (Walter et al., 2006). Assessing performance and disregarding one or several dimensions can 
easily be criticized as an oversimplification. However, as emphasized, the scope of most papers does not 
allow the possibility to assess all dimensions, and most may not even be capable of identifying all. It is 
therefore necessary to select the most relevant and accessible dimensions. Moreover, performance 
indicators will often ignore RBSOs that have been discontinued, thus not separating for example a high-
performing RBSO that has been acquired by a large corporation from a poor-performing RBSO that went 
bankrupt. This is particularly an important limitation when assessing quantitative performance 
indicators. 
Performance is essentially linked to the firm’s growth, the differential outcome between at least two 
points in time (Penrose, 1959). Delmar and Wiklund (2008) argued that growth in revenues is the most 
effective growth performance variable as it translates easily across geographical regions and industries, 
and is also the measure of choice for entrepreneurs and investors. Furthermore, Shepherd and Wiklund 
(2009) found that employment growth seemed to be the unit of analysis with best concurrent validity 
across studies. Moreover, these two quantitative indicators are easily available from secondary 
databases in most countries. Financial statements over several years of development can provide a solid 
overview of the overall value creation of an RBSO, primarily by evaluating the development of operating 
profit and salary expenses. Employment size itself and its evolution can also provide a precise picture of 
the development run and current state of an RBSO. 
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For this thesis, it is important to recall the qualitative nature of the study. This gives a unique 
opportunity to assess more qualitative performance indicators. The perceived present performance of a 
RBSO can often prove a simple way of mapping performance (subjective and both financial/non-
financial), encompassing many but varying dimensions. As such, it is a strong multidimensional indicator, 
but is potentially weak methodologically as firms have different perceptions and priorities when 
assessing present performance. For example, as McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) illustrate it, a major 
advertising campaign may increase sales growth but decrease growth in profitability, a perception of 
growth performance that may be perceived differently. It is thus a highly subjective indicator, but strong 
as it encompasses many variables. 
Furthermore, many studies have used qualitative units of analysis where the firms were asked to account 
for their growth performance over a certain number of years, typically over a 5-year period (McKelvie 
and Wiklund, 2010). Several of these studies showed that many new firms start small and remain small 
throughout their existence (McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010). These firms are often disregarded in growth 
performance studies, an exclusion that is too restrictive as many RBSOs fall into the previously presented 
knowledge-based category. Delmar and Wiklund (2008) assessed these studies and found that the initial 
willingness to grow was able to largely predict subsequent growth. McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) 
however argued that this finding may be a setback for a consistent understanding of growth 
performance as it is a varying unit of analysis. Indeed, the intentions and goals of a firm may vary over 
time, and the acquiring of a new manager or the acquirement of a new external funding source such as a 
venture capitalist may entirely change the expectations of growth performance. It is thus important to 
be aware of these evolutionary changes when assessing this particular performance indicator. This is 
particularly relevant for RBSOs that hire surrogate entrepreneurs to develop the firm, often representing 
an important change in perception of future goals as was the actual case for some of the case firms 
presented later in this thesis. 
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Together, these units of analysis are highly relevant for RBSOs in particular and are easily available 
through secondary and primary data collection such as qualitative case studies. They will form the basis 
for further assessment of the performance of the case firms, and are summarized in the table below. As 
emphasized, it is essential to keep in mind that there are however important limitations to the presented 
indicators. Table 4 gives an overview of the performance indicators used in this thesis. 
Table 4 - Performance indicators 
Quantitative  Qualitative 
Financial statements  Perceived present performance 
Employment size  Initial willingness to grow vs. subsequent growth 
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 Funding sources 4.2
A major constraint for the development of RBSOs is access to financial resources (Wright et al., 2007). 
Need for these resources change as the business grows (N. Berger and F. Udell, 1998) and depends on 
the nature of the RBSO. Entrepreneurs seek to lower the cost of obtaining financing through selecting 
sources of funding that are available at a low cost, thus internal funding – investments made by the 
entrepreneur, friends or family – is preferred over external sources (Rasmussen and Sørheim, 2012b). In 
most cases, the founders do not have sufficient personal capital to fund their own venture. Different 
external sources of funding are therefore necessary in order to ensure continuous development of the 
RBSO and its products. Soft funding is funding originating from government initiatives and support given 
by the associated PRI. Private equity funding includes informal investors such as business angels and 
professional investors such as venture capitalists – both private and corporate. A strategic alliance 
between a RBSO and an outside firm commonly involves shared funding of the product development. 
Debt funding is a rare source and mostly serve as leverage for the growth phases of RBSOs. Table 5 
provides an overview of the funding sources available for RBSOs. 
Table 5 - Funding sources available for RBSOs 
Type Stage of investment Involvement 
Financial 
contribution Availability 
PRI incubators Pre-seed to Seed 
Depends on 
incubation strategy 
Depends on 
incubation strategy 
High 
Government 
programs 
Pre-seed to start-
up 
None Low High 
Business Angels 
Pre-seed to start-
up 
Mostly high Medium 
Generally low, 
depending on 
access to 
investor 
network.  
Strategic Alliances Seed to start-up 
Low in management, 
high in R&D 
Medium to high 
Generally low, 
depending on 
business sector 
Venture Capitalists Start-up to Exit Very High High Low 
Corporate Venture 
Capitalists 
Start-up to Exit Very high High Low 
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Throughout the next sections, each funding source will be reviewed individually. For each source, a 
presentation of the main theoretical findings will first be given, followed by a thorough theoretical 
analysis performed by the authors. 
 Internal funding  4.2.1
Internal funding is mainly obtained in two ways. First, the financial contribution by the “3Fs” (family, 
friends and fools) can provide a limited amount of capital in the earliest stages (De Clercq et al., 2006). It 
is procured through the founder’s personal funds, interest-free loans or investments from family or 
friends as well as sweat equity in the form of time and effort put into the venture.. Secondly, the RBSO 
can cut their costs to reduce the overall capital need. Often, the PRI from which the RBSO emerge from 
offers use of their resources such as office location and access to testing labs, which for some RBSOs 
represent central early-stage costs. This way of cutting costs through acquisition and use of resources 
without raising equity or borrowing, or minimizing the need for funding by securing resources at little or 
no costs, is termed bootstrapping (Brush et al., 2006). It is important to note that only equipment and 
spatial resources offered by institutions will here be considered as bootstrapping (and thus internal 
funding). Access to for example competence within the institution or direct funding will be treated as 
incubation funding and treated in the next section. 
Internal funding is highly dependent on the properties, abilities and attitudes of the entrepreneurial 
team (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). Some founders strive to reach independence with their RBSO. This 
can be attributed to the reluctance of working for superiors, wanting to do their own thing or wanting to 
have control over their venture (Hessels et al., 2008). Furthermore, Hessels et al. (2008) found that 
entrepreneurs who were mainly motivated by this independence did not have a strong focus on growth 
and they were not likely to have high ambitions with their business. Conversely, those with low growth 
ambitions are less adverse towards external funding and rely more heavily on internal funding. 
As established previously, RBSOs as a group include both technology-based businesses and technical 
consultancy firms. The development costs are higher for the product-driven companies than service-
driven companies. Additionally, within the product-based group of RBSOs, ventures based on software 
have shorter time-to-market and lower development costs than other companies (Heirman and Clarysse, 
2007). The companies that have lower development and production costs are less dependent on 
external funding and as a result use more internal sources when funding the growth of their venture. In 
some cases, the product or service offered by the RBSO has already been developed previous to the 
venture creation, and as a result, the RBSO can to a larger degree rely on revenues as part of the 
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investment structure from the beginning than those without a finished product at start-up (Politis et al., 
2012). 
The main advantage with this kind of funding is that the ownership of the RBSO is entirely kept by the 
founders. According to the pecking order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984), firms tend to follow a 
pecking order when acquiring funding for their projects: internal equity, debt and then external equity. 
This theory reflects the mind-set that has been documented in other parts of the literature that founders 
wish to keep the ownership of their ventures within the founder group.  
Founders have full disclosure of their own business and especially in the case of RBSOs where 
information asymmetries and uncertainties are highly relevant this is important for the founder. An 
additional advantage is that internal funding is much less costly than external funding, mostly due to the 
little to none information asymmetry associated with it. 
The main disadvantage of internal funding is that the available funds almost always are insufficient to 
successfully develop a venture (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010), as most founders do not possess 
substantial financial resources to cover the start-up cost of the venture. While bootstrapping can be used 
in order to cut costs in some parts of the development, particularly companies that are established with 
a far from market-ready product have substantial product development costs that cannot be funded this 
way.  
Another significant shortcoming is related to the related advantages of other funding sources, as these 
can offer other competencies the RBSO do not possess at start-up. As previously stated, managerial 
competencies in particular are lacking in high-tech start-ups.  This poses the risk of founder bias when it 
comes to topics such as the commerciality of the technology or development of the company. While 
some founders prefer to keep the control within the group of founders, they might have predetermined 
opinions concerning central strategic patterns that potentially can lead the RBSO to wrong directions. 
For example, the most common shortcoming in relation to this is the commerciality of the final product. 
Several academics do not understand how to create a package of their research that is appealing to the 
market they want to attract, or they are targeting the wrong market (Vohora et al., 2004). 
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 Soft funding 4.2.2
In general, initial funding obtained by RBSOs does not come from private sectors investors. Although it 
may vary across institutions depending on their level of prestige, RBSOs often need to obtain public 
sector capital before they can obtain private equity financing, referred to as the finance gap (Mustar et 
al., 2008). Shane (2004) presented evidence that even RBSOs from a prestigious academic institution 
such as MIT had trouble raising seed stage capital from private sector sources. He explained this mainly 
by the high uncertainty linked to the commercial exploitability of products or services deriving from new 
technologies. To answer this challenge, governments and institutions have engaged in numerous funding 
activities, as RBSOs represent a significant stimulus to local surrounding economy and job creation 
(Shane, 2004). In this thesis, soft funding will be divided into funding provided by government programs 
and funding provided by incubators, although these are closely linked to each other. Throughout the 
thesis, PRI is used to designate the institution of origin when it comes to initial research performed, thus 
encompassing universities, colleges and research institutes in one term. This generalization is considered 
appropriate for this part by the authors, as soft funding schemes seldom target a certain type of 
institution performing research (Rasmussen et al., 2012). Some minor distinctions between research 
institutes and universities/colleges will however be made throughout the rest of the thesis. 
Government programs 
Government funding is often the major source of funding during the initial period of technology 
development and allows RBSOs to develop their technology to the point where they can achieve private 
sector financing (Shane, 2004). Most researchers acknowledge that government funding is vital for the 
founding and development of RBSOs in the first place (Wright et al., 2007, Rasmussen and Rice, 2012, 
e.g. Queen, 2002). According to Shane (2004), there are several reasons for this. First, government 
funding allows technologies to be transformed to products and services, often referred to as the proof-
of-concept. Second, it allows RBSOs to find commercial uses of their technology through market and 
customer need analysis. Third, government funding provides a way to decrease the risks associated with 
new technology. It thereby facilitates the obtaining of private sector financing, serving as a catalyst. 
Every country has a different set of funding programs aimed at bridging the RBSO funding gap. Some 
target RBSOs exclusively while others target new technology-based firms in general (Rasmussen and 
Sørheim, 2012a). Several attempts to categorize the different initiatives have been conducted, among 
others by Wright et al. (2007) who divided them into six types of measures: (1) public funds focused on 
pre-seed, (2) public funds focused on seed stage, (3) public/private partnership funds focus on pre-seed 
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and seed phase, (4) schemes which leverage the deals made by adding public money to the private 
investment, (5) insurance schemes which guarantee part of the VC money in case of bankruptcy and (6) 
fiscal incentives and incubation schemes. 
The recent study conducted by Rasmussen and Sørheim (2012a) identified three main types of public 
funding based on empirical data from Canada, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Scotland and Sweden. This 
model classifies the different initiatives by looking at the rationale behind, giving a more relevant 
categorization of the different types of programs. The three types of government programs are 
presented more in detail: 
• Proof-of-concept funding aims at lowering the technological uncertainty of projects at an early 
stage by supporting technology verification. It is typically awarded as a 100% grant to projects. 
Some proof-of-concept schemes also provide competence-enhancing and networking activities. 
Usually, these grants are restricted to applicants approved by the TTOs to secure a proper 
anchoring of the project in the local infrastructure. The funding itself is most often administered 
by the projects themselves. 
• Pre-seed funding aims at reducing organizational uncertainty by providing assistance in the 
development of business plans, strengthening the entrepreneurial team and networking with 
external partners. This type of funding is often administered by regional actors such as the TTOs. 
Much of this funding is done through initiatives such as counseling, training programs and 
indirect support such as leave-of-absence grants. 
• Seed funding aims at reducing the overall investment risk by improving the availability of early-
stage funding through direct funds to RBSOs. It is often designed as a “gearing” mechanism, by 
supplementing private investments with public loans or equity. Another approach is to set up 
public funds exclusively aimed at early-stage project or tax relief measures. 
For RBSOs, the main advantage of government funding is the low risks associated with it. Government 
institutions require few guarantees, and an eventual failure in the formation of a RBSO does not have 
great consequences for the founders with regards to personal responsibilities (Lockett et al., 2005). This 
may however prove a disadvantage as the lack of financial responsibility could lead to entrepreneurs 
abusing the system with a “nothing to lose” attitude. Funding of projects with excessively high risks may 
lead to government funding being “wasted” in fruitless projects, hence negatively affecting the funding 
of other projects and increasing the selection criteria for later projects. 
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Another important positive aspect of government funding is its stability and relatively large 
independence of the market conditions. During the crises in 2001 (dot-com bubble) and 2008 (financial 
crisis), access to VC funding plummeted as markets experienced severe decline. Due to the difficulties of 
accessing capital, fewer projects were carried out and the chances for success decreased substantially 
(Darcy et al., 2009). The role of government funding becomes increasingly important in periods of 
recession. Furthermore, government funds are generally more important in regions where the industrial 
activity is not as high, in a way substituting the lack of industrial funding (Siegel et al., 2007). Stable 
access to government funding makes RBSOs less dependent of the economic cycles and influences. 
From a holistic perspective, government funding programs were implemented as a result of the lost 
socio-economic value creation due to the risk adverse nature of the private sector in the early stages of 
RBSO development (Wright et al., 2007). This has positive implications for RBSOs, as the financing 
measures put in place have limited  focus on returns and have a rather long-term focus (Rasmussen and 
Sørheim, 2012a). Governments also have limited involvement on the RBSOs operations, and do not 
generally require ownership or board positions in contrast to private equity investors. As a result, RBSOs 
have high control over their company after they receive government funds. 
In several European countries, a perceived problem is that risk capital from private sector largely goes to 
specific geographic areas and to more mature technological fields (Borlaug et al., 2009). This is where 
government funding proves necessary as it covers the funding gap created by market failures between 
different regions and technological sectors, due to the private sector’s investment preferences (Siegel et 
al., 2007, Ben-Ari and Vonortas, 2007). Thus, the more specialized the technology is or the more distant 
the institution is from industrial activity, the more valuable government funding becomes. Whether or 
not this is positive is however arguable, as it is, on a national basis, often better to focus on specific 
technological areas where you have a competitive advantage relative to the global market (Porter and 
Millar, 1985). 
Governments are often focused on holistic and profit-inhibiting measures such as the environment or 
district activity enhancement that may be disadvantageous for RBSOs (Siegel et al., 2007). This could for 
example be requirements to what use the technology should have that could benefit the environment 
the most, or that production must be set in place in a defined area to promote regional growth. This 
overall focus often take shaped as regulations that conflict with not only the RBSOs interests, but also 
other additional investors such as VCs, as their goal is often more growth and profit-oriented (Sørheim et 
al., 2011). Hence, the implication for the RBSO is that there has to be a trade-off between the value of 
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governmental funding versus the economic value lost to the restrictions imposed by the government, 
both from the regulations and other potential investors. 
Another negative aspect of government funding is that the investment process often has a large set of 
reporting requirements (Jones-Evans, 1998).  This leads RBSOs to have to devote a lot of resources on 
time-consuming paperwork, resources that RBSOs with few employees often struggle to allocate. 
Additionally, there are usually several government institutions managing the different funding 
instruments, often leading to additional bureaucracy problems for RBSOs due to coordination problems 
between these institutions (Borlaug et al., 2009).  
Lastly, government programs in general provide relatively low financial contributions to RBSOs (Wright 
et al., 2007). This is problematic as technology is not as basic anymore and the development process is 
costly, particularly within life sciences and biotech (Darcy et al., 2009). Markets have also become 
increasingly global, thus the introduction of new products or services often require a significant amount 
of resources (Knight, 2000). Researchers argue that the lack of large investments in the early stages has 
transformed the phenomenon of “funding gaps” into a situation of “thin markets” (Nightingale et al., 
2009). Murray and Marriott (1998) presented evidence from all over Europe that suggested that the 
performance of early stage government funds is poor compared to later larger funds’ performance. 
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Incubators 
A PRI involved in technology transfer can engage in a variety of support activities to provide RBSOs with 
the resources and capabilities it needs to develop through its different phases  (Wright et al., 2007). 
Today, most European PRIs organize these activities through own associated technology transfer offices 
(TTOs), which exclusively focus on the commercialization of research (Gulbrandsen, 2010). This leads to 
another interesting categorization where different so-called incubation strategies employed by 
institutions can be classified in terms of resources utilized, activities undertaken, and their goals and 
objectives. Wright et al. (2007) further examined these different strategies through a sample of 43 
European PRIs. They identified three reference models: 
• The Low Selective model has a mission towards maximizing the number of entrepreneurial 
ventures and relies on a natural selection process. Activities undertaken are mostly oriented 
towards raising entrepreneurial awareness among researchers and students. Funding is 
characterized by small amounts originating from public funds and ranging from 15 000 € to 100 
000 €. Support is typically given at pre-founding stage. 
• The Supportive model is oriented towards generating RBSOs as an alternative to licensing and 
tends to focus on profit-oriented RBSOs with growth potential. It takes its name from the 
extensive support it provides to the entrepreneurial team during the pre-startup phase. Key 
activities are incubation and business plan advice, and the funding is typically provided in the 
early stages through public-private partnership funds ranging from 350 000 € to 600 000 €. 
• The Incubator model is oriented towards creating financially attractive RBSOs with focus on exit 
possibilities in the later stages. The PRIs are more proactively seeking opportunities, and 
resemble VC investors in their selection of projects and support activities provided. The funding 
scale is also similar to a VCs ranging from 1 to 4 million € in startup capital and followed by 
several investment rounds in the later stages. The staff is often more professional and the link 
with industry is tighter than the two previous models. 
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In addition, Wright et al. (2007) identified two sub-optimal model types related to two types of 
deficiencies.  
• The resource deficient model type refers to the PRIs with high ambitions in terms of objectives 
but with the lack of resources to realize them. These are often trying to imitate other models 
without having the key success elements. These elements are for example sufficient financial 
resources and a strong regional network that support entrepreneurial activities. 
• The competence deficient model type refers to PRIs with sufficient resources but which do not 
have the sufficient ability to perform the activities needed for success. Typically this deficiency is 
related to the institution employees’ lack of experience and knowledge in the fields of 
entrepreneurship and networking. 
Arguably the funding provided by incubators is by far the most easily available financing source for 
RBSOs, a fact that can be explained by the few barriers present between the different actors. As 
mentioned previously, the legislation changes that turned PRIs into IPR-owners lead institutions to take 
on a more active role in the commercialization activities. PRIs have become increasingly involved in the 
operation of TTOs and commit own resources for this purpose (Siegel et al., 2003). The advantages are 
mostly related to the close geographical proximity (face-to-face interaction), the low “psychic distance” 
between the founding entrepreneurs and the incubator employees and the evident fact that technology 
developed is a direct result from previously funded research at the institution (Darcy et al., 2009). 
Not only is funding provided by incubators easy to come by, it is also highly available, as most 
institutions in Europe have established their own TTO (Darcy et al., 2009). High availability of funds is 
often a necessity to close the gap between academic research and commercial application. According to 
Rasmussen and Rice (2012) funding provided by incubators can be seen as part of the idea of extending 
research into technology development. In other words, risks associated with the high uncertainty of 
technology developed at institutions discourage industrial actors to take part in the technology 
development, making funding through incubators a necessity for many RBSOs. As stated previously, 
difficulty obtaining financing is considered by RBSOs as the main obstacle towards commercialization, an 
obstacle that incubator funding helps overcome. 
Formation of RBSOs is however a costly mechanism for technology transfer due to the additional costs 
involved in the formation of a new firm, for example through acquiring market knowledge or time-
consuming activities such as networking (Shane, 2004). Incubators in general have tight budgets, a 
45 
 
restriction that brings us back to the two sub-optimal incubation strategies that we presented previously 
(Wright et al., 2007). Consequences of the resource deficient type are the most obvious ones, as general 
lack of financial resources has been shown to lead to unsuccessful commercialization results. Budget 
constraints of incubators also directly leads to a competence deficient type of incubation strategy, as it 
often results in a lack of sufficient staff and necessary training programs at TTOs (Wright et al., 2007). 
In addition to being funded through government programs, incubators receive funds directly from the 
institutions. Institutions’ role as investors is disputed by several experts (Shane, 2004, Rory et al., 2004). 
The primary mission of institutions is creation and dissemination of knowledge through research and 
teaching, for which the institutions in large part receive taxpayer’s money to achieve. This raises the 
ethical dilemma of using institution funds aimed at education and research to invest in high-risk 
formation of RBSOs. In addition, the underlying goal of achieving profit from RBSOs can reduce research 
on areas with limited commercial potential (Shane, 2004). Furthermore, involvement in potential 
unsuccessful firms can risk the institution´s prestige and reputation, making subsequent acquisition of 
financial resources from industrial actors more difficult (Rory et al., 2004). 
Another negative aspect of incubator funding is the potential lower involvement of industry actors in the 
early stages. According to Shane (2004), high share of incubation funding can lead to less focus on 
commercial applicability, increased difficulties to work with private sector in later stages, and make 
introduction to market more difficult. In other words, it increases the “academic naïveté” of RBSOs 
(Shane, 2004). Too much affiliations with the institution could lead the RBSO into a confined “institution 
bubble”, hence giving difficulties to adapting the technology to the business world. 
 Private equity investors 4.2.3
In this thesis, three types of private equity are considered: Business angels (BAs), Venture Capitalists 
(VCs) and Corporate Venture Capitalists (CVCs). Start-up funds through private equity is vital for many 
start-up firms as informal, institutional and industrial investors can provide larger investments than most 
soft funding programs (Meuleman et al., 2009). Private equity investors accept more risk than e.g. 
commercial banks (Wright et al., 2006). This type of investor provide capital beyond the level that can be 
guaranteed by a venture’s assets, thus seed-stage investors cannot shift risk to entrepreneurs 
completely and must bear some of it themselves (Shane and Cable, 2002). 
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Profit is an important measure for all private equity investors and return on their investments as 
motivation behind investment decisions is shared by all, but to different degrees. The ventures they 
invest in are therefore often regarded as means to a goal. Additionally, private equity investors share a 
selective behavior when choosing ventures to invest in (Berger and Udell, 1998). VCs for example have 
strict predetermined screening criteria potential ventures need to qualify for.  
The size of the investment often qualifies private equity investors for partial control over the venture 
which is a reason for hesitance in seeking this kind of funding from the RBSOs point of view. In order to 
make sure they get the most out of their investments, private equity investors often take on an active 
role within the new venture and provide several value-adding activities. Mainly this additional value is 
provided through managerial and organizational competencies that RBSOs commonly lack. Often 
researchers and academics have a false impression on the commercial applicability of their product due 
to less market knowledge (Wright et al., 2004b), which these value-added activities can help substitute 
for. In the following sections, the different sources of private equity will be more thoroughly discussed 
from the perspective of RBSOs.  
Business Angels (BAs) 
BAs are individuals who invest their own capital directly into new ventures. They often have 
entrepreneurial backgrounds which gives them the needed knowledge of evaluating prospective 
investments. Although BAs share similar characteristics, they are heterogeneous in many ways (Erikson 
and Sørheim, 2005) and several attempts have been made in order to classify this kind of investors (e.g. 
Sørheim and Landström (2001), Avdeitchikova et al. (2008)). As individuals, they are hard to come across 
for the entrepreneur, and personal networks are important in order to attract this kind of investor. Most 
countries in Europe have established BA Networks (BANs) (Christensen, 2011). Typically, these networks 
are operated by a non-profit organization such as a university (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
When it comes to BA funding, the trend seems to be that these investors enter RBSOs at an earlier stage 
than other private equity investors (Shane, 2004), often in pre-seed and seed stages. Their evaluation 
process is more subjective than the other two private equity sources, and often results in a preference 
for geographically close proximity and investments in ventures that, on a later stage, will attract funding 
from venture capital (De Clercq et al., 2006). Furthermore, the evaluation process is emphasized more by 
agency risk – the belief that the entrepreneur have the needed competence to bring the product to the 
market, than market risk – the assessment of the market potential of the venture (Wright et al., 2007).  
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BAs are heterogeneous (Erikson and Sørheim, 2005) when it comes to their technical focus, experience, 
targets, and motivation behind investments. A comprehensive categorization of BAs was made by 
Sørheim and Landström (2001) who split this kind of investor into four categories: The Lotto Investor 
who have a low investment activity and low competence in regards to founding and running 
entrepreneurial ventures, the Traders who have a high investment activity, but possesses low 
competence, the Analytical investor who have a low investment activity, but have a high competence 
and lastly the business angel who have both high investment activity and high competence. By 
consciously looking for suitable BAs, founders of RBSOs can look for a fitting investor rather than try to 
subjugate themselves to the demands of more institutional investors, a fit that can, in later stages, prove 
to be a competitive advantage. Deciding which type of BA to reach out for is an important decision for 
RBSOs who seek this kind of financing. In the following, the last category of business angels is the one 
discussed. 
Like the other private equity providers, BAs aid the venture through value-adding activities. Politis 
(2008) found several ways the BA is involved in the development process such as providing consultancy 
services for the board of directors, and by promoting and protecting the venture’s interests. This 
resulted in four different roles of BAs: (1) sounding board/strategic role – provide strategic advice to the 
entrepreneur, (2) supervision and monitoring role – shielding investments from potential managerial 
misbehavior through instating proper accounting information systems and by serving on the board of 
directors, (3) resource acquisition role – providing access to resources such as investor groups, business 
contacts and additional funding through their networks and (4) mentoring role – providing more informal 
support. (Politis, 2008). 
More often than not, BAs have previous valuable experience, both as investors and as entrepreneurs. 
Firstly, most BAs have gained their funds through a successful start-up and subsequent buyouts (Politis, 
2008). The entrepreneurial competencies BAs can contribute with are therefore highly relevant for new 
start-ups, and can be used as tools to reduce the market risk of the RBSO. Secondly, the networks BAs 
have built during previous involvement in start-ups or their own entrepreneurial venture provide 
connections that are useful for the RBSO. For example, the contribution of these networks can open up 
for additional funding (Politis, 2008). 
Contrary to other private equity investors, BAs are patient investors; they have generally a longer time 
frame on their investments and do not require the same rate of return on their investments as for 
example VCs (Shane, 2004). In his work, Shane (2004) furthermore express the motivation behind BAs’ 
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investments as not only return on investment, but also a genuine interest in the technology or business 
concept. This lets them become more involved in the creation process of the RBSO on a personal level 
and they will invest in ventures where they believe the entrepreneurs are the right persons to bring the 
technology to life (De Clercq et al., 2006). As a result, they do not require the same return on interest as 
VCs (Shane, 2004). 
As other private equity investors, BAs want a degree of interaction and control over the progress of the 
RBSO, thus requiring some sort of influence on how the RBSO is managed in order to reduce the agency 
risk of the investment (Wright et al., 2004b). This control is however not as fixed as the demanded 
control from other private equity funders (Ehrlich et al., 1994). As already discussed, BAs depend more 
on this agency risk than market risk when choosing firms to invest in which imply that BAs are confident 
in the entrepreneurs abilities. For example, BAs are influenced from referrals when considering 
investment opportunities (Sørheim, 2003). With their confidence that the entrepreneur is the person to 
bring the RBSO to life, the need for personal control over the venture is reduced. Consequently, BAs 
demand less control over the ventures they invest in than other private equity sources. 
The main disadvantage for this kind of investor is the low availability. While there is a trend of 
developing BA networks (Christensen, 2011), BAs are few and not easy to find (De Clercq et al., 2006). As 
a result, procuring this kind of funds is, in general, not easy. The number of RBSOs compared to BAs is 
big, and there are simply not enough BAs to fund the projects. In fact, the study by Sørheim (2003) found 
that informal investors come across more than enough investment opportunities, but lack the funds to 
follow through. Directly, this means that while BAs might want to invest in a venture, they do not have 
capacity to fund the development. As a result, the competition among RBSOs seeking this kind of funding 
increases. 
BAs dispose smaller funds than other private equity actors do and consequently their contributions are 
relatively smaller. As a result, they risk being diluted if the business requires additional funding (Mason 
and Harrison, 2004), increasing the expected risk of entering the RBSO. Especially in technology-driven 
start-ups, there is a need for extensive capital investments in several phases, increasing the risk of 
dilution. Hence, BAs are often more hesitant to invest in ventures with uncertain technology. 
Furthermore, due to the BA only being private individuals, the process is more informal. This can prove 
as both an advantage and a disadvantage. On the one hand, the informal approach can give the 
entrepreneurs more freedom to develop at their own pace. On the other hand, a relation-based 
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involvement of an investor can prove problematic when it comes to conflict management (Lee and 
Cavusgil, 2006). The potential conflicts that arise often depend on the actual level of trust between the 
BA and the entrepreneurs. As seen before, BAs give more freedom to entrepreneurs than other private 
equity actors. If this trust only shows at the surface, the parts might question each other’s incentives 
which in turn lead to a less constructive working environment. Potential conflicts that are not dealt with 
accordingly can cause bigger troubles than necessary. For example, some BAs are more profit-oriented 
than others and have several similarities to VCs, and might take advantage of the less rigid relational 
collaboration between the RBSO and the BA (De Clercq et al., 2006). 
Venture Capitalists (VCs) 
VCs buy stakes in the entrepreneur’s idea, nurture it for a short period of time and then exit the 
investment with expectations of high return on their investments (Zider, 1998). At any point of time, 
they have interests in several projects, thus they are portfolio-firms. These portfolios are evaluated 
continuously and every investment is made through a staged approach. VCs generally operate with a 
short time horizon on investments, often between five and seven years (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). In 
order to control the progress they demand important decision making positions in the venture 
(Macmillan et al., 1987), and the level of control is much higher than for BAs (Berger and Udell, 1998).  
VCs prefer to invest in later development stages, where the technology risk is lower (Berger and Udell, 
1998) and investments are made in a staged process based on the performance of the RBSO (Dahiya and 
Ray, 2012). New ventures launched in large industries and those in industries that have stronger patent 
protection are more likely to receive venture capital funding (Shane and Stuart, 2002). Objective 
dimensions of venture development such as financial statements have significant impact on the 
probability that a venture will receive external financing (Eckhardt et al., 2006).  
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) distinguish between three phases of the VC investment cycle: pre-investment, 
post-investment and exit. In the different phases, respectively, the VC screen for the “right venture”, 
monitor and provide values, and end the investment in the venture. The screening process of the VC in 
the pre-investment phase has been thoroughly researched. Emphasis is often put on the extensive and 
time-consuming nature of this process.   
VCs seldom seek ventures in the latest stages of development, and at the same time no sooner than the 
seed-stage (Sahlman, 1990). In the earlier stages, the uncertainty concerning the technology and 
business concept is too high even for this type of investor. Information asymmetries and uncertainties 
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that often occur in connection with RBSOs are commonly attempted to be reduced with strict, pre-
defined contracts on the investments (Sahlman, 1990) and staging of contributions (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003).  
The most common exit-strategy for RBSO founders is through a trade-sale (Wright et al., 2007). Other 
forms of exit are through an initial public offering (IPO), buyback of the VCs shares buy the founders or 
liquidation of the venture. IPO is often a preferred exit-method for both entrepreneur and investor as 
this type of exit often results in the highest valuation of the RBSO (De Clercq et al., 2006). Receiving 
venture funding is the single most important determinant of the likelihood of IPO, which in turn implies 
that much of the variance in new venture performance is attributable to the factors that affect the 
likelihood of VC funding (Shane and Stuart, 2002). 
VCs are experienced investors and have competencies in several aspects concerning venture 
development, particularly when it comes to managerial issues such as business plans and financial 
administrative tools (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989, Sapienza, 1992). As a result, the VCs offer a varied 
selection of value-adding activities such as building the investor group, reviewing and helping to 
formulate business strategy and to fill in on the management team (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). Time 
spent on value-adding activities is short but frequent, depending on the investor’s position (lead/non-
lead investor), and meetings are typically shorter ranging from monthly visits to quarterly visits (Gorman 
and Sahlman, 1989). As with the resource acquisition BAs, VCs offer social funding through providing 
access to professional networks and industries and thus give access to unique market information or 
increase the likelihood of additional funding by promotion (Berglund, 2011). As studies have shown, 
RBSOs typically lack in the managerial aspect of getting their concept ready for market, and deliberately 
seek founding through venture capital in order to gain these competencies (Colombo et al., 2010, Ortín-
Ángel and Vendrell-Herrero, 2010). There have been several studies on these value-adding activities 
(Macmillan et al., 1989, Sapienza, 1992, Hellmann and Puri, 2002) which generally result in the 
acknowledgement that the activities varies along with the competence of the VC. VCs intensively 
monitor start-up managers, typically demand a large enough share to control the venture and demand 
representation on the board of directors, often in order to address information asymmetry related 
problems. Entrepreneurs receiving funds from VCs also appear to be more likely to gain access to 
additional rounds of equity at critical stages of their development (Ehrlich et al., 1994). 
In the seed-stage and forward, need for financial support is high as the technology or idea start to 
develop. A main advantage with VCs as investors is the high financial contribution they offer in the 
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phases where capital is most needed. In fact, VCs can be considered the dominant form of equity funding 
of businesses that rely heavily on technology (Lerner, 2004, Berglund, 2011).  
VCs are highly selective and only invest in the most promising ventures, thereby providing increased 
credibility for RBSOs (Colombo et al., 2010, Knockaert and Vanacker, 2011). In order to decrease the risk 
associated with information asymmetries and choosing the right venture, VCs’ screening process often 
consist of extensive information collection and they seek to continuously develop their abilities in 
selecting ventures (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). Criteria for getting this kind of funding are 
consequently tough, and the start-up must not only show an appealing business idea, it must also prove 
that it has the entrepreneurial skills to bring the concept into life (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). Only the 
start-ups deemed the most promising will be considered for possible investments, thus funding through 
venture capital sends important signals about the start-up, even if the USO is only in the earliest 
screening process (Davila et al., 2003). As other market actors are aware of this screening practice, the 
RBSO can be associated with the same values of high potential and credibility that VCs portray. 
The disadvantage of the capital provided by all types of private equity investors, and VCs in particular, is 
that the founders must give up parts of the ownership. VCs often invest enough to be qualified to a 
position on the board of directors where their opinions have significant influence. Of the three private 
equity funders, VCs are likely to place stricter control measures than any of the others  and demand 
more reporting (Ehrlich et al., 1994). Additionally, according to Hellmann and Puri (2002), VC-backed 
firms are more likely to replace the founder with an outside CEO. Consequently, founders may feel loss 
of control of their own venture. 
A supplementary disadvantage to the demanded ownership position of VCs is the potential for conflicts 
of interests. VCs often have the organizational or managerial understanding to drive the development of 
the RBSO, but may lack in technological knowledge. As a result, their emphasis when making decisions 
for the RBSO is influenced by this (Wright et al., 2007). While the entrepreneurs tend to have a personal 
attachment to the RBSO or the technology, the VC regards it as a means to create returns. 
Combining the two above-mentioned disadvantages, there are several potential areas of conflicts where 
the loss of control is particularly apparent. For example, determining time spent on developing the 
technology, the relevance of the technology for the market, understanding the market potential or using 
market knowledge to further develop the technology may be sources of conflict. VCs will push towards 
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commercialization while RBSOs often will push towards more technology development, and the loss of 
control may be enhanced as the entrepreneurs and the VC representatives have conflicting opinions.  
VCs frequently evaluate their portfolio of investments; they weigh further investments in current 
portfolio companies against new potential ventures which are a constant trade-off between costs of 
development and uncertainty against the potential for revenues in the future (Gorman and Sahlman, 
1989). As a result, if the VC owner group decides the investment is no longer beneficial for the VC, they 
will liquidate the project. Alternatively, the VCs do not have the funds for further investments even 
though they want to continue investing. As VCs often hold the majority of shares, there is not much 
entrepreneurs can do in order to keep the RBSO running with the exception of buying back the venture. 
As a consequence, investments by VCs bring along a threat of premature liquidation the RBSO. For 
example for a technology-based RBSO where the time needed to develop the technology in order to 
make it ready for the market might exceed the preferred time horizon of the VC thus leading to a 
liquidation in order to reduce costs. 
Corporate Venture Capitalists (CVCs) 
The investments in external start-ups by corporate funds can be defined by two features: the objective 
of the investment and the relationship between investor and venture (Chesbrough, 2002). Where the 
VCs main objective with an investment is financial, CVCs usually have more diverse and complex strategic 
objectives as well (Park and Steensma, 2012), seeking synergies between the parent company and the 
venture (Chesbrough, 2002). The strategic objectives of the CVC may however conflict with the interests 
of the RBSO, where the investor may be more interested in the technology than the venture itself (De 
Clercq et al., 2006). The second characteristic of this kind of investments is the linkages between the 
RBSO and the CVC’s current operational capabilities. In investments where the venture is closely linked 
with the CVC, additional value-adding properties such as access to manufacturing plants or distribution 
channels become available for the start-up (Chesbrough, 2002).  
RBSOs are chosen based on their potential strategic contribution to the parent company and the chance 
for an acquisition or a trade-sale at a later stage is high (De Clercq et al., 2006). The study by Park and 
Steensma (2012) revealed that when specialized complementary assets were needed, CVC-backed firms 
were more likely to reach an IPO. Additionally, they deemed CVCs as more beneficial when the 
operational environment of the RBSO was characterized by high uncertainty. RBSOs operating in stable 
markets are able to predict their resource needs and equity ownership is less important as it is less 
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opportunity for opportunistic behavior. In uncertain environments, the performance of CVC-backed 
ventures is enhanced compared to non-CVC funded ventures (Park and Steensma, 2012).  
Corporate venture capitalists represent most of the same advantages as the VC. They are able to provide 
a relatively high financial contribution at a critical time in the venture development, and participate in 
the development process through value-adding activities. Furthermore, their access to networks are 
highly relevant for the RBSO (Chesbrough, 2002). As with the VCs, RBSOs backed by CVCs will receive an 
increased credibility in the market as the technology is deemed interesting by a highly selective investor. 
If the CVC holds a respected brand, this could be extended to the RBSO (Chesbrough, 2002). 
In addition to benefits shared with the VC, CVC investments also include the option of industry 
experience. The competence of the CVC management often includes technical capabilities, especially 
within the operation field of the parent company. As a result, the investors can appreciate that 
development of technology might take more time. An additional advantage of the industrial experience 
is that the networks provided through the company are related to the business area of the RBSO to a 
greater extent.  
Involvement of a corporate investor may also have some disadvantages. For one, the parent company’s 
strategic interest could be different to the RBSO’s, and as with VCs, this might cause an additional 
conflict of interests. The potential conflict concerning profit versus technology that VCs represent is still 
valid for CVCs, but the strategic interest provide the investor with another important factor to account 
for when making decisions. Investments in RBSOs as a way of outsourcing R&D leaves the CVC 
susceptible to exploit the properties of the RBSO (De Clercq et al., 2006). Motivation behind the 
investment decision is to create value for the parent company, and consequently, if the RBSO cannot 
contribute to increasing this value, the CVC may pull out of the investment. Furthermore, there might be 
underlying motivations behind strategic decisions which will subordinate the RBSO to the parent 
company (De Clercq et al., 2006, Chesbrough, 2002).  
Funding from a corporate actor will establish a lasting link between the RBSO and the parent company. 
Involvement from one market actor can cause other companies in the same sector to be hesitant in 
investing in the RBSO as an extension of their competitor (De Clercq et al., 2006). One could argue that 
co-investment with a direct competitor is not a preferred situation for most companies, as investment in 
other companies that are subordinated to another company’s practice will conflict with own interests. 
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Alternatively, the potential customers might be hesitant in acquiring the products as they consider this 
an extension of the parent company (Park and Steensma, 2012).  
 Strategic alliance (SA) between a RBSO and an industry partner 4.2.4
CVC is the option for firms to indirectly invest in new ventures. A direct approach to corporate 
investments is through SAs. For the purpose of this thesis, a SA will be defined as a relationship between 
a RBSO and an industry partner to pursue a set of agreed upon goals or to meet a critical business need 
while remaining independent organizations, hence excluding the alternative where the outside firm 
owns equity in the RBSO. SAs will in this thesis include both technological agreements (e.g. research joint 
ventures and technology sharing agreements) and commercial agreements (e.g. joint distribution 
agreements and customer-supplier relations) (Colombo et al., 2006).  
Whilst many researchers and academic entrepreneurs have collaborated with industry partners on 
research projects, the literature on this subject is limited (Wright et al., 2004a). A study conducted by 
Lubik et al. (2013) shows however that the formation of alliances for RBSOs in particular is surprisingly 
common. Indeed, more technically innovative firms and firms in emergent markets exhibit greater 
likelihood of alliance formation (Colombo et al., 2006). The main rationale behind such collaboration lies 
in the potential gains for both partners. From a RBSO’s perspective, the industry partner can contribute 
with crucial resources such as capital, development know-how, technological capabilities and scale-up 
facilities. Additionally, industry partners can often contribute with important complementary assets such 
as market information and market access (Lubik et al., 2013). From the industry partner’s perspective, 
the RBSO provide the technology and solutions the firm needs to achieve competitive advantage in the 
form of innovation. In other words, the RBSO can be seen as a form of outsourcing partner of the R&D 
operations of the firm (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Hence, a SA represents a great opportunity 
to create value from “getting the best of both worlds”.  
Moreover, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) argued that firms capitalizing on founders strong social 
positions is another important basis for alliance formations. These social positions include personal 
relationships, status and reputation of key individuals and capitalizing on these has been shown to create 
higher awareness of opportunities of alliancing. In addition, strong social positions give increased 
knowledge and trust among potential partners, especially beneficial for the high information 
asymmetries associated between RBSOs and industrial partners (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). 
The predominant factor found in the literature that allegedly hinders alliance formation is related to the 
small size of RBSOs. Indeed, SAs potentially lead to high transaction costs, often unbearable for the 
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limited resources of RBSOs (Colombo et al., 2006). The time and attention of the few employees in an 
RBSO are valuable resources, and the costs of searching, assessing, negotiating and later managing a SA 
will take away these resources from critical core activities. 
In essence, a SA gives a competitive position that otherwise would not have been possible (Teece, 
1986). The outside firm does not always possess the technology or idea it needs to develop an innovative 
product, while the RBSO lacks the financial strength and market expertise to be able to enter a product 
development phase with acceptable associated risks. Given the outside firm´s prior knowledge of its 
industry and an overall superior “market intelligence”, it possesses a great advantage in developing 
opportunities from an industry-relevant technological discovery (Wright et al., 2006). A key word here is 
the firm´s knowledge of the customer’s unmet needs, which leads to an accelerated product 
development process and reduced development costs (Tsang, 1998). Furthermore, the industry actor 
often has managerial expertise that facilitates the commercialization process, as well as access to 
superior facilities and equipment that the RBSO does not have initially (Miles et al., 1999). 
Another positive aspect is the increased credibility the new venture can acquire from this cooperation 
(Wright et al., 2004b, 2006). The prestige of the university or research institution where the RBSO 
originates from in addition to the outside firm’s reputation gives the SA both the recognition of 
accomplished research and market competence. A key word here is legitimacy, a feature crucial for the 
often pioneering technologies that RBSOs try to implement (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Tying 
the technology to established firms and making them spend resources on developing it can often 
outperform other rival technologies. 
An important difference between a SA- and VC/CVC-backed RBSOs is that the SA relation is more 
constructive (Wright et al., 2004b). Usually, the only common goal that exists between a VC and a RBSO 
is the goal of growth and profit. A SA on the other hand will have other equally important common goals, 
such as for example knowledge transfer through trade of technology and market competence, or the 
reduction of development and production costs. Furthermore, the possibility of retaining independence 
as an autonomous entity while receiving the competencies and capabilities needed for successful 
commercialization makes SA a preferred alternative to equity investors (Miles et al., 1999). 
There are however always goals not common to both parties, constituting possible sources of conflict. 
The question of who should own the intellectual property rights of the technology developed will often 
be problematic. In the same way, industry partners will often claim some form of exclusiveness, limiting 
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the market potential for the venture (Forrest and Martin, 1992). There will also be a discussion during 
the product development, as the firm often will require product properties to be specific for their 
corresponding product portfolio, while the RBSO would want the product properties to be compatible 
with the rest of the market. Another source of conflict could be that firms often have a shorter time 
horizon and are less ambitious than the ventures (Forrest and Martin, 1992). The interest of the outside 
firm will often only lie in covering one specific technological need for their product line giving them the 
competitive edge on the rest of their competitors. A RBSO on the other hand is looking to establish itself 
as a solid firm, and will often aim at developing the products and solutions further with a more long-term 
focus. 
The power distribution between the two partners is also potentially problematic, as outside firms are 
significantly stronger financially and have little dependence on the RBSO. The RBSO on the other hand 
possesses few assets and will be tied up to the firm when collaboration has been initiated (Miles et al., 
1999). This high dependence gives the industrial actor a higher bargaining power, and is a possible 
source of exploitation of the RBSO. Furthermore, Lubik et al. (2013) suggested that RBSOs that had 
several alliances had increased and more sustained commercial success, thus pointing out the potentially 
vulnerable position of only relying on a single alliance partner. 
Cultural difference between academic environments and the business world may also prove a 
disadvantage (Shane, 2004). Researchers and academics are often not used to being pressured by time 
aspects and managers, as well as the high focus on income potential from the outside firm. Another 
factor for academics is that collaboration with outside firms leads to more confidentiality measures, 
hence no academic recognition or publication reward (Siegel et al., 2007). Lastly, an important 
disadvantage of collaborating and receiving funds from the private sector is that several soft funding 
alternatives will no longer be available (Wright et al., 2004b). 
 Private Debt Funding 4.2.5
A simplified version of the debt funding process is that a loan is issued from a lending institution, which is 
to be paid back within a given time period against an interest rate which rises along with the uncertainty 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). It is important to note that only the debt funding provided by private lending 
institutions is here considered, hence excluding soft and internal loans. 
When seeking funding by credit, the uncertainties the RBSOs represent are particularly critical. Banks are 
highly risk-adverse, and lending money to a high-risk project such as a RBSO is rare (Colombo and Grilli, 
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2007). As already thoroughly discussed, the technological uncertainties and high information asymmetry 
that RBSOs embody severely increase the risks associated with them. This is intensified by the often 
absence of audited financial statements in the early stages, and a way to decrease this is through 
collateral and guarantees (Hogan and Hutson, 2005). Berger and Udell (1998) found that most small 
businesses that actually have loans are in fact backed by collateral of either the firm’s or the 
entrepreneur’s assets or through guarantees. This is however a rare luxury for RBSOs in particular, as 
human capital and IPR are often the only assets they possess. Hence, the limited tangible assets highly 
constrain the size of the loan that lending institutions can justifiably provide (Mason and Harrison, 2004). 
Audretsch (2004) argues that debt funding for RBSOs is essentially an inappropriate mechanism, as the 
administrative costs for lending institutions to assess the creditworthiness of RBSOs are too high. Indeed, 
lending institutions are almost unanimously generalists, thus have difficulties in evaluating technology 
projects due to too high information asymmetry. In addition, the fact that banks cannot benefit from the 
higher expected returns to the same degree as other funding actors further emphasizes the 
unsuitableness of debt funding for RBSOs (Colombo and Grilli, 2007). The underlying goal of a lending 
institution is solely to secure the loan back with interest, with minimal risks associated with it. Compared 
to the previously presented funding sources, there are no value-adding activities or network access 
associated with bank loans. 
Despite the inappropriateness of debt funding, there are some advantages. The most obvious is that it 
does not require entrepreneurs to give up ownership. Independence can often be considered as the 
main motive for starting a firm, and is the main rationale for seeking private debt funding (Hogan and 
Hutson, 2005). Moreover, the interest payments are tax-deductible, thus potentially reducing some of 
the operating expenses (Hogan and Hutson, 2005).  
However, there are also some significant disadvantages with debt funding. Firstly, lending institutions 
generally require a fixed schedule of repayment, thus ignoring the varying performance of the RBSO 
(Ben-Ari and Vonortas, 2007). If the firm experiences a period of low income and is not able to reimburse 
the periodic payment, it can potentially default. This is particularly negative for RBSOs, as many require a 
lengthy and uncertain product development process. Secondly, debt has a negative impact on the firm’s 
cash flow, as revenue that should be reinvested into the company is forced into repayment of debt (Ben-
Ari and Vonortas, 2007). Thus, private debt funding may in some cases prove somewhat short-term, as it 
potentially inhibits future growth. Lastly, debt funding reduces the incentives for private equity actors to 
invest in a RBSO, as debt holders are more strongly protected by law (Audretsch, 2004). If the RBSO is 
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financed both by banks and private equity, it is the lending institutions that get the money back from 
selling assets or collateral owned by the firm. Hence, debt funding practically implies disregarding 
private equity as complementary source. 
To conclude, the literature suggests that private debt only play a minor role in early stage financing of 
highly innovative firms (Audretsch, 2004, Colombo and Grilli, 2007, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000, 
Wright et al., 2006). It is only in the late growth stage, where much of the initial uncertainty has 
disappeared and the firm experiences positive cash flows, that debt financing becomes more suitable. 
The need for leverage however only arises for firms with high resource needs, typically high-growth firms 
with high concept maturity (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2003). 
 Summary of funding sources  4.3
As funding sources is a leading topic for this thesis, the authors decided to perform a thorough 
theoretical analysis based on an extensive literature study. This provided insightful knowledge and 
permitted the authors to perceive the prominent strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for 
each source. The result is summarized in the next table. Throughout the thesis, these perceived 
characteristics formed a solid framework for gathering empirical evidence and further analyzing the 
results. Table 6 provides a summary of the funding sources discussed in the previous sections. 
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Table 6 - Summary of funding sources 
Source Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
Internal funding - Independence 
- Little-to-none 
information asymmetries 
- Lack of complementary 
competencies 
- Small contribution 
 
- Founder makes decisions 
 
- Lose perspective over 
commercial potential 
- Critical decisions 
 
Soft funding - Stability 
- High control 
- Availability 
- Regulations 
- Reporting requirements 
- Low financial 
contributions 
- Covers funding gap 
- Low risks 
 
- Nearly inexistent 
Business Angels - Experience  
- Networks 
- Value-added 
 
- Low availability 
- Smaller funds 
- Informal process 
- Investor heterogeneity 
- Patience 
 
- Success might not work 
other places 
 
Venture Capital - High contribution 
- Competencies 
 
- Information asymmetries - Value-adding activities 
- Increased credibility 
- Conflict of interests 
Corporate Venture Capital - Industry experience 
- High contribution 
- Information asymmetry 
- Strategic motives 
 
- Increased Credibility 
- Value-adding activities 
- Conflict of interests 
- Other hesitant in 
investments 
Strategic Alliances - “Market intelligence” 
- Constructive relations 
- Power distribution 
- Cultural difference 
- Competitive position 
- Increased credibility 
- Conflicts 
Private debt  -No external influence - Inappropriate 
mechanism 
- Tax-deductible 
 
- Default the company 
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 Note for further reading 4.4
The literature study has hopefully provided the reader with a deeper theoretical understanding of 
the central topics surrounding RBSOs and the funding sources available to them. Throughout this 
chapter, several frameworks were developed such as to reduce some of the complexity 
characterizing RBSOs, and further give the authors suitable tools to present the gathered empirical 
data in a meaningful and transparent way. Hopefully, the reader will find this approach relatively 
simple to follow.  
In the following part, the empirical results will be presented in a narrative way following copiously 
the structure employed in the theoretical part. Hence, the first part will present the main 
characteristics of the case firms. The stage-model will provide a sound basis for evaluating where the 
RBSOs are in the development process. Further the RBSOs will be categorized using the developed 
typology. Last, the performance indicators will serve as basis for assessing the performance of each 
of the case firms in the sample. The second part will present the main empirical findings concerning 
each funding sources, and each will systematically be summarized in a table to facilitate the 
interpretation for the reader.  
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 Empirical results 5
 RBSOs 5.1
 RBSO development process  5.1.1
During the theoretical examination, a stage-model of RBSO development was appointed. As a 
reminder, an important expansion was made that incorporated critical junctures to pinpoint the 
transitions between the different stages. The stages and critical junctures include several activities 
that must be performed in order to proceed to the next stage. In the following, each individual stage 
will be discussed chronologically. Figure 4 provides an overview of the present situation for the case 
firms. The blue dot evidently represent their present situation, while the “X” represents either failure 
to perform the set of activities in that particular stage or failure to overcome a critical juncture. 
 
RBSO Pre-
seed 
Entrepreneurial 
commitment 
Seed Credibility Start-up Sustainability Growth 
A        
B        
C        
D        
E        
F        
G        
H        
I        
J        
K        
L        
M         
N        
O        
 
Figure 4 - RBSO development through the stages 
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As a recapitulation, it is in the pre-seed stage that the business idea is recognized. There are two 
aspects of the idea recognition; the technical and the commercial. All the case firms in the sample 
had evaluated the technical opportunity of their technology, or had started the venture with the aim 
to further research the opportunities of the technology. The commercial potential was however 
significantly less evaluated or at least was given less importance from the entrepreneurs. Evidently, 
most of the companies started up with an idea for the commercial use of their technology, but the 
actual work of screening it was however not a central part of the process in this stage. Particularly, 
lack of understanding of how to create a commercial package of the technology seemed to be critical 
for the companies. For example, firms C and O only identified these commercial opportunities at a 
later time. Companies G and H, under direction of their incubator, stated a current consideration to 
together form a collaborative commercial package. The founder of company J started the company in 
order to develop the technology further and initially knew which markets they wanted to target. 
There was however no actions taken in order to reach the targeted market. In addition, company N 
had an idea for which market to target, but had not researched how to introduce their product to the 
market. There were however some exceptions, such as for example firm A that was a product of an 
entrepreneurship school at a university and therefore the commercial potential of the technology 
was assessed as part of an educational project, and company O that changed their target market 
when a new investor entered the company. 
Already in the first critical juncture of entrepreneurial commitment, several of the companies 
revealed shortcomings (company C, G and H). These were companies that had founders who were 
still employed by their PRI, and thus needed to juggle responsibilities in both their research job and 
in the RBSO. In addition, the fact that they had a stable income arguably decreased the incentive to 
develop the company further. A particular case was Company B, where the researcher was asked if 
he had any research that could be exploited in a RBSO, but had other commitments, and as a result 
was not as eager to follow up the technology development within the company. As he said: “I did this 
with my left foot. The student who wrote a thesis on the project was not interested in the business 
part of it. No one really had the passion and the resources to continue this”. This company was later 
dissolved. Company C was a unique and interesting case in the sample, as they hired an external CEO 
in order to push the firm forward. The lack of commitment from the initial founders led to stagnation 
of the company in the start-up stage as will be discussed later on.  
In the seed stage, the technology is further developed and strategic plans are implemented. As a 
result, managerial competencies among the founders become increasingly important. RBSOs like 
company D, F, I and O, where the founders had previous experience with start-ups, proved to put a 
greater emphasis on the strategic part than others in this particular stage. Five of the companies 
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seemed to have stagnated in this stage. Interestingly enough, neither of these five had focused on 
strategic aspects in the previous development. Company B was dissolved before it could evolve 
further mostly due to lack of entrepreneurial commitment, and company J suffered in this stage as 
they had no apparent strategic plan for reaching out to the market. Subsequently, they did not 
receive sufficient funding in order to develop further. Other companies such as G and H only recently 
seemed to find a strategic direction for their technology, as given by the common board leader in 
both companies:  
“These companies are underfunded, single solutions with a bit of a ‘shaky’ foundation. We are 
considering the possibility of merging these two and a third company […].There is a larger 
commercial value if we merge the companies and services into one.” 
The threshold of credibility is the second critical juncture. The focus here includes creating credibility 
among industrial actors and potential customers towards the RBSO. Ten of the companies had 
moved past this threshold. Company J on the other hand seemed to have stagnated in this stage 
before it was sold. The technology development reached a point where new capital was needed in 
order to develop further. It proved hard to gain the necessary funding and lack of funding ultimately 
led the entrepreneur to sell the company. The technology was however not brought further in the 
buying company. 
In the start-up stage, all the RBSO had become legal entities. In most cases, the entities were started 
in earlier phases, while companies such as C and I established themselves only in the start-up stage. 
The essential aim in this stage is to have a market-ready product. Six of the companies had 
introduced their product or service to the market. Further, this was the stage where the 
shortcomings from the previous stages and transition phases become distinctly evident. A common 
response to the perceived development during interviews was that it was lengthier than expected. 
Company F ran into collaboration problems with their industry partner concerning their patent, and 
was to a certain degree successfully sold. Moreover, Company I was sold in this phase, as they 
considered it beneficial to continue the development of the RBSO through an industrial acquirer that 
could provide a large distribution network rather than grow independently. 
The third critical juncture, the threshold of sustainability, is where the management needs to re-
configure their resources and turn weaknesses into strengths. Company A employed a CEO with 
managerial background in order to overcome this threshold that proved successful. Company C also 
hired a surrogate entrepreneur, and went from stagnation in the start-up stage, mainly due to 
underperforming in all prior stages, to finally beginning to move further. However, even though this 
company started to generate revenues that kept the company “barely floating” as put by the CEO, 
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the company was still dependent on support from the incubator. Companies K, L and M were all 
service-oriented companies which had a shorter development period, and were able to receive 
revenues from early on. As a result, they all had sustainable operations today.  
Lastly, the growth stage is where the companies generate sustainable returns and aim at further 
growth. Companies A, D and E had all reached this expansion stage and were all seeking international 
markets. Companies L and M had no particular growth strategy, and claimed that they had grown as 
much as they wanted. Lastly, Company K had stable growth and was not interested in increasing the 
growth rate, as explained by the CEO: “We have had an annual growth of 20% until now. That is a 
suitable growth in order to keep the quality in what you do.”  As a result, these last three companies 
seemed to have matured and on their way out of the growth stage. 
 RBSO typology  5.1.2
The empirical case study investigated 15 RBSOs. As can be ascertained by reading about the wide 
variety of development runs and ultimate faiths of each of these cases (for further reading, see 
appendix 2), the RBSOs were formed on diverse concept maturities and experienced significant 
differences in resource needs along the way. On the basis of the developed typology, the authors 
distributed the case firms to the corresponding type of RBSOs. The categorization ended up as 
illustrated in Figure 5. In the following, empirical evidence to support the categorization will be 
revealed 
 
Figure 5 - Typology of the cases 
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Knowledge -based RBSOs 
Knowledge-based RBSOs are, as the name implies, based on the knowledge of the founder, and are 
often formed as technical consultancy firms. Among the cases, this description particularly fitted 
Company K, L and M. It was important to not mix this type with RBSOs where the entrepreneurs 
resorted to consulting in order to keep revenues coming as part of the financial mix. For instance, 
company C had a technology product as their main product offering, while knowledge-based RBSOs 
often base their operations on consultancy services.  
In addition to the service-oriented offering, all companies within this group also shared the fact that 
the founders were able to employ themselves full-time contrary to founders of other types of RBSOs.  
This was mainly due to an already existing client-base at start-up, and as a result, generated revenues 
from day one. This evidently led these firms to be much less dependent on external funders. 
Company K was partially owned by the research institution in which it originated from, and as a 
result, they gained the necessary funding from the incubator. Moreover, company L had an 
agreement on partial funding of their projects, which made them less dependent on client claims. 
Company M was lucky enough that they had a contract partner ready at establishment of the 
company, a contract that had provided them with a stable customer-base since start-up. 
The growth ambitions of each of the companies were rather small. Company L had slowly built their 
stock of employees correspondingly to the growth of their work, but their growth was exclusively 
organic. Company K had recently opened up a subsidiary in Sweden, and was among the companies 
that employed the most people in the sample of case firms. Company M deliberately chose to be 
small, as the founders exquisitely desired a small team. The co-founder of this company expressed it 
the following way: 
“We do not have a growth ambition now. We are content with keeping the current level […] We 
were six employees previously, but then he quit and then we will not employ anyone new now. 
Any more [employees] than that is not anything we want […] because then you need 
administrative employees etc. and then you reach a completely new financial level” 
Innovative product –based RBSOs 
Innovative product –based RBSOs are founded when the product offering is close to market-ready. 
These RBSOs are often founded on the basis of previous extensive research at a PRI, and the 
technology development of the initial product is close to completion. Company C and I were assessed 
to correspond with this description, as both companies originated from considerable research and 
had strong links to their PRI of origin. For company I, the research institution from where it 
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originated from had a commercialization model that actually required own RBSOs to be based on 
near to complete R&D performed at the institution. This was thoughtfully expressed by the 
interviewee from this particular research institute: 
“In our system we have a tradition for not starting ventures unless we have a clear idea and we 
work consciously with business plans and … so that there is a good basis for the venture. […] So 
we have not started many ventures. Common for all we have started is however that there is a 
substantial R&D behind them.” 
Company C had a slightly different business model. They were able to market their product shortly 
after the start-up. However, the founders still were employed at the research institution after start-
up. Contrary to Company I, this company had less growth ambition after start-up and as a result, the 
company did not have the funding necessary to employ the researchers full-time. The growth 
ambitions later changed with the recruitment of a hired executive to develop the venture, an 
interesting case that will be further analyzed in the next chapter. 
Incremental technology –based RBSOs 
Incremental technology –based RBSOs, contrary to Innovative product –based RBSOs, establish the 
ventures with still much R&D to perform before their product offering is ready for introduction to the 
market. Among the cases, company B, J, N and O fell into this category. An important distinction for 
these firms was that the technology developed was not as innovative and disruptive as some of the 
other RBSOs, but rather represented the mentioned “incremental” step.  Among the companies in 
the sample that were found here, company N had patented a technological tweak to an established 
tidal energy solution. Another example was company O, where the business idea was based on 
technology that was originally developed for another business area. 
None of the RBSOs in this category managed to finalize a commercial product as of 2012. A main 
reason for this was claimed to be the lack of funding for the further development of the initial 
business ideas. Company B was dissolved at an early stage, while the technological solution of 
company J was forced sold due to lack of funding.. Company N had procured interested industrial 
partners, but was not able to gain the necessary funding in order to create a prototype. 
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Disruptive technology –based RBSOs 
This type of RBSOs is based on a disruptive technology and typically has high growth ambitions. In 
the empirical sample, Company A, D, E, F, G and H were considered to be part of this category. A 
common fact for all these firms were the close relationship they had with the industry In order to 
acquire enough funds to develop the technologies, as well as industry acceptance. For instance, 
company F had several strategic alliances with central industry actors in order to test their product. 
Others, such as Company A and E, were dependent on facilities and market knowledge provided by 
their industrial partner to develop their initial technology.  
A common feature for these firms was that many had international operations. Company A, D and E 
all cooperated with globally present industry actors, and were planning to grow through these 
partnerships. For instance, during the work of this thesis, company E acquired a world-leading 
industrial partner that contributed with significant funds to expand the RBSOs operations. While the 
technology of company F was somewhat successfully sold, company A, D and E all had sustainable 
operations.  
Further, companies G and H were still in the earliest stages of development, and growth-wise 
seemed to have stagnated. Their technology was among the more disruptive and high-tech 
technologies in the sample, but several factors had impeded their development. The analysis of the 
empirical results will offer further enlightenment around these factors.  
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 Performance 5.1.3
The aim of this thesis was to reveal the impact of funding sources on the performance of RBSOs. In 
order to achieve this, it was therefore essential to measure and establish the performance of the 
case firms. As ascertained through the theoretical discussion around performance indicators, this 
was a rather challenging task as there is no set formula to perform this. Fortunately, a set of 
indicators were developed and were later applied to the empirical analysis of the case firms, which 
resulted in the distribution shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 - Performance of RBSOs 
Case 
firms 
Growth in 
revenues 
Employment 
growth 
Perceived present 
performance 
Initial willingness to 
grow vs. subsequent 
growth 
Overall 
assessed 
performance 
A Very high Very high Very high Medium Very high 
B1 - - Bad Bad Bad 
C High Moderate Good Bad Medium 
D Very High Very high Very high Very good Very high 
E Moderate Moderate Very high Medium Good 
F2 - - High Bad Good 
G3 Very low - Bad Bad Bad 
H Negative Negative Bad Bad Bad 
I4 - - Very high Very good Very high 
J5 - - High Medium Bad 
K High High High Good Good 
L Very high Stagnated High Medium Medium 
M Stagnated Stagnated High Good Medium 
N6 Negative - Bad Bad Bad 
O Negative Stagnated High Bad Medium 
 
                                                          
1 Company closed down. 
2 Company sold. 
3 No permanent employees. 
4 Company sold. 
5 Company forced sold 
6 No permanent employees. 
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Growth in revenues and employment growth were assessed through the preliminary secondary data 
collection performed, and are based on the previous 5-year existence of the RBSO. For the attentive 
reader, the data collection method was presented in chapter two. The companies that were sold or 
had no employees registered could however not be assessed by means of these indicators, as can be 
observed by the gaps in the table.  
Further on, the primary data from the case study was analyzed and incorporated in single terms (e.g. 
“Good”, “Medium” and “Bad”), a data compression performed by the authors themselves as a result 
of an overall assessment of each case firm interview. As can be observed, the perceived present 
performance often differed from the perception of initial willingness to grow vs. subsequent growth. 
This is largely due to the latter variable explicitly incorporating the initial intentions and goals of the 
case firm, an aspect that change over time. Several of the firms did for example hire new managers 
or encountered large hinders (e.g. technological challenges resulting in extended R&D process or lack 
of funding), thus changing the expectations to the performance of the firms, and thereby the 
perceived present performance.  
Ultimately, the overall evaluated performance was not based on a weighted mathematical formula, 
but on a subjective assessment from the authors. This was essentially due to the nature of the study, 
as qualitative data is rather difficult to conceptualize into tangible measures. 
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 Funding sources 5.2
Choice of funding source varied considerably among the RBSOs in the study. Almost every RBSO had 
internal funding as part of their funding mix, while few used private equity sources. Additionally, only 
one company had procured private debt. On the other hand, different soft funding sources along 
with SAs were frequently used. In the following sections, the collected perceptions and preferences 
of the entrepreneurs will be presented individually for each source. A summary of the main empirical 
findings will be given at the end of each section (Tables 9-15). An overview over the distribution of 
financial sources among the RBSOs is listed in the below table.  
 
Table 8 - Overview over the funding sources used by the case RBSOs 
 Internal Debt Soft funding Private equity 
 RCN IN Incubation Other BA VC CVC SA 
A X - X X - - - X X X 
B X - - - - - - - - - 
C X - X X X X - - - X 
D X - X X - - X X X - 
E - - - X - - - X X X 
F X - - X - X X - - X 
G - - - - X - - - - - 
H - - - - X - - - - X 
I X - - X - - X - X - 
J X - - X - - - - - X 
K X - X - - X - - - - 
L X X - - - - - - X X 
M X - - - - X - - - X 
N X - - (X) - X - - - - 
O X - X - - - X - - X 
TOT 13 1 5 8 3 5 3 3 5 9 
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 Internal funding 5.2.1
As is to be expected for most start-ups, nearly all case firms used internal funding. Evidently, sweat 
equity put into the venture was common for all these firms. Further, the most common way of 
internally funding the venture was through personal funds, with most entrepreneurial teams 
contributing personally to the initial share capital required. Additionally, several of the case firms 
used bootstrapping as a mean to reduce costs by using the associated institute’s equipment or partly 
sponsored office locations. CEO and founder of company O illustrated this the following way: 
“The only reason we are situated on campus is access to 100 m2 of extensive equipment and 
machinery that we rent and use, thus avoiding the large costs of having our own workshop.” 
The three RBSOs (companies E, G and H) that did not use internal funding were entirely associated 
with research institutes, and can nearly be considered as founded by the research institutes 
themselves. Initial funding was entirely provided by the institutes and salaries were paid to the initial 
entrepreneurs from day one. As previously mentioned, this funding is throughout the thesis 
considered as incubator funding and not internal funding. 
A common finding was that internal funding proved too scarce for further development of the RBSOs 
and most reported requiring additional funding sources. Two of the case firms relying on internal 
funding discontinued as they were not able to acquire this additional funding. The founder of 
company J, sold mainly for this reason, put it the following way: 
“We got it started, sold some, but came to a situation where we didn’t have a lot of resources, 
were not able to move any further, were not so eager to go through the efforts of obtaining 
external funding. […] We ended up selling all the activity to a larger firm.” 
Somewhat surprisingly, as many as three firms (companies K, L and M) considered internal funding 
sufficient as virtually the only source of capital. These firms had based their development mainly on 
organic growth, thus using revenues as the primary way of funding the venture. A decisive factor for 
these firms was the exquisite wish for independence and retaining of ownership shares. Evidently, as 
most entrepreneurs, these founders had strong entrepreneurial mindsets, thus desired to avoid 
having to answer to superiors or interfering with other actors such as external investors. Co-founder 
of company M expressed it the following way: 
“We enjoy working for ourselves, be our own bosses. We dislike others controlling us. […]. We 
kept our independence in order to keep the freedom of choosing the course of action. […] We 
initiate the projects we find interesting.” 
These firms were found to have less focus on strategic aspects of their businesses, both during start-
up and later during growth. Indeed, some didn’t even have a business plan in the basis when started 
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or any further competence on how to establish and develop a firm. A “learning by doing” attitude 
was a common position for these case firms. The CEO and co-founder of company K illustrated this 
adequately: 
“We have never sat down and written a business plan. […] As long as you have a product, a 
marked and a few customers, you don’t need to write a business plan. And that was how it was 
for us. So then we just started.” 
The firm’s ability to sustain development through using primarily internal funding was found to 
depend heavily on the ability and attitude of the entrepreneurial team. Some had favorable contacts 
through family or friends, and procured direct funds and loans through these (companies F and M), 
while others had previous successful ventures that gave them enough personal funds to develop the 
RBSO (company N). On the other hand, some founders (companies O and L) did not wish to risk 
personal assets as they considered the sweat equity put into the venture as constituting enough risk-
taking. The founder and CEO of company O put it the following way: 
“The only safety I’ve had is to live in a farmhouse, a security that can be passed on to family. I 
have never leveraged own assets, I can only recommend it if you can afford it. […] I believe that a 
start-up involve so much risk and coincidences that betting house and all you have has no place. 
The fact that you spend so many working hours, you are available 24/7, travel a lot etc. is 
enough sacrifice already.” 
Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests a link between high share of internal funding and type of 
case firm considered. Indeed, the three mentioned firms that relied mostly on internal funding 
belong to the knowledge-based type of RBSOs. This rather makes sense, as these firms had 
substantially lower need for resources and were based on more mature concepts that the 
researchers opportunely discovered through knowledge of a narrow field. 
Another empirical finding was that entrepreneurs who were more heavily academically involved such 
as professors and acknowledged researchers generally put less sweat equity into the venture, as 
more focus was put on their academic careers. This type of founder was ascertained to later in the 
RBSOs development rather assume a consultant type of involvement, thus getting paid by the hour 
rather than involving themselves directly in the venture. Hence, they represent a different type of 
entrepreneur as they partly exit the venture before the critical entrepreneurial commitment juncture. 
Empirical evidence showed that his aspect led to two different outcomes: (1) acquiring of surrogate 
entrepreneurs, hired executives or sales persons brought the venture to the next stage (companies A 
and C) or (2) the RBSO never managed to overcome the juncture (company B, G and H). Hired CEO of 
company C described their situation the following way: 
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“We have formal consultant agreements with the three professors who founded the company. 
[…] They still work many hours, it’s working very well. […] The main shareholder used a 
headhunting firm that contacted me about the position. […] I perceived that they required a 
manager with background in sales and marketing.” 
Lastly, RBSOs originating from research institutes proved to use less internal funding than those who 
originated from other types of PRIs. RBSOs from research institutes often had less to none internal 
funding because the institute paid salaries and had own commercialization units that invested in the 
RBSO, along with offering access to their facilities. This type of funding demonstrates a gray area 
between internal and soft funding, but as previously clarified, it will be treated as incubator funding. 
Research institute leader and founder of company I illustrated this: 
“All research institutes in Norway have their own investment firms. […] This is where we gather 
all the spin-off firms, and provide funding for them. And then we practice schemes for 
researchers to obtain leave of absence from the institute to enter management roles in this type 
of firm.” 
Table 9 - Internal funding 
Internal funding 
Mostly considered insufficient as funding source. 
Knowledge-based RBSOs with high focus on independence and low growth ambitions nearly entirely 
relied on internal funding. 
RBSOs with internal funding as primary source of funding showed less strategic focus. 
RBSOs with more academically involved founders used less internal funding, due to less commitment 
into the venture. 
RBSOs originating from research institutes used less to none internal funding, as incubator funding 
often substituted this initial need.  
 Soft funding 5.2.2
Evidently, as all the case firms were supported by RCN through the FORNY program, every firm had 
soft funding. However, the extent and magnitude of soft funding procured varied a great deal. 
Nearly all the case firms reported use of SkatteFUNN to fund R&D projects, bringing forward easy 
acquiring and appropriate gearing mechanisms as the most important features. The perception of 
SkatteFUNN as government scheme was overwhelmingly positive, as the following two citations 
brilliantly depict, first from the CTO from company A and second from business controller from 
company E: 
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“Very easy reporting, easy structure, everything gets accepted, seems like they have a pretty low 
threshold.” 
“We had SkatteFUNN, you never manage to finance everything during all phases through 
industrial funding only, and thus it’s fantastic when you can pull away 20 % of your cost 
expenses.” 
IN proved to be an important contributor to soft funding of the case firms. However, the opinions 
concerning IN support mechanisms were mixed. Some emphasized the invaluable nature of IN 
funding, as a demanding and valuable interlocutor, as expressed by the CTO from company A: 
“With IN, it’s very different. We talked directly to the people, pitched our ideas, they have been 
involved all the way from writing to decision-making. They tell you what is bad and what is 
good, and they are very flexible. We are very impressed with the way they work.” 
Additionally, the most successful firms in the sample of case firms emphasized the important role IN 
play for RBSOs with global ambitions, as illustrated first by the business controller from company E 
and second from the CFO of company D: 
“Close cooperation with IN have been positive to us. We are perfect for them as we are 
developing a new technology for a global market, the development is both national and 
international, it is highly exportable to other countries, and the firm intends to build an 
organization there. This is where IN has been most valuable, as globalization and business 
development support. […]They end up supporting as much as 30 % of these costs in given 
intervals, which has given us the opportunity to take larger steps and given us a lot of security as 
the costs are covered no matter what. We have had several projects with them, both in 
developing the product and the organization, the latter one being probably the most uncertain 
part of the costs.” 
“They offer a lot of services beside financial support, with network and foreign offices. […] They 
are helping us in Brazil, facilitating with offices and other stuff.” 
Other firms had negative experiences with IN, often pointing out the lack of competence in the IN 
apparatus, as illustrated by the co-founder of company L: 
“I find there level of knowledge about start-ups in general as superficial, or insufficient at least, 
there are certainly not many of the caseworkers that have started anything” 
Further, some drew attention on the limited and unequal contributions IN was providing. CEO and 
founder of company O gave a rather detailed argumentation explaining this: 
“Everyone is getting some, but they get too little, insignificant sums really. It doesn’t cost 
400 000 NOK to start a company, it does not cost 1 million NOK to develop a finished product, it 
cost 10 million NOK! […] The initial programs from IN give around 200 000 NOK on average, but 
then you need much more to even survive the first year. And then there is a maximum limit of 
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800 000 NOK over the first 2 years, that no one achieves due to the large number of applicants. 
And further, IN has this governmental role, with district politics and gender balance, thus the 
farther away from Oslo you get, the more money you get, and if you are a girl, you are lucky.” 
Similarly, the opinions around the support schemes provided by RCN were also mixed. The 
competence of RCN was also similarly to IN put to question by some, as founder of company J put it: 
“We went through many consultant people that without realism see an interesting market for 
us, multiply it and claim that this has gigantic potential. We encountered a lot of weird stuff 
from RCN, and we have become very critical to them after that experience.” 
Additionally, several case firms pointed out the little involvement of RCN in the application process 
as a very negative aspect. CTO from company A expressed: 
“With RCN, it’s a “fireball” process, you write the application, send it in, there is no 
communication during the process, and you get either a “yes” or a “no” for an answer.”  
Others considered RCN more professional than IN, but defined the RCN apparatus as rather 
bureaucratic. CEO and founder of company O illustrated it the following way: 
“RCN is more professional. There they have industry represented in the program committees, 
they know how hard it is to start a firm and how much money you actually need. But you have to 
push them in order to get things done, and they are supposed to help you connect to industry 
and help you internationalize, but they never have time for it. […] Typical bureaucracy, it’s the 
definition of it. Your project just lays there till they have time for it.” 
Moreover, several case firms had some general remarks on soft funding in general. For example, 
some pointed out the easier acquiring of soft funds due to the previous academic careers of the 
founders. CTO from company A stated: 
“We had 2 professors on the team. They were used to report on research projects. I believe they 
saw it as routine, it was not so bad in terms of work put into the reporting.” 
One other finding was that some firms used external specialist in order to deal with the application 
process for soft funding, as the CTO from company A expressed: 
“Rather than use time ourselves, we hired a firm that specializes in application writing. We have 
done it before, and we say that there is a 10-20 % chance of getting the application through if 
we write it, 30-40 % chance if the specialists write it. So we found that it was worth it.”  
For some of the smaller firms, the fact that funding comes a certain time after the application 
process itself proved a problem, as illustrated by hired executive and current CEO of company C: 
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“It takes time to write applications, but that is ok. The worst part is that money comes after. For 
a small company, this is a major burden on the cash flow as you first pay many work hours to 
write the applications and after some time receive the actual money.” 
For the few larger firms in the sample, a whole other issue was pointed out, as that they had 
encountered becoming too large to acquire soft funding, as illustrated by the CFO of company D: 
 “We have had a lot of IFU projects. […] We are actually in one now, but IN have stated that this 
was our last supported IFU project. We have become too established now, too big.”  
For RBSOs originating from research institutes, some particular issues appeared. Especially, the 
problems posed by EU regulations were shown to be challenging, as competitive regulations 
significantly reduce the amount of funding support they can receive from governmental sources. 
Both the research institute leaders interviewed had some interesting perspectives on the matter, 
first the research institute leader responsible for commercialization of companies G and H, and 
second the current research institute leader and founder of company I: 
“A problem that has occurred now is that EU has introduced competitive regulations. This is 
actually a major issue when making spin-off from our research, and for all research institutes 
today, if you own more than 50 %, you get much reduced funding support from government 
agencies. This slows down many projects, reduces the attractiveness. Even if we own much, we 
do not possess a lot of money. […] We are not a capital-intensive organization. But we still wish 
to own a lot in the start, so we can decide a lot in the start.” 
 “We don’t use soft much for the initial part itself. […] It is for the R&D stage where the different 
parts of RCN come in, this is where the significant soft funding is, where they match you with 
industry. IN comes in for the commercialization of the product itself, but it is not as attractive as 
it was, because they demand a lot. We have to go in with 1/3, a demanding industry partner 
1/3, and then IN come in with 1/3, but from this they subtract the funding from SkatteFUNN, 
which lead to lot of work for little reward. They are however okay to deal with, they have 2 
months processing time, no deadlines, as opposed to RCN that only has deadlines every year.” 
  
77 
 
Table 10 - Soft Funding 
Soft funding 
SkatteFUNN was considered a valuable scheme. 
Some considered IN a demanding and valuable interlocutor, as well as an important partner for 
RBSOs with global ambitions. 
Some claimed that IN provided too small contributions and had a lack of competence. 
RCN had too little involvement in the application processes and was considered bureaucratic by 
some. 
Some considered RCN more professional than IN. 
More academically involved founders made it easier to acquire soft funding, while some case firms 
found it valuable to use external competence for the application process. 
Small firms pointed out the delay between application work and actual received funding as a severe 
burden to the cash flow, while some of the larger firms had become too established to receive soft 
funding. 
RBSOs from research institutes encountered significant limitations in the amount of soft funding. 
 
 Private Equity Funding 5.2.3
As the attentive reader may have observed from the overview of funding sources used by the case 
firms, few RBSOs in the sample used VCs, CVCs or BAs as funding sources. In fact, the following 
empirical results for each source of private equity will reveal some distinct perceptions and 
preferences several of the entrepreneurs had towards the different private equity sources. 
Business Angels 
Four of the case firms had used BA funding during some part of their development process. Some of 
the firms that had not acquired BA funding often argued that they had not even considered this as a 
funding source. Other firms argued that they had received sufficient funding from other more 
institutional funding sources, thus did not need further private equity funding. Particularly company 
A and E promoted this reason, as CTO of company A illustrated: 
“We are looking at around 100 million dollar sizes in investment… There are private individuals 
that invest these amounts, but then they practically operate as professional investors.” 
The different BAs were found to be quite different, thus confirming the heterogeneous nature of BAs 
that was determined from the literature study. BA (D) and BA (I) were individuals that were 
experienced in starting up new ventures, but had low investment activity. This is comparable with 
the analytical investor type of BA described by Sørheim and Landström (2001). The two other BAs 
were matched with the Traders or Lotto type of BA. BA (O) had invested in several ventures with 
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varying degrees of success, but had no technical competence concerning the relevant business field 
of company O. BA (F) was already affiliated to the founder, and wanted to contribute financially to 
the patent-seeking process as long as he was appointed co-investor on the application, even though 
he had no experience within the relevant field of study. This last investor did not have any further 
connection than this initial contribution and as a result, will not be discussed further. BA (D) and BA 
(O) were however more interesting cases and will be depicted more in detail. 
BA (D) had largely contributed with managerial competence in several ventures, and was previously 
employed by a VC. Company D considered the BA’s experience as vital for the company, and stated 
that he was often used as a consultant in the earliest stages of the development process. Particularly 
in the seed-stage and start-up stage of company D, his contributions were considered essential. 
Additionally, BA (D) helped appointing a network of additional investors for the firm, as CTO of 
company D illustrated:  
“Because of previous experience in starting new ventures they were particularly important in the 
beginning. BA (D) knew which steps to go through”. 
BA (O) had varying degrees of success with his previous investments. In addition, his education was 
not relevant for the business field where company O operated. However, the founder and CEO of 
company O had several previous experiences with start-ups, and as he himself said, did not need 
further competence on how to start up a firm but rather valued the financial contribution of the BA 
itself. 
Some of the firms in the case sample expressed skepticism towards BAs as investors, as they 
considered BAs to have too fixed mindsets on how to develop a venture. CEO in company C depicted 
this perspective: 
“I have always been kind of skeptical towards this kind of investor. This is because: Yes, they 
bring cash, but they also bring some home crafted opinions on how things should be. And while 
they have succeeded in a way […] they believe that what they succeeded with previously can be 
applied other places. I don’t really believe in that.” 
The BAs in the sample often had long time-frames on their investments. However, their degree of 
ownership varied largely. While BA (D) presently only owned a small share of the company, BA (O) 
acquired a majority share of 90.1 % to achieve complete control of company O, illustrated by CEO 
and founder of company O: 
“BA (O) is a 100% investor, he wants things to be done as he desires, something you can’t 
achieve ownership-share context until you have acquired 90,1 %, because then you can throw 
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out the minority shareholders with nothing more than a case coordinator, though he has to then 
pay the market price for the rest of the share.” 
 The founder of company O considered the very large share of ownership of BA (O) as a threat, as the 
firm was highly dependent on financial contributions from this single source. He therefore 
intentionally chose to seek soft funding as an additional source of funding, in order to decrease this 
dependence. In fact, the case of BA (O) was rather interesting. Company O targeted a renewable 
energy source that is rather undeveloped, and the BA’s (O) main motive was in fact considered to be 
idealistic, as expressed by the CEO of company O: 
“He wants to be renewable/ecological/sustainable. That is his sincere opinion. I have tested him 
several times. The money arrives. He used to be more idealistic, bus has become more cynical in 
later times. […] I believe investments according to BA (O) are primarily an ethical and moral 
responsibility and contribution to the next generation. Return on investments is a secondary 
priority I think. “ 
The informal nature of the connection between the case firms and the BAs in this sample was 
brought forward as a positive feature. For instance, BA (O) had full control over the company, but the 
daily operations were entirely left to the CEO and contact kept through informal meetings. Some had 
more involvement in the companies’ operations, as for example BA (D) that frequently took part in 
managerial decisions, but the involvement was more directed towards strategic guiding than direct 
influence on the firm’s operations. 
Table 11 - Business Angels 
Business Angel funding 
BAs were largely heterogeneous, with differing investment motives and size of contributions. 
The BAs were considered to have vital roles in the early stages of development. 
Some firms disregarded BA funding as they required much larger contributions than what BAs 
usually can offer, while others had not even considered BAs as a possible source of funding. 
The relation with BAS was considered informal, a fact that was positively perceived. 
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Venture Capital 
Out of the case firms, three (A, D and E) used institutional VC investors as funding source. Common 
for these companies was that they all had high initial growth ambitions and had subsequently high 
growth. In fact, these firms represented some of the most successful firms in the sample, as was 
established by the previously performed performance assessment. Furthermore, all the firms were 
coincidently characterized as disruptive technology -based RBSOs, an implication that will be further 
treated in the next chapter. 
Among the companies that did not acquire VC funding, some considered their venture not mature 
enough to acquire VC funding, thus did not even attempt to acquire it. Others made definite 
statements that VC funding was not desired at all. Most case firms were in fact hesitant to VC 
funding, as illustrated by CEO of company M: 
“You know that typically, if you get an external investor involved, if they only enter with capital, 
they also want a fast exit – they want their money back on their investments. For most 
companies this is negative as the focus shifts to revenues and profit as opposed to the quality of 
the work”  
One of the main negative perceptions around VC involvement was loss of control of the venture. This 
perception often originated on the basis of stories told by other entrepreneurs or the general 
negative image given to VCs. However, some case firms also had first-hand negative experiences with 
VCs.  For instance, the founder of company O had a previous start-up experience where he ended up 
being completely overruled by a VC. Ultimately, he was forced to sell his stocks for a small amount 
compared to the actual worth of the stocks. He evidently expressed a reluctance to trust VCs as a 
potential source of funding of this company.  
“In [a previous start-up] we used VC. […] There is no long-term perspective, which creates 
conflicts among the investors. I experienced that the involved VC called a meeting with me the 
day before an emission. I was told that unless I signed off my shares to them, they would pull out 
and take other investors with them. I had no choice. My shares were sold for 1 NOK.” 
A few firms that had no VC funding did however have a rather positive perception of VCs. For these 
firms, the main reason for not acquiring this type of funding was a self-evaluation of being an 
uninteresting investment case for VCs. As CEO of company C put it: 
“I think we actually are too small to be relevant for VCs. […] I believe that VCs are competent 
people, demanding but also very experienced. They create a whole new dynamism in the firms 
they enter, they are thorough, and seek to develop the firm, contrary to an industrial owner that 
with time only aim at integrating the firm in their own organization.” 
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For the three firms that had VCs as funding source, a highly positive attitude towards external 
investors, or “competent capital” as many termed these, was brought forward. Predominately, they 
demonstrated high awareness of the value added that the VCs provided, as expressed by business 
controller in company E: 
 “They have competent people who have been through different technological developments and 
commercializations. […] they have been part of this technology development from the start 
through the establishment of the operating company. […] They are a professional actor; they 
know both technological and the commercial sides of the business. […] They are very important 
people!” 
The case firms with VC funding all reported that they had active VC members on the board. First of 
all, emphasis was put on the professionalism that was added to the venture through the VC. 
Secondly, the VCs largely helped the companies to provide additional funding through their investor 
network. The financial contributions made by the VCs were found to be quite substantial. It was the 
mix of private equity funding that was attributed importance to, as all these three firms had both VCs 
and CVCs as equity holders. The mix of funding sources was not report to pose any conflict-related 
problems, as the different sources were part of a seemingly collaborating investor network. 
Lastly, the case firms with VC funding highlighted the fact the VCs often had very experienced people 
in many relevant business fields, with a large network containing the most important industrial 
actors. The business controller from company E summarized some of the main positive perceptions 
around VCs: 
“The persons behind the VC who are now owners of this company […] have highly valuable 
contributions, they are important strategic partners and are valuable through their provided 
networks, their role as knowledgeable discussion partners and through help managing the firm”. 
Table 12 - Venture Capital funding 
Venture Capital funding 
The companies with VC funding were high-performers and disruptive technology –based. 
The main reason for not acquiring VC funding was not attempting.  
The main negative perception of VC funding was loss of control. 
The firms with VC funding had a highly positive attitude towards external investors, emphasizing 
value-added such as previous start-up experience, providing access to investor networks and access 
to important industrial actors. 
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Corporate Venture Capitalists (CVCs) 
Six of the case firms had CVC funding. All the CVCs were associated to large multinational 
corporations with close links the Norwegian oil and gas industry. None of the firms that reported 
having no CVC distinctively expressed seeking CVC funding in particular. In fact, these interviewees in 
general had few perceptions around CVCs, neither negative nor positive. For the case firms that 
received CVC funding, the acquiring seemed to either have originated from a previous SA or acquired 
through the academic network available to the initial entrepreneurs. The following empirical findings 
mostly originated from the case firms actually receiving CVC funding. 
The main perception of CVC funding was the privileged access to market knowledge. The 
competence provided from the industrial partner to help developing the technology was highly 
valued, especially related to needed product specifications. Further, several of the firms brought 
forward the role the CVCs performed as strategic guides through active participation in boards, as 
important. When asked for possible strategic disagreements between the entrepreneurs and the 
large industry actor, all the firms surprisingly declared that very little overruling from CVC was made. 
For instance, when company A desired to increase their product offering to expand to new markets, 
the firm received unexpected support from the CVC: 
  “It is actually quite incredible. We asked for funding in order to enter financial and medical 
markets, and were granted this by CVC (A)!” 
Moreover, the CVCs were shown to have very little actual involvement in the case firms besides the 
active involvement in the boards. The CVCs were found to require little control of the operations of 
the RBSOs, and none of the case firms reported any form of exploitation. CTO of company A 
expressed it the following way:  
“We are regarded as a small and innovative company. Most do not even consider trying to 
control us”.  
As was pointed out for the VC-backed firms, a mix of CVC and VC as funding sources was shown to be 
common. The contributions from this investor network were shown to be high, and some of the 
interviewees explained the mix of CVC and VC as a way for the private equity investors to share the 
high investment risk, as well as increasing the extent of value added to the firms. 
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Table 13 - Corporate venture capital funding 
Corporate Venture Capital funding 
The acquiring of CVCs originated from previous SAs or through the initial entrepreneur’s academic 
network.  
CVC funding was found to give a privileged access to market knowledge and valuable strategic 
guidance. 
CVCs were found to have little actual involvement in the operations of the case firms. 
CVCs and VCs often constituted a mixed source of private equity funding. 
 
 SA funding 5.2.4
The number of firms found to use strategic alliances as a source of funding was surprisingly high, with 
a total of eight firms. Among these, a total of seven were firms situated in the oil and gas industry. 
Indeed, empirical sources pointed out that large firms in the oil and gas industry in Norway had 
important incentives to invest money in new technologies through RBSOs. Moreover, the RBSOs 
themselves considered cooperation with large firms in the oil and gas industry as a critical success 
factor, as the industry was regarded as as rather “conservative”. Business controller in company E 
put it the following way:  
“We put the project in place through industrial funding, funds that can be considered virtually 
depreciable for the oil and gas industry. In addition, they have a goal to become technology 
leaders, thus they have to support the development of products that can give them a 
competitive edge. […] When the product starts to get a bit more ready, the firms start to make 
some requirements, and require something in return. […] Industrial funding is a must for the 
business area we are operating in, new technology in a very conservative sector.” 
Many of the SAs were further shown to often originate from initial soft funding that triggered 
projects such as JIPs and IFUs. Nearly all the case firms that had engaged in SAs mentioned soft 
funding schemes as precipitating factor for collaboration with industrial partners, exemplified by the 
CEO and founder of company O: 
 “RCN were the triggering institution for our collaborative development. […] For the moment, we 
have two large oil companies that have entered, and are awaiting a third industry partner.” 
The positive aspects of associating with industry partners were widely put forward, where legitimacy 
and market intelligence were the main positive features. Hired executive and CEO of company C 
expressed it the following way: 
“Our industry partners have contributed a lot with market expertise and identification of market 
needs. A number of them have been our main customers during the R&D processes, and a few of 
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them have worked tightly with us and contributed enormously to how we have defined new 
products. And then we have one industry partner who has not contributed so tightly but has 
brought a clear oil and gas perspective on a product development.” 
During the case interviews, the authors tried to reveal potential negative aspects related to the 
cooperation with larger and more established firms. Despite the case interviews being anonymous, 
the views on SAs were nearly unanimously positive. The cultural differences for example were shown 
to pose very little problems for the interviewed case firms. Several pointed out that the industry 
partners often were people of similar backgrounds, as illustrated by co-founder and former CEO of 
company J: 
“We had a good relation with our industry partner, lots of familiar people, same backgrounds 
and network. […] It’s a major challenge in principle to work with different partners with varying 
firm size. One expects big cultural differences and different understanding of things. We had to 
look at what was needed in order to work well jointly. Indeed, one quickly achieves positive 
effects from affiliating with larger partners. “ 
Others pointed out that the RBSO often only cooperated on a more strategic level, and not so much 
on a technological level, thus there were fewer sources of conflict. For instance, company A stated it 
the following way: 
“It is often the more operative parts of the industrial partner that were involved with us. I don’t 
think the relevant technological departments even knew about us. […] The only thing we get 
strung over our head is standards most often, […] and technological challenges that are only 
relevant for a specific strategic partner. […] There are very large differences in cultures, but we 
have not experienced anything significantly negative about it. […] They try from time to time to 
thread upon us some bureaucratic processes, but they often end up understanding that these do 
not work for us in particular.” 
Another empirical finding was that the main perceived problem with cooperating with large firms 
was the threat of reorganization within the industry partner. This was experienced by the CTO in 
company A for example:  
 “In autumn 2008, our large industry partner made a significant reorganization due to a merger. 
[…] It was a bit of a crisis for us, because it happened near the end of our joint R&D 
development, and those industry people that were involved with us where now to be found 
completely different places in that organization, […] thus for example reducing the ownership 
feeling to our collaboration.” 
The singular case where the RBSO had an overwhelming negative experience with cooperating with 
an SA was experienced by founder and former CEO of company F. He brings forward the negative 
aspect of having to deal with a large and powerful industrial actor, as the unequal power distribution 
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in this case lead to a forced sale of the RBSO. It could seem however that this case was rather unique 
in the sample. After telling a successful JIP story, he expressed the following: 
“Then something occurred. The leader of the steering committee from our partner applied for an 
alternative patent, being of the opinion that the technology we developed wasn’t good enough. 
Evidently, no one wanted to sponsor us when there was a pending patent conflict with a large 
industry partner. […] There were later additional problems as the industry partner wanted to 
rather license the technology than building up the organization, we did not agree. […] It ended 
up with us being forced to sell our shares, the whole affair was in the juridical borderland, and 
our large industry partner ultimately never admitted doing anything wrong.” 
Lastly, empirical evidence indicated that the industry in general was more closely linked to RBSOs 
originating from research institutes than universities. Often, the research institutes had well-
established links to important industrial actors through previous projects, thus facilitating access to 
SA funding. For one research institute in our case sample, the industry even had direct ownership in 
the research institute, as stated by research institute leader and founder of company I: 
“The university controls 85% of the shares in the research institute. And then we have three 
industrial owners, which own 5 % each. And they all have representatives on the board.” 
Table 14 - SA funding 
SA funding 
High share of case firms used this type of funding. 
Oil and gas industry had special incentives to fund RBSOs, and RBSOs considered SAs a critical success 
factor to overcome the conservativeness of the oil and gas industry. 
SAs were often triggered by soft funding schemes. 
SA funding was principally motivated by legitimacy and market intelligence. 
Insignificant problems caused by cultural difference and unequal power distribution. 
RBSOs from research institutes had easier access to SA funding than RBSOs originating from 
universities. 
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 Private debt funding 5.2.5
Not surprisingly, only one of the case firms reported use of private debt as source of funding. The 
procurement of the loan was however in this case both challenging and somewhat temporary, as 
expressed by the founder and current CTO in company L: 
“We lent money for an R&D project […]. We had no assets, applied for a loan, got rejected at 
first, but a local bank provided us with a loan in our second attempt. The first bank later argued 
that they had to tighten up on corporate loans at that time, and without security it was not 
justifiable to provide loans.” 
The remaining firms stated nearly identical reasons for not using private debt. The most evident was 
the lack of collaterals for most of the firms, as they, when asked, immediately excluded private loans 
as even attainable due to the lack of tangible assets. Further, some firms elaborated the fact that 
they intentionally avoided loans due to rigorous requirements of banks, as uncertain cash flows and 
unavoidable periodic payments were declared as a bad match. Founder and CEO of company K put it 
the following way: 
“Banks secure themselves well, so what they can’t collect from me, they take from other co-
owners. […] You never know what is going to happen the next day. Always negative to have a 
loan.” 
It is not unexpected that private debt funding is virtually inexistent as funding source, as few of the 
case firms are actually experiencing positive cash flow. The firms that experienced positive cash flows 
were in fact the firms that relied solely on organic growth. Empirical evidence thus indirectly state 
the inappropriateness of debt funding for RBSOs in particular, as lack of collaterals and/or positive 
cash flow practically make it impossible to acquire loans from banks. 
Table 15 - Private debt funding 
Private debt funding 
Virtually inexistent. 
Unattainable due to lack of tangible assets and/or positive cash flow. 
Unwanted due to rigorous requirements from banks. 
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 Analysis 6
At first, a theoretical framework was developed based on an extensive literature review and the 
addition of some refined theoretical models. Thereafter, this framework was used as a basis for 
presenting the empirical findings. This proved a systematic and organized approach to present the 
different topics examined during the case studies, hopefully making it easier for the reader to follow 
the intended thread. In this part, the authors wish to promote an analytical method in order to 
examine some of the main issues that were discovered through the literature review, and bring 
forward some new elements identified through the case studies. As emphasized previously in this 
paper, RBSOs are heterogeneous and dynamic in nearly every aspect. The authors therefore found it 
purposeful to develop a set of scenarios to encompass these dimensions. Hopefully, this approach 
will help shed some light over the divergent processes of developing a RBSO, and contribute to the 
discussion around funding sources and their impact on subsequent performance of RBSOs 
In order to develop the different scenarios, the typology of RBSOs proposed in chapter three formed 
a suitable starting point as it encompassed much of the heterogeneous nature of this type of firm. 
Moreover, the established stage-model together with the identified critical junctures appeared 
evident to include in order to incorporate the evolutionary aspect of a RBSO. Further, the thorough 
discussion around the different funding sources together with the empirical findings will construct 
the foundation for the conceptualization of the different scenarios. As the starting point was chosen 
to be the typology of RBSOs, the scenarios were named: 
• Scenario #1 – Knowledge -based RBSOs 
• Scenario #2 – Innovative product –based RBSOs 
• Scenario #3 – Incremental technology –based RBSOs 
• Scenario #4 – Disruptive technology –based RBSOs 
For each scenario, the initial capabilities that characterize each type of RBSOs will firstly be analyzed. 
Thereafter, a discussion relating the empirical findings t the stage-model will be given. Further, 
common funding sources used for each type of RBSOs will be determined. Ultimately, the 
performance of the case firms in the different categories will be assessed, and patterns will be 
identified. The product of each analytical discussion will be conceptualized as a “best practice” 
scenario. To illustrate the different scenarios, a comprehensive graphical model was conceived. At 
the basis of each design, the evolution of resource needs, both social and financial, was initially 
outlined based on the prior theoretical work. As illustrated in Figure 6, the X-axis gives the different 
stages and junctures that are found along the development process of a RBSO, while the Y-axis 
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represents the total resource needs. For the RBSO to successfully develop through the different 
stages, the area below the graph has to be covered by one or several funding sources. The following 
analytical discussions will comprehensively attempt to identify a “best practice” approach to cover 
these areas. 
 
Figure 6 - General Scenario Model 
 Preliminary scenario draft 6.1
Companies K, L and M 
Knowledge-based RBSOs are characterized by high concept maturity and low resource needs. A 
common rationale behind starting up the venture is to employ the knowledge and competence of 
the founders and the staff (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). As a result, these companies are often 
designed as technical consultancy agents (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004). Among the RBSOs in the 
sample, companies K, L and M are included in this group. Company K and M are purely service-
oriented, while company L is more product-oriented.  
The core entrepreneurial team of these companies consisted of 1-3 persons. The founders came 
from both research institutes (K and L) and university (M). None of the founders had notable 
previous entrepreneurial experience before the start-up. They all used the trial-and-error method in 
the earliest stages of RBSO development instead of strategically plan their development process. The 
linkage between the parent institution and the RBSO varied. Company K had the strongest academic 
network, with the parent institution being the majority owner for a long time, followed by company 
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M, who found the connection to academic research crucial in order to keep updated with current 
technologies. Company L, on the other hand, had a weaker institutional linkage as there was no 
evident relation to their PRI after start-up. Particularly for the knowledge-based companies, the 
network resource is central both concerning academic and commercial networks. At start-up, RBSOs 
are small and have weak market recognition, thus lack necessary legitimacy recognition in their 
markets. They are therefore dependent on good working relationships and access to customers is 
particularly important (Walter et al., 2006). Among the case companies, company K and M were able 
to bring their personal, commercial networks from the PRI into the RBSO. In fact, company M was 
able to base their start-up with a contract already secured. Indeed, the initial resource mix of the 
company is influential on the success of the company in later stages (Rasmussen and Rice, 2012). The 
relation between the RBSO and the SA in the abovementioned case has led company M to have 
comfortable access to customer projects since start-up  
Through assessment of the stage-development of the ventures in this group of case firms, it seems 
that all RBSOs have reached the growth phase. This appears to be attributed to the properties of 
knowledge-based RBSOs that allow them to quickly move through the stages and in shorter time 
than other types. For one, the small size enables the RBSO to adapt to the dynamic environment in 
which it operates in. Most important reason for the fast move through the stages is furthermore the 
lack of a costly product development process. Heirman and Clarysse (2007) found that time-to-
market was significantly higher for high-tech companies. For knowledge-based RBSOs, this leaves 
activities related to the commercialization of the venture to be performed rather than product 
development, and implies that the activities undertaken in the seed stage will be less time-
consuming. By starting out with a client base, the marketing efforts can be omitted as the access to 
the market is provided through the network base. This is particularly applicable in the start-up stage, 
where marketing efforts are continuously important. Passing the threshold of credibility is arguably 
connected more to the knowledge and academic reliability of the entrepreneurs than the product-
oriented types of RBSOs who depend on a product to a greater extent. It was also shown that the 
entrepreneurial commitment juncture was overcome for all the companies in this category. Founders 
of both company K and M had prominent careers in their respective PRI and as such, this reliability 
was accounted for. Notably, the future growth ambitions for these companies were quite small. It is 
therefore arguable that the knowledge-based companies in this sample have reached the end of the 
growth stage.  
Knowledge-based RBSOs are the most independent of all the types of RBSOs. For one, as already 
discussed, the nature of their business idea leads to a less costly development process, and as a 
result, they have lesser need for expanding their financial mix to include more than internal and basic 
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soft funding. Indeed, internal funding was the main funding sources for all companies. Company K 
had additionally used soft funding schemes in several projects. Company L had by far the largest 
variance of funding sources in this group with both SA/CVC and debt funding, in addition to the early 
internal and soft funding. It is noteworthy to recognize that this also was the only company who 
started out without already having a commercial network. As all companies had entered markets and 
had constant business, they also generated revenues that funded operations, and as such, the need 
for additional capital was not noticeable. 
As expressed above, the need for external funding in connection to knowledge-based RBSOs is rather 
small or even non-existent. During the interviews it also became evident that the founders of these 
RBSOs were cautious towards private equity funding, and VC in particular. Apart from company L, 
none of the interviewees had personal experience with this kind of funding and thus, when asked 
about their perception of this kind of funding, they focused on the aspects traditionally considered as 
disadvantages, such as loss of control or cultural differences, while not paying attention to the 
potential benefits of external funding. These value-adding activities include the commercial expertise 
RBSOs commonly lack as well as network connections to mention a few (Sapienza, 1992). 
Furthermore, there are several ways to gain the commercial competence and other critical 
competences for the RBSOs. Rasmussen et al. (2011) argue that this can be created through 
interaction with several actors  and thus a base of demanding customers and partners might be just 
as useful to the RBSO as external funding sources. In fact, based on the low growth ambitions and 
low capital needs, these companies are not of particular interest to VCs (Wright et al., 2007). It is 
therefore plausible that both the knowledge-based RBSOs and private equity funders are mutually 
not interested in each other. A last point concerning knowledge-based RBSOs and external funding is 
that this type is able to grow organically to a greater extent than other companies and they gain 
network access through their operations. Deciding on the funding mix is therefore often to bootstrap 
costs rather than gaining external funding.  
Evaluating the performance of this kind of RBSO is challenging because they typically score lower on 
quantitative measures, while generally low growth ambitions leads to higher scores on qualitative 
measures. According to Delmar and Wiklund (2008), growth performance studies often disregard 
these companies. Company K had an overall good performance and comparing quantitative 
measures with other successful RBSOs, and was actually considered one of the better performers. 
Company M, who was rather pleased with the state of their business, had an overall low 
performance, but scored high on the qualitative measures. Company L had higher growth ambitions 
and as such, did not score as well on the qualitative performance. This illustrates the complexity this 
group of ventures provides for this thesis and arguably, if the performance evaluation would have 
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been based on purely qualitative measures, this group of ventures would consequently be 
considered better performers. 
The best-performing RBSO, company K, had the strongest connection to their parent organization as 
the PRI owned the majority of the company until 2007. Furthermore, this company had expanded 
their staff continuously, which led to an increased competence base within the company. While, 
objectively, this is the best-performing company in the sample, company M performed best 
according to their own growth ambitions. Development of network capabilities and the RBSO 
network is a mean to improve performance of the company, and successful RBSOs have been shown 
to be continually networking (Walter et al., 2006).  
As the only RBSO type, all companies had reached the growth stage. This implies that time spent in 
each of the previous stages and phases are significantly shorter than other types. Activities in pre-
seed, seed and start-up are quick and less costly due to small associated development costs. Mainly 
the start-up process itself and fixed costs make up the resource needs. As with other RBSOs, the 
development presumes entrepreneurial commitment and passing of the threshold of credibility, but 
these companies do not aim for high or fast-paced growth. Combining this with the presence of 
sustainable revenues early on, the resource needs in the growth phase is declining. Investments 
aimed at increasing the value of the company are done as to increase the competence and 
knowledge of the staff. With exception to initial soft funding provided by the incubator, internal 
funding was used by all: Company K through their PRI, L and M through personal funds and funds 
provided by family. Funding sources were almost exclusively based on internal funding till the 
revenues increased. This leads to the following “best-practice” scenario, as illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 - Scenario 1: Knowledge -based RBSOs 
 
 Scenario 2: Innovative product RBSOs 6.2
Companies C and I 
Innovative product –based RBSOs are characterized by low concept maturity and low resource needs. 
The technology is innovative compared to existing technology and is based on extensive research in 
the PRI (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004). When the venture is established, the product is close to market-
ready and subsequently, they move through the resulting phases faster than the other product-
oriented RBSOs (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). Among the case companies, Company C and I belong 
to this group. Both emerged from a PRI and had close relations to their mother institution. As only 
two companies belong to this group, distinct patterns were hard to identify, but some 
generalizations could be made from the analytical discussion. 
The size of the core entrepreneurial team varied significantly from one founder (I) to five founders 
(C). All founders were however experienced researchers or professors, and thus had prominent 
academic reputation and competence within their field. Central to innovative product-based RBSOs is 
that the technology is developed at a PRI prior to establishment and consequently, the founders had 
spent years on development of their respective technologies. Entrepreneurial experience was 
predominately more present in company I, as this particular founder had participated in starting up 
several RBSOs. Through a close relationship with his PRI, the founder of company I had access to an 
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important incubation apparatus. Company C on the other hand eventually suffered from lack of 
entrepreneurial experience. After starting the company, the founders of both companies were still 
employed at the PRI, and thus strengthening the link to the PRI.  
Assessing the two innovative product-based RBSOs through the stage-mode, company I reached the 
start-up stage before being sold, while company C had finally moved into the threshold of 
sustainability but not achieved growth yet. While company C apparently has reached farther than 
company I, this last company was sold in 2002, and as such surpassed the previous stages much 
quicker than the other. Following the findings of Heirman and Clarysse (2007)  companies that have a 
more or less market-ready product at start-up will enter this into the market at earlier stages than 
other, it became apparent that both companies spent short time from start-up product launch.  
While it may seemed that the two companies had a similar development pattern, there is a clear 
difference between. Due to lacking commercial experience in company C, activities that should have 
been undertaken in the earliest stages were not fulfilled before the first product was introduced into 
the market. The prime example for this is the lack of entrepreneurial commitment by the initial 
founders, who still held their part-time positions at the PRI. According to Vohora et al. (2004), if the 
important issues to overcome each individual juncture are not dealt with, the company will stagnate 
in its development process. This evidently appeared in the case of company C. While the company 
spent few years on reaching the start-up stage, it spent almost three times this time on achieving 
sustainability. Company I on the other hand was meticulous in performing the required tasks in each 
stage, and therefore had an overall better performance. It was not until company C hired a surrogate 
entrepreneur that the firm started to move out of the stagnation phase.  
Innovative product-based RBSOs depend on the industry in order to reach the last development 
stage of their product development, as the technology developed on the PRI needs to be adapted to 
the market needs. In addition, in order to perform a full-scale testing of their product, they need 
proper specifications (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). Both companies had extensive collaborations 
with industrial partners, both companies through a number of SAs. These were easily achieved as 
their product offering complimented operations in the industry. Using the CVC/SA as a distribution 
channel is an advantage with this kind of funding (De Clercq et al., 2006). For this kind of company, 
there has often been some interaction with industry while the technology was developed at the PRI, 
a connection often taken advantage of from the resulting RBSO. 
Even though company C is the one existing today, company I was assessed as the better performer of 
the two. As this company is discontinued, the quantitative measures are not available. In addition the 
perceived performance of company C was assessed as bad, a result of the lengthy development 
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process. The difference in how the activities in the different stages were performed is essential to 
ultimately understand how to create a successful venture. Company I ultimately performed better 
due to higher strategic focus in the earliest stages than company C. Further, the close relation with 
the PRI turned out to be a pitfall for company C as the initial entrepreneurs returned to their 
research positions.  
Both had substantial cooperation with the industry, as both companies had several SAs. Both 
products had managed to reach the markets. Both RBSOs used soft funding to a large degree, a fact 
that can be related to the founders’ origin and credibility acquired from associated PRIs. In fact, both 
companies had used soft funding to a degree in which they could not receive more as governmental 
schemes generally do not fully finance R&D projects. 
The difference in the performance between the two companies gives an indication for the 
formulation of a “best practice” for innovative product-based RBSOs. Due to the fact that much of 
the R&D has been performed at the PRIs for this type of firm, the costs of technology development 
are mostly covered going into the venture. The costs in the earliest phases are therefore highly 
related to commercial activities such as marketing. Costs in the seed stage are in addition related to 
the adaption of the technology to a particular customer, and creating “beta-versions” of the 
technology. Academic entrepreneurs too affiliated to the PRI of origin can further turn out to be a 
pitfall in the first critical juncture of entrepreneurial commitment. On the other hand, a strong 
linkage to the PRI proves useful in passing the threshold of credibility. As the company is rooted in a 
highly academic setting, close relations to the industry through SAs or CVCs provide the RBSO with 
the required “market intelligence”. The initial soft funding is mostly procured from the associated 
incubator to initiate the firm development process, while the relations to the industry become 
increasingly important in later stages. As a result, a choice between SA and CVC or both is optimal 
when much of the market activities need to be performed. 
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Figure 8 - Scenario 2: Innovative product -based RBSOs 
 
 Scenario 3: Incremental Technology RBSOs 6.3
Companies B, J, N, O  
As a reminder, this type of RBSO has a high concept maturity, but requires considerable resources to 
develop the concept into commercial products or services. The concept is typically a non-disruptive 
technology that addresses a known market, but is far from market ready (Druilhe and Garnsey, 
2004). For the sample of case firms, this corresponded to four firms: B, J, N and O. 
The core entrepreneurial team of these firms consisted initially of 1-2 scientific researchers, with 
varying degrees of bond to a PRI. For example, the researcher from company B had worked for a 
university for many years, while the researcher from company N was more of a self-proclaimed 
inventor. A common feature was that the entrepreneurs had relatively weak networks when the 
firms were established. Nosella and Grimaldi (2009) found that this led to poor opportunity 
identification opportunities, harder access to resources, and lack of status and referrals. Moreover, 
the initial entrepreneurs did to a very limited degree recruit additional individuals. Solely firm O had 
permanent employees besides the entrepreneurs themselves. As Wright et al. (2007) presented 
through the upper echelon perspective, the lack of cognitive diversity was shown to negatively affect 
the performance of RBSOs.  
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A common feature for these firms was that they had identified a market opportunity, but needed to 
develop their research in order to exploit it. The founder of company B, a researcher at a university 
for many years, attempted for several years to recruit a person that had the technical competence 
and entrepreneurial curiosity to develop his idea. Unfortunately, he did not achieve this, leading to a 
close down of the firm as he prioritized his academic career rather than further committing to the 
firm. A part from company B, the entrepreneurs possessed the entrepreneurial commitment to their 
initial idea, but needed to receive both financial and social capital in order for the RBSO to surpass 
the credibility threshold. This juncture is critical in order to acquire external funding and industry 
support (Vohora et al., 2004). However, only one of the case firms, company O, managed to 
overcome this juncture, and that only recently. The research and business idea of company J was 
sold for very little to a research foundation, and the development was partly continued in this entity. 
Company N still exists, but is struggling to achieve credibility among both commercialization units 
and the relevant industry. It may seem from a stage-model perspective that R&D-based technology-
development companies struggle to achieve support from both soft funding actors and industry 
actors. 
Through assessment of the different funding sources acquired for these firms, it appears that internal 
funding stands out as the most common source. Company B and N practically solely used internal 
funding, despite the costly development processes ahead of them. For company B, this was partly 
due to the limited resources needed as the entrepreneur did never initiate the development phase 
itself. He explained this by the lack of interest from the industry and the previous inability to recruit 
an individual committed to developing the firm. For company N, the owner invested a significant 
amount of his personal funds gained from a previous successful venture, but is as previously stated 
struggling to overcome the credibility threshold. In addition to small amounts of personal and soft 
funds, company J did acquire SA funding, but was promptly cut off due to declining oil prices and 
changes in priorities by the industry partner, according to the founder.  
Company O is interestingly enough one of the three firms in the sample that acquired BA funding. 
This did however only happen after several years of struggling with small amounts of soft funds and a 
short period with SA funding. As presented in the empirical evidence, this BA had no relevant 
background for providing value-adding activity to the firm in question, and entered the investment 
rather on more idealistic motives towards renewable energy. Moreover, the BA required a large 
majority share in the venture, but did not involve himself in the business other than for more 
important strategic decisions. Hence, a relevant theoretical category for the BA in question is 
problematic to find due to the rather unusual characteristics, hence only emphasizing the 
heterogeneous nature of BAs (Erikson and Sørheim, 2005). Two features that describe this BA is the 
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low level of control over the operations of the firm, and the informal relation between the 
entrepreneur and the BA. Mostly, the authors would like to argue that the increased credibility that 
the strong financially situated BA gave company O through his involvement, in addition to the 
financial resources themselves, were the two factors that ultimately allowed company O to surpass 
the credibility threshold. The founder of company O admitted this as he emphasized the importance 
of having strong financial backing when seeking industrial partners. The acquiring of BA funding later 
led to SA funding and new ambitious growth goals for company O. 
Not surprisingly, companies B, J and N were assessed to have performed badly. Company B was shut 
down, company J was sold for very little and company N is still struggling after several years of 
stagnation in the seed stage. Company O was assessed to have moderately performed despite the 
high presently perceived performance. This was due to the poor employment growth and poor 
subsequent growth with relation the initial willingness to grow.  
Ultimately, this sample of case firms revealed that the key to higher performance for the incremental 
technology RBSOs is surpassing the credibility threshold. This type of RBSO requires considerable 
resources to develop their initial ideas, and convincing investors and industry partners that their 
business concept is valid remains a crucial factor. Therefore, it is essential for these firms to acquire 
support in the early stages, especially in the seed face where much of the business planning is done 
and the venture becomes more tangible (Ndonzuau et al., 2002). The R&D-based technology-
development firms in this sample were however shown to use surprisingly little soft funding. Several 
of these firms stated that they applied for additional soft funding to the initial FORNY support, but 
their applications were rejected or the contributions given were too small. A possible reason for this 
may be the low level of anchoring in the local infrastructure for some of these firms, especially 
relevant for company J and N. Additionally, the case firms in this category were shown to have rather 
weak networks, making it harder to access resources and leading to lack of status and referrals 
(Nosella and Grimaldi, 2009). 
The authors would like to argue that a larger degree of soft funding in the stages preceding the 
credibility threshold may have helped the incremental technology RBSOs in this sample of case firms 
to perform better. Soft funding contain several schemes that aim at lowering technological 
uncertainty through proof-of-concept funds, as well as pre-seed and seed funding schemes that aim 
at assisting the entrepreneurs with making business plans more tangible as well as networking 
(Rasmussen and Sørheim, 2012a). These are essential support activities to help firms overcome the 
credibility threshold.  
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Further, it is evident that the backing from a financially strong BA made it possible for company O to 
surpass this same challenge. The authors would like generalize this to argue that the acquiring of a 
sound financial partner in general to provide for the initial development of the RBSO is essential for 
the subsequent performance. An industry-relevant SA would therefore also prove an optimal funding 
source for the stages preceding the credibility threshold. 
Empirical results show little evidence as to what sources may be most suitable for this type of RBSO 
after the credibility threshold, as only one of the firms just recently overcame it. One could however 
expect that the often non-disruptive nature of the products and services developed, together with 
the known market needs they cover, may prove valuable investment undertakings for equity 
investors and particularly industrial investors. 
To conclude, a “best practice” scenario for incremental technology RBSOs contains two phases. As 
argued, to overcome the credibility threshold, the firms basically depend on soft funding schemes. 
Further, the additional acquiring of a strong financial investor to help fund the resource-intensive 
technology development itself is essential. After the credibility threshold, the RBSO becomes a valid 
investment object for more resourceful and value-adding investors such as VCs and CVCs. The 
scenario can be illustrated the following way: 
 
Figure 9 - Scenario 3: Incremental technology -based RBSOs 
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 Scenario 4: Disruptive technology RBSOs 6.4
Companies A, D, E, F, G, H  
To recapitulate, this type of RBSO, similarly to the previous type, requires considerable resources to 
develop the concept into commercial products or services, but has a lower concept maturity. The 
RBSO will typically develop a disruptive technology that often addresses more unclear market needs 
(Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). It is considered as the type of RBSO with largest uncertainty but 
highest growth potential (Shane, 2004). For the sample of case firms, this description suited five of 
the firms: A, D, E F, G and H. 
The initial core entrepreneurial team of three of these firms consisted of a research team or a group 
of professors containing 3-4 persons (A, D and E). The other three firms in the sample (F, G and H) 
consisted of a single researcher closely linked to the research institute where he initially worked. A 
common feature here was that the entrepreneurs had a very robust academic network and had 
strong support from their mother institutions when commercializing their research. This often leads 
to increased opportunity identification capability, strong both financial and organizational support 
from associated incubator and can significantly increase the credibility of the RBSO (Nosella and 
Grimaldi, 2009). Moreover, the strong anchoring in the local infrastructure made it easier to recruit 
additional technical competence, as well as acquiring guidance and organizational support using 
“privileged witnesses” (Vanaelst et al., 2006). As a result, this type of case firm often benefitted from 
strong cognitive diversity through larger entrepreneurial teams in the earliest stages and access to 
“privileged witnesses” to compensate for deficiencies related to market knowledge, and sales and 
marketing for example (Bjoernaali and Gulbrandsen, 2010). 
Assessing the case firms’ position in the stage-model, it appears that there are two sub-types of 
RBSOs in this category: firms overcoming the entrepreneurial commitment juncture and firms that 
did not. Included in the first type, companies A, D and E have all developed through the different 
stages and are presently situated in the growth stage. It was however not the initial entrepreneurial 
that took the firms pass the entrepreneurial commitment threshold. Indeed, the initial group of 
professors in companies A and D gradually stepped out of the venture itself, only participating part-
time on the technological development. Similarly, the research team behind company E was not the 
main drivers for developing the venture, but the PRI itself. For all three firms, external entrepreneurs 
and hired competence were acquired in order to overcome this critical juncture, while the initial 
entrepreneurs gradually returned to their academic careers and research activities. The three firms 
passed the credibility juncture very early due to the previously presented strong support from their 
PRI. The sustainability threshold took however a varying time to overcome for these three firms, as 
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for example company D has been situated in the growth stage over several years, while company E 
just managed to overcome this critical juncture. Company F correspondingly overcame both the 
entrepreneurial commitment juncture and the credibility threshold, but was then more or less 
successfully sold during the start-up stage.  
Included in the second type, companies G and H never managed to overcome the entrepreneurial 
commitment juncture. Both researchers were closely linked to their PRI, and continued to work there 
part-time along the venture. The researchers were only committed to developing the technology 
itself and did not seek to recruit the needed competence and entrepreneurial will to develop the firm 
itself. Both these ventures have still not surpassed this juncture, and the firms can today more or less 
be considered as “living-dead”, as the researchers have entirely returned to their research careers, 
while the legal entities and associated intellectual property still exist. 
Assessing the different funding sources, a pattern emerges. In fact, all 4 firms that managed to 
overcome the credibility juncture used a combination of soft and SA as main funding source in the 
pre-seed and seed stage, while a mix of VC and CVC constituted the main funding sources pass these 
stages. The high use of soft and SA as funding sources in the early stages is not surprising. The use of 
soft funding is clearly linked to the strong anchoring in the mother PRI, which make it easier to 
acquire funds from governmental schemes together with the strong incubator support. Additionally, 
empirical evidence showed that RBSOs with global growth ambitions were the ones having the best 
impressions from IN and RCN. Furthermore, the early use of SA funding covers an especially 
important feature when introducing a disruptive technology, namely legitimacy (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996). Tying the technology to established firms and making them spend resources on 
it gives increased credibility. Further, SA funding provides many value-adding activities that are 
essential for this type of RBSO to succeed, such as “market intelligence” and access to facilities. 
Further, the mix of VC and CVC in the later stages is sensible. Indeed, developing a disruptive 
technology requires a considerable amount of resources, amounts that practically only VC and CVC 
can provide (Lerner, 2004). Moreover, to successfully introduce a disruptive technology in the 
market, substantial activities besides the development of the technology itself are needed. This is 
certainly why this type of RBSO is commonly described as the VC-backed venture, together with the 
often high growth potential (Shane, 2004). The value-adding activities VCs and CVCs can provide is 
essential for the disruptive technology-development RBSOs. Especially the efforts they bring into 
building an investor group, whom often lead to this mix of VC and CVC together, and the fill in on the 
management teams, are particularly valuable (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). 
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Moreover, company D and F had small contributions from a BA in the pre-seed stage. For both 
companies, these contributions were considered essential for the early development of the firm. For 
company D, the importance of the contributions was more linked to the value-adding competence 
the BA provided. For company F, the contributions were solely financial, and the BA was more of a 
Lotto investor (Sørheim and Landström, 2001). 
Between the two firms that did not overcome the entrepreneurial commitment juncture, solely soft 
funding was used, mostly through incubator funding from the PRI itself. It is evident that without 
entrepreneurial commitment, other funding sources are hard to acquire. 
Not surprisingly, companies A, D, E and F were assessed to have highly performed. Besides company 
F that was successfully sold, the 3 other companies constitute the case firms in the sample with 
highest overall growth and most jobs created. Companies G and H are today merely “living dead” 
firms, and were assessed to have performed badly. 
Ultimately, the key to high performance for these firms was shown to be overcoming the 
entrepreneurial commitment juncture. All of these firms were strongly anchored in the PRIs, thus 
received substantial support in the earliest stages from the mother institution, which led to the 
attainment of sufficient soft and SA funding to surpass the credibility threshold. The successful firms 
were then later shown to attract a mix of VCs and CVCs, as they potentially constituted very valuable 
investment objects.  
With such a definite pattern between funding sources and performance, the “best practice” scenario 
for the disruptive technology-development firms is rather given. As argued, soft funding and SA gave 
the legitimacy and resources needed to overcome the credibility threshold. CVCs and VCs were later 
considered indispensable to fund the considerable resources, financial and organizational, needed to 
introduce the disruptive technology to the market. 
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Figure 10 - Scenario 4: Disruptive technology -based RBSOs 
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 Conclusion 7
This thesis has combined deep theoretical understanding on RBSOs with extensive empirical 
evidence from a set of case studies, and attempted to clarify the connection between choice of 
funding and subsequent performance. The value-adding resources provided by each type of funding 
source have additionally been linked with the initial resources possessed by the entrepreneurial 
team. Moreover, collected perceptions and preferences of academic entrepreneurs have been 
presented and analyzed. Due to the largely heterogeneous nature of RBSOs, the environment 
surrounding this type of start-up is complex, and many factors have been taken into account when 
trying to understand their development processes. The authors have attempted to introduce several 
theoretical frameworks in order to reduce this complexity, and further provide suitable tools for 
presenting and analyzing the empirical evidence. Hopefully, this made the understanding of RBSOs 
and the topics brought forward in this thesis easier to grasp for the reader. 
In the end, a conceptual scenario model of “best practice” has been created in order to analyze the 
empirical evidence in a comprehensive and enlightening way. Four scenarios named after the 
different types of RBSOs have been illustrated by graphical models after a thorough analytical 
discussion, and constitute one of the main contributions of this thesis. 
Suggestions for further research 
As emphasized throughout the thesis, there are a large number of factors influencing the 
development processes of RBSOs, and the study field is waste. The topics that were promoted in this 
paper are complex, and require further theoretical work in order to reduce the intricacy. Therefore, 
the authors would like to call for the development of more comprehensive theoretical frameworks 
that can ease future studies on RBSO performance. 
Moreover, the empirical case studies performed were limited to a rather specific context. Evidently, 
the Norwegian context possesses many particularities that are hard to generalize, and the chosen 
industry context only increased the specificity of the study. To achieve consistence and deeper 
understanding of the topics in this thesis, studies that include RBSOs present in all are required. 
Further, comparative studies with other countries are needed to provide more generalizable results. 
Lastly, policymakers have an increasingly important role in supporting the initial commercialization 
process of research. This study distinguished soft funding schemes to some degree. However, to 
construct a set of support activities that optimally helps the commercialization of research, an in-
depth study of the impact of individual funding schemes on the subsequent performance of RBSOs is 
necessary. 
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 Appendixes 9
 The FORNY Program 9.1
FORNY (Forskningsbasert Nyskapning) is a joint program between the Research Council of Norway 
(RCN) and Innovation Norway (IN), and is considered the main support mechanism for 
commercialization of public-funded research in Norway. It was established as a project within the 
RCN in 1995 and became an independent program in 2000. The FORNY program was officially 
terminated in 2010 and replaced by a new program, the FORNY2020 program. As all cases in the 
selection were founded before the new program was put into action, the old FORNY program will be 
presented, followed by a brief summary of the main improvements in the new program. 
The overall objective of the FORNY program is to increase wealth creation in Norway through 
commercialization of research-based business ideas with high value creation potential (RCN, 2009). 
In order to achieve this, the program has two strategic target areas (Borlaug et al., 2009): 
• To establish an infrastructure to lower barriers towards commercialization at the research 
institutions. 
• To professionalize the commercialization process aiming at increasing both the number and 
the quality of commercialization projects. 
The theoretical rationale of the FORNY program is the perceived “gap” between academic research 
and industry, and the need for facilitating processes that may lead to increased commercialization of 
academic research. In this context, the main objective of FORNY is to contribute to the development 
of the system by supporting organizations that may serve as intermediaries, to contribute to bridge 
the gap between academic research and industry, and to provide economic resources adequate for 
stimulating processes of commercialization (Borlaug et al., 2009). 
Rather than targeting researchers and entrepreneurs directly, the FORNY program works through the 
technology transfer offices (TTOs) of research institutions as well as other commercialization units 
such as innovation companies and science parks. The resources for running the program are provided 
by several Norwegian ministries and Innovation Norway. The Ministry of Trade and Industry is by far 
the most significant provider of funding with more than fifty percent of the total budget (Borlaug et 
al., 2009). From an initial budget of 27 million NOK in 1995, the budget in 2011 amounted to 107 
million NOK (RCN, 2011b). In total, during the period 1995- 2011 the program received about 1,3 
billion NOK (Rasmussen and Gulbrandsen, 2009, RCN, 2011a) An illustration of the FORNY program 
organization is given below. 
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Figure 11 – Appendix 1 - Organization of the FORNY Program 
The staff of the FORNY program is organized as a small secretariat within the RCN. The main task of 
the secretariat is to allocate resources to organizations that are approved for participating in the 
program, and to serve as a coordinating body for information exchange and strategic development of 
the program (Borlaug et al., 2009). 
Most of FORNY´s budget is channeled through the TTOs, and is distributed among four different 
funding schemes and one incentive scheme. A brief overview of the different schemes is presented 
below (Gulbrandsen and Rasmussen, 2012): 
• The infrastructure funds allow the research institutions to apply for funds to include 
commercialization as part of their strategies, to increase awareness and knowledge about 
patenting and commercialization, and to stimulate the search for commercialization 
possibilities. FORNY covers up to fifty percent of total costs. 
• The commercialization funds award the TTOs with a lump-sum grant based on annual 
application. FORNY covers up to fifty percent of the costs of specific commercialization 
projects up to licensing or firm establishment, excluding product development costs. 
• The proof of concept funds are awarded only to TTOs already receiving commercialization 
funds, and are granted to prioritized projects to support product development. The funding 
decision is based on a panel evaluation of submitted applications. 
• The leave of absence grant is designed to support researchers to commercialize an idea 
through covering from twenty to hundred percent of the employment cost of the researcher. 
• The incentive funds award the TTOs with an annual bonus depending on the performance of 
start-ups and licenses regarding several qualitative criteria. 
 
A major challenge for the assessment of the results and performance of government programs such 
as FORNY is to find relevant indicators. These indicators could for example be the number of 
commercializations and corresponding exits, the number of jobs created, the total turnover created 
or more qualitative indicators such as number of organized commercialization seminars and 
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corresponding number of participants (Gulbrandsen and Rasmussen, 2012). To provide a picture of 
FORNY´s performance since its inception, some indicators are given below based on numbers 
provided by the FORNY secretariat. 
• From 1995 to 2011, FORNY facilitated the creation of 436 start-ups. 
• Over the years 1995 to 2011, the accumulated value created is estimated to 2,2 billion NOK, 
where Opera Software accounted for 827 million NOK. 
• In 2011, the value created by all the FORNY start-ups amounted to 573 million NOK, where 
Opera Software accounted for 454 million NOK. 
• The total number of employees in 2011 amounted to 1245 distributed among 158 firms that 
reported these figures to the Brønnøysund Register Center, where Opera Software 
accounted for 310 employees (these figures are not mandatory to submit, hence figures are 
only indicative). 
The FORNY program has been evaluated several times during its existence, last time in 2009 by NIFU. 
This report concluded that the FORNY program has succeeded in its goals, but measurable results 
such as number of patents and start-ups have been modest compared to international results. The 
report also pointed out that most of the start-ups had low growth potential (RCN, 2011b). As stated 
previously, the FORNY program was replaced in 2010 by a new program, the FORNY2020 program. 
The new program is essentially similar to the old, but emphasizes on the proof of concept activities 
with increased pre-seed funding and closer monitoring of commercialization projects in the early 
stages. This resulted in a change of focus for the program, from building up the commercialization 
units to promoting the commercialization projects with highest value creation potential. 
Furthermore, the infrastructure and commercialization funds are now awarded only to the 
commercialization units and on a multiannual basis, giving more financial power and predictability to 
the TTOs (RCN, 2011b). 
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 Cases in the Selection 9.2
In the following, a better description is given of all cases in the thesis. As the contents of the 
interviews are confidential, the authors have chosen to give a more thorough background in this 
appendix so that the reader can get more information on the companies.  
 
Table 16 – Appendix 2 -  Overwiew over the tables in the appendix 
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Table 2.1 – Main facts: Company A 114 
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Table 2.4 – Main facts Company D 118 
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Table 2.12 – Main facts: Company L 126 
Table 2.13 – Main facts: Company M 127 
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Table 2.15 – Main facts: Company O 129 
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Company A 
Table 2-1 – Main facts: Company A 
Company A 
Employees 60 
Area Trondheim 
Age 9 
Start-up Year 2004 
Institution of origin University 
Business Area Petroleum 
Type Disruptive Technology –based RBSO 
Stage Growth 
Funding Sources Internal, Soft, VC, CVC, SA 
 
Company A is a product from the school of entrepreneurship. As part of the school’s program, 
students are required to start up their own company. The founding team behind company A was 
therefore a combination of four students of the university and two professors who had worked on 
the technology in their research.  
The company was founded in 2004, but it did not develop much until 2006 when they were granted 
support from the PETROMAX program from the Norwegian Research Council. Through this program, 
the founders were given funding for a two-year project grated that they could find an industrial 
partner. After several rounds of discussion, CVC (A) agreed to participate in the project provided they 
would be allowed to invest in the company and also brought along VC (A).  
The development during the first year and a half of the project was slow. However during the 
autumn of 2008 and shortly into 2009 the company started to form and the entrepreneurs got a 
better idea of where they wanted to take the company. However, CVC (A) went through substantial 
internal changes at the same time due to a fusion with another large company. This resulted in 
reorganization internal in CVC (A) and company A suddenly found that the ownership disappeared. In 
addition, the funding through the PETROMAX-program ended in 2008 and they realized that they 
needed to generate revenues. As a result, they hired a CEO who had substantial commercial 
experience. Shortly after hiring a new CEO, the target market was redefined from national to 
international. A subsidiary was established in Houston. 
In 2011, the company was split into three separate subsidiaries, targeting the energy-, financial and 
medical sector. This was because an industrial actor within the oil-business was interested in a 
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sponsorship of the technology. The founders of company A wanted to keep open the option of 
developing their technology into other markets without any involvement from this SA.  
In 2012, the company reached sustainable sales in their operations. Mainly, they target the onshore 
oil business, and get access to offshore markets through their SA.  
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Company B 
Table 2-2 – Main facts: Company B 
Company B 
Employees N/A 
Area Trondheim 
Age N/A 
Start-up Year 2005 
Institution of origin University 
Business Area Petroleum 
Type Incremental technology –based RBSOs 
Stage Start-up (but never crossed the Critical 
juncture of entrepreneurial commitment) 
Funding Sources Internal 
 
Company B started up in 2005. A professor at a university was to participate in another project by a 
network contact. He declined the offer on the other project, but upon request he offered them the 
technology behind company B. The professor himself did not have the time to participate, but a 
student of his had started to develop the technology. She had however no interest in the business-
aspect of the company. This start-up was after the change in regulations, which led the TTO at the 
university to claim some ideas. In addition, researchers from another institute at the university were 
engaged in the project. Unfortunately, the project never developed from the idea-stage, and after a 
few years the TTO wanted out. The professor bought the TTO out and dissolved the company shortly 
after.  
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Company C 
Table 2-3 – Main facts: Company C 
Company C 
Employees 2 
Area Trondheim 
Age 12 
Start-up Year 2001 
Institution of origin Research Institution 
Business Area Petroleum 
Type Innovative Product –based RBSO 
Stage Stagnated at Start-up (but never crossed the 
Critical juncture of entrepreneurial 
commitment and threshold of credibility) 
Funding Sources Internal, Soft, SA 
 
Company C was started in 2001 in order to commercialize technology and knowledge created at the 
research institution. All the founders were either employed at the research institution or at the 
nearby university. From start-up there has been several development projects funded by the 
Norwegian Research Council as well as Joint industry projects. In addition they have exploited the 
opportunity of having a university nearby to write their doctoral thesis for them. Today, the company 
has two market-ready products and one product in development.  
The level of ambition among the founders was rather low in the earliest years. As a result, the 
company stagnated in the start-up stage. In 2011 however, a new CEO with substantial commercial 
experience was hired and has started the process of developing the company into growth and the 
ambition level changed drastically. In addition to increased growth ambitions, the company is also 
seeking external funding in order to finance the growth.  
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Company D 
Table 2-4 – Main facts: Company D 
Company D 
Employees 16-24 
Area Trondheim 
Age 11 
Start-up Year 2002 
Institution of origin University 
Business Area Petroleum 
Type Incremental technology –based RBSOs 
Stage Growth 
Funding Sources Internal, Soft, BA, VC, CVC 
 
Company D was founded by four professors along with a BA and a lawyer. Their product targets the 
petroleum and shipping markets. During the years the company has cooperated close with several 
industrial actors. Their ambitions are to become a global actor and a large company.  
The company was founded in 2002 in order to avoid the coming legal regulations on intellectual 
properties developed at a university, but had to take several rounds with their TTO in the earliest 
stages. In 2005, the company wanted to grow further and found that in order to test their technology 
they needed specifications and a collaborative partner. Therefore they did an emission which led to 
the entrance of CVC (D). Additionally, the company moved out of their locales at the university and 
into their own. From 2006 and further on, the company continued to grow in their international 
market, a lot due to close cooperation with their CVC. The CVC provided regulation in which their 
operators had to comply with which led to an incentive for the operators to use the technology of 
Company D.  
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Company E 
Table 2-5 – Main facts: Company E 
Company E 
Employees 21 
Area Stavanger 
Age 1 (9, 9) 
Start-up Year 2011 (2004, 2004) 
Institution of origin Research Institution 
Business Area Petroleum 
Type Disruptive Technology -based Company 
Stage Growth 
Funding Sources Soft, VC, CVC, SA 
 
Company E is a particular company in that it was established in 2011 in order to operate the 
technologies of two companies (E1 and E2). For the representation in this thesis, it was decided to 
only use the operating company, but the historical development follows the companies E1 and E2 as 
this is where the properties is stored today. The process is quite similar for both companies. Both 
companies sprung out of a research institution in Stavanger where they wanted to develop the 
technology further than the research institution was able to.  
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Company F 
Table 2-6 – Main facts: Company F 
Company F 
Employees N/A 
Area Stavanger 
Age N/A 
Start-up Year 1997 
Institution of origin Research Institution 
Business Area Petroleum 
Type Disruptive technology –based RBSO 
Stage Dissolved (Start-up) 
Funding Sources Internal, Soft, BA, SA 
 
The idea behind the technology of Company F was developed in 1995 by the founder while he was 
between jobs. It was patented in 1996 right before the founder was hired by the research institution 
in Stavanger. The costs of filing the patent were covered by an American investor who wanted to be 
named as co-investor on the filings in return.   
The technology behind company F is an alternative to more used procedures of re-injection and 
hydro cyclones. Development happened through several projects and several industrial actors were 
included in this process. The first JIP, finished in 1998, was a success and was followed by an emission 
in order to acquire further funding. The technology was licensed out to an industrial actor. The next 
test did not turn out remotely close in results. It was however discovered that they had received 
wrongful specifications and another JIP was done. In addition a company which specialized in 
injections and mixing equipment was incorporated. Meassures was made in order to commercialize 
the product. 
However, a competing patent was filed in 2004. In the end, the company was sold to the company 
that had filed for the competing patent.  Later on the company was incorporated into another 
company which furthermore was sold to a Canadian company. 
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Company G 
Table 2-7 – Main facts: Company G 
Company G 
Employees N/A 
Area Stavanger 
Age 9 
Start-up Year 2004 
Institution of origin Research Institution 
Business Area Petroleum 
Type Disruptive technology –based RBSO  
Stage Stuck-on-seed 
Funding Sources Soft 
 
Company G was started in 2004 by a single researcher that took a patent on a so-called “Smart 
water” solution, treatment of water in oil reservoirs. The special about his solution was its 
applicability to limestone reservoirs in particular, a type of reservoir that there only exists one of in 
Norway. The majority of the reservoirs in the Middle East are however of this type. Some research 
was done previously to the start-up, but much R&D remained. Today, the company is underfinanced 
and has not managed to develop the technology much further. 
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Company H 
Table 2-8 – Main facts: Company H 
Company H 
Employees N/A 
Area Stavanger 
Age 10 
Start-up Year 2003 
Institution of origin Research Institution 
Business Area Petroleum 
Type Disruptive technology –based RBSO 
Stage Stuck-on-seed 
Funding Sources Soft, SA 
 
Company H was started in 2003 by a single researcher that had a lot of experiencing with in-reservoir 
chemical treatment of water. He had no patent, but lots of expertise in modeling and implementing 
new disruptive technologies involving use of bacteria to solidify water around reservoirs. The 
researcher had performed a large amount of research on the subject before the company was 
created. The company had a test for a large field in Norway, but never managed to develop the firm 
beyond the initial test. Today, the company is underfinanced and has not managed to develop the 
technology much further.   
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Company I 
Table 2-9 – Main facts: Company I 
Company I 
Employees N/A 
Area Bergen 
Age N/A 
Start-up Year 2000 
Institution of origin PRI 
Business Area Petroleum 
Type Innovative Product –based RBSOs 
Stage Start-up 
Funding Sources Internal, Soft, BA, CVC 
 
Company I started with an idea the founder came across during a visit to an American science park in 
the middle of the 90’s. After a time of collaboration, adding seismic data to the model in USA and 
several trips back, he gained a non-exclusive license on this technology to target the oil and gas 
market in 1997. As the business model at the PRI in this case involves developing the idea at the PRI 
closer to market-readiness and much of the research was done before the RBSO was established. The 
research department of a large industrial company provided the seismic data. Further on this 
department became the main collaborative partner in the development process. Tests of the first 
prototype occurred in 1998/1999. 
The technology is a virtual technology program and subsequently was dependent on internet 
resources in order to work. However, at the time, the equipment necessary to run the technology 
was large and heavy. In addition, in order to promote the product the management had to travel to 
location to demonstrate. With the heavy equipment, this was a difficult process. It is important to 
note that this development happened in late 90s/early 2000s. Industrial interest for this technology 
was however relatively large on an international scale.  
The company was established in 2000 and sold again in 2002 as the founders had to make the choice 
between attracting funding for further development or selling the product in which the development 
could happen. This mainly concerned the commercial development of the company, in particular 
distribution channel and proper sales.  
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Company J 
Table 2-10 – Main facts: Company J 
Company J 
Employees N/A 
Area Bergen 
Age N/A 
Start-up Year 1997 
Institution of origin Univeristy 
Business Area Petroleum 
Type Incremental Technology –based RBSO 
Stage Growth 
Funding Sources Internal, Soft, SA 
 
The technology behind company J is a modelling of geological structures and petro-physical 
parameters that is translated into seismic models. It was started as a research project at a university 
with a larger development project as a combined effort between the NRC, industrial oil and gas 
companies and the university. As the projects ended, some of the researchers wanted to take the 
development farther and established the company in 1998. Through the incubator, the two founders 
was aided with strategic help towards starting the company, but the consulting help received was 
found to be more abstract than what was productive for the company.  
During the development process, also this company had a close cooperative relationship with a 
industrial partner. The process went well the first years, but as the drop in the oil prices occurred, 
and the income the founders had generated through consulting dried up. As a result, the company 
had financial troubles and as there had been no big effort in attracting funding for their project, the 
company struggled. They then made a royalty agreement with a research center who gained rights to 
the technology. All IP was transferred during the acquisition.  
Later on, the company name was transferred to a new start-up within a new field but with a different 
unit number and no connection to the first company.  
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Company K 
Table 2-11 – Main facts: Company K 
Company K 
Employees 22 
Area Oslo 
Age 15 
Start-up Year 1998 
Institution of origin PRI 
Business Area Renewable Energy 
Type Knowledge -Based RBSO 
Stage Growth 
Funding Sources Internal, Soft 
 
Company K was founded in 1998 as a consulting company spinning out from the local PRI. In the 
beginning, the parent organization was the main owner but had gradually pulled out of the company. 
The founders were all researchers at the institute.  
As this is a consulting company, there is a focus on competence and the employees have education 
within fields ranging from physical/fluid mechanics to meteorological and environmental. The 
company has several times won awards both on local and national level. Also this company was 
named a “gazelle” for 4 years. In 2010 a subsidiary was started in Sweden.   
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Company L 
Table 2-12 – Main facts: Company L 
Company L 
Employees 14 
Area Oslo 
Age 1996 
Start-up Year 17 
Institution of origin PRI 
Business Area Renewable Energy 
Type Knowledge-Based RBSO 
Stage Growth 
Funding Sources Internal, Debt, SA/CVC 
 
Company L offers a combined energy solution that combines several heating alternatives. The idea 
for the company came to the founder during a stay in the north of Norway. After moving back south, 
the founder further developed the idea. He was granted a position as Doc.ing. and through the PRI 
he had access to an incubator who helped with the establishment of the company. Through the 
FORNY program he was bought out of his position and never returned to this.  
As the development of the company continued, the founder sought external funding and as part of 
the technology relied on oil as a heating source, the natural partner was an actor within this field. 
This partner entered first as a SA, but the trade provided the SA with the option of later gaining 
owner shares, which they took later on. After a process and combined with the oil prices, it was 
decided that oil might not be the best energy source for the concept after all, and the then CVC 
pulled out. When the time came to develop hardware for their product, the process was funded 
through debt in a local bank.   
127 
 
Company M 
Table 2-13 – Main facts: Company M 
Company M 
Employees 5 
Area Oslo 
Age 14 
Start-up Year 1999 
Institution of origin University 
Business Area Petroleum 
Type Knowledge -based RBSOs 
Stage Growth 
Funding Sources Internal, Soft, SA 
 
One recently graduated student and one researcher from a university founded company M. The 
researcher had been involved in several collaborative projects between the industry and the 
university and subsequently had contacts through these. When the company was started, the 
founders therefore had a contract going in to the collaboration. Still the company keeps their close 
relation with the university in order to keep updated on the project.  
Apart from access to locales, the founders did most of the work themselves. One had family who has 
had great success with another start-up and has become an internationally leading company within 
this field, and another had lawyers within close family. The resulting activities in order to start up a 
company were mainly done by one of the founders who used resources available on internet to 
learn. The cooperation with the initial company has provided company M with further contracts, 
which is where their main income comes from.  
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Company N 
Table 2-14 – Main facts: Company N 
Company N 
Employees 0 
Area Oslo 
Age 13 
Start-up Year 2000 
Institution of origin N/A 
Business Area Renewable Energy 
Type Incremental Technology –based RBSO 
Stage Seed 
Funding Sources Internal, soft 
 
The founder of company N had little experience with this kind of technology and considers himself 
self-made. The idea is inspired by larger scale projects in mainly France and Russia and the founder 
has visited several sites in both countries and has collaborated with a Russian PRI on his idea. It was 
however no real interest from Norwegian PRIs in the projects. While some has been interested 
nothing has come from this. The technology is patented. In addition to the original founders, a 
previous incubator consultant is part of the board of this venture.  
Funding for this venture has proved difficult, as it has not been granted funding through the NRC. The 
idea was acknowledged by IN, but in order to get the funding from them, company N needs industrial 
partners.  Several international actors has been interested, but these are not accepted by IN. Shortly 
before the interview, an application was sent to a European fund. 
The family who owns this company also has a property in the north of Norway and through the 
holding company of this property; they have mainly funded company N. The university college 
located close to the property has shown interest in research following this idea.  
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Company O 
Table 2-15 – Main facts: Company O 
Company O 
Employees N/A 
Area Oslo 
Age 9 
Start-up Year 2004 
Institution of origin Other 
Business Area Renewable/Petroleum 
Type Incremental technology –based RBSO 
Stage Start-up 
Funding Sources Internal, Soft, BA, SA 
 
Company O was initially started in Trondheim in 2004 by a serial entrepreneur that had been 
involved in several relevant start-ups and established firms. Lack of funding led the firm to be sold in 
2009 to a BA situated in the Oslo area. The company was initially focusing solely on geothermic 
power generation, but later developed their solution for purposes useful to the oil and gas industry. 
He then made a SA with two large oil and gas industry partners, and managed to perform a feasibility 
study. The entrepreneur received salary from NCR to develop the technology. Today, they are 
situated at a university location in the Oslo area, where they rent facilities from the university itself. 
They are only a few employees now, but are planning to employ 6-9 persons during the following 
year. They have managed to achieve a new SA now and are aiming at achieving VC support next year. 
 
